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Welcome to the Guest Editors 
When I first spoke to Lesley Klaff about the possibility of JSA hosting 
ESA conference papers, I was not exactly certain what was involved. For 
several years, ESA’s roster of paper presentations was top notch and often 
included key conceptualizations not found elsewhere. I wanted to make 
certain that some of the field’s best thinkers were receiving their due. 
JSA was located in North America, ESA was located in Europe and the 
gap needed to be bridged. My appreciation to Karin Stoegner and her team 
for their perseverance in making such fine work available to others. The 
papers have in common a distinct European flavor—they are nuanced and 
contextual driven. Except for David Patterson, the authors are European 
offering their perspective from what has become ground zero in displays of 
the new antisemitism. 
Europe is also ground zero for the old antisemitism and the context of 
the Holocaust affords certain insights that North Americans have yet to 
fully understand. Perhaps an expanded research network can will afford 
new insights, new focus and new direction. Unfortunately, contemporary 
antisemitism is not a separate and distinct phenomenon unrelated to the 
antisemitism that culminated in the Holocaust. 
If we pay attention to the new breed of European antisemitism 
researchers, no one is doomed to “repeat the past.” Countering the 
resurgent, globalized anti-Jewish animus will return it to its less inciting 
political past viz., under the rock from which it came. 
STEVEN K BAUM, EDITOR 
SHIMON T SAMUELS, BOARD CHAIR 
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Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism 
In the Shadow of the Holocaust 
Karin Stoegner, Nicolas Bechter 
Lesley Klaff and Philip Spencer* 
This Special Issue of the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 
contains a collection of papers that were presented at the International 
Conference “Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism in the Shadow of the 
Holocaust”—the midterm conference of the Research Network on Ethnic 
Relations, Racism and Antisemitism within the European Sociological 
Association. The network was set up over a decade ago with the aim of 
addressing what was felt to be a serious gap in contemporary social theory, 
the continuing and indeed growing presence of antisemitism and its 
connection to other racisms. 
The conference was particularly important both in terms of venue and 
timing. In Vienna, as in Austria more generally, responsibility for National 
Socialism and the Holocaust was acknowledged officially only in the early 
1990s.  Before that, Austria’s master narrative was that it had been Hitler’s 
first victim. Those who are familiar with the situation in Austria, with the 
political as well as with the public discourse know that the past still heavily 
weighs on the present and that present discourses are in various ways 
infused by the past, which is commemorated in official events but not 
actually worked through. In Vienna, the actuality of National Socialism and 
related forms of antisemitism that are based on defensiveness against guilt 
can be felt at every turn, which was the reason for us to choose the focus on 
contemporary antisemitism in the shadow of the Holocaust as the focus for 
this conference. 
Today, the question of the actuality and prevalence of antisemitism 
has become a contested field within academia as well as in a broader public 
discourse. Debates are going on as to whether antisemitism today is to be 
regarded as a genuine structural feature of contemporary society or rather 
as a relic of an ideology which no longer has any relevance in 
contemporary Europe. Adherents of the latter position suggest that 
compared to the antisemitism of the Nazis and compared to the Holocaust, 
to speak of antisemitism today, at least in Western Europe, is an 
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exaggeration, a refusal to see how far Europe is no longer trapped in its old 
delusions and barbarism. As Robert Fine has argued in this narrative, 
“antisemitism is tucked away safely in Europe’s past, overcome by the defeat 
of fascism and the development of the European Union.” In this case, 
“antisemitism is remembered, but only as a residual trauma or a museum 
piece.”1 
The either/or logic that Robert Fine explicates is itself part of the 
problem: it reproduces the exclusive and unmediated juxtaposition of the 
past and the present and disregards the dialectical relationship between 
them. 
If antisemitism is exclusively identified with its genocidal form of 
National Socialism, latent forms of antisemitism simply go unrecognized. 
The continuity in the discontinuity is thereby disregarded, as is the 
possibility that latent forms of antisemitism, even if they are not identical to 
the genocidal kind may nevertheless be connected to it in important 
respects. 
There is a perhaps particularly strong tendency in Germany and 
Austria, as the post-Nazi countries, to deal with antisemitism only as an 
historical issue. The task of coming to terms with the Nazi past is narrowed 
down here to commemorating antisemitism and the Holocaust as mere 
historic incidents and as questions only of historical responsibility that has 
to be met by Germany or Austria as successor states of National Socialism. 
But a consequence of this is that antisemitism is thereby seen as something 
for museums rather than viewed as a problem of today’s societies. This 
becomes evident in the vast number of publications and events, both 
academic and also dedicated to a broader public audience, which deal with 
antisemitism from a purely historical perspective that lacks any connection 
to contemporary forms of antisemitism. Antisemitism is analyzed from an 
external perspective, from the shielding distance of 70 years after the defeat 
of Nazi terror – the past is seen as self-contained and the Holocaust 
remembered as an incident that happened “once upon a time.” After 1945 
and more particularly antisemitism in our contemporary societies, however, 
is far less often made a topic for conferences, events and scholarly 
publications. 
This reassuring narrative that remembers antisemitism as a relic of 
bygone times disregards what Walter Benjamin, the great critic of 
historiography, called the correspondence between the past and the present: 
that we never remember the past itself, but that memory is always an 
1. Robert Fine, “Fighting with phantoms: A contribution to the debate of
antisemitism in Europe” Patterns of Prejudice, 43:5 (2009), 463 
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expression of the past in the present.2 For Benjamin, memory’s central task 
therefore is to look closely at the marks the past has left in the present. 
Then we may realize that contemporary antisemitism, far from being a 
mere relic of bygone times, exhibits some continuity with Nazi ideology in 
contemporary societies, a “survival of National Socialism within 
democracy”, which Adorno considered “to be potentially more menacing 
than the survival of fascist tendencies against democracy.”3 
From this perspective, the Nazi past is not a closed chapter in the 
history book of civilization but spills over to the present. This can be seen 
in the prevalence of secondary antisemitism that occurs with explicit as 
well as latent reference to National Socialism in order to legitimize it and in 
order to deflect from guilt. So if we take the meaning of working through 
the past seriously, the way Adorno elaborated on it, we need to stress that 
antisemitism today is not to be viewed as a remnant of the past but has its 
very strong roots in contemporary society; we need to think not just about 
National Socialism, but also about the conditions that made it possible. In 
as much as these conditions are not overcome, the past still infuses the 
present. Contemporary antisemitism needs to be analyzed in the shadow of 
the Holocaust. 
This is exactly what the authors of this special issue do: from different 
perspectives, from different backgrounds, by reference to different cases 
they analyze how contemporary antisemitism relates to the Holocaust and 
how this connection can be tackled in theory and praxis. 
The papers in the first section explore Holocaust remembrance in 
different contexts and in different countries. The papers either explore 
theoretical concepts or are approaches. Julia Edthofer discusses how the 
postcolonial debates on antisemitism and anti-Muslim racism are shaped by 
remembrance of the Holocaust and the colonial and how they both refer to 
an anti-Israel view on the Middle East conflict. Evelyn Goodman-Thau, 
also in a theoretical paper, describes the role of myth and messianism in 
discourses of Holocaust remembrance. Elke Rajal embeds her study of 
Holocaust education in Austria in Adorno’s theory of society and 
remembrance. 
The next two papers deal with postwar antisemitism in Germany. 
Holger Knothe asks, if there has been a qualitative change in antisemitic 
resentment and considers the extent to which we can justify talk of a “new 
antisemitism”. Ljiljana Radonic describes the antisemitic experiences of a 
 
 2.  Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History” in Selected Writings Vol. 4 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press 2003). 
 3.  Theodor W. Adorno, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” in Critical 
Models. Interventions and Catchwords, translated and with a preface by Henry W. Pickford 
(New York: Columbia University Press 1998), 90. 
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Jewish woman within the women’s movement in the 1980s and antisemitic 
tropes in a certain string of protestant, feminist theology. Finishing with 
Judith Butler she explores such continuities in queer theory. 
The second section deals with three case studies of current and historic 
forms of antisemitism in Sweden, Poland and Austria. Anna Sarri Krantz 
interviews a schoolgirl in the context of Sweden’s political antisemitism 
and laws designed to prevent anti-Jewish incidents. Alina Cala analyses 
Polish and the Jewish competitive victimhood, anti-Zionism during the 
communist era, and its reappearance in its contemporary forms of 
antisemitism and Holocaust denial. Karen Frostig describes the burdens 
and problems she faced when trying to organize an art project on Holocaust 
remembrance in Vienna and thus confronted Austrians with their Nazi-past. 
The articles in the third section deal with antisemitism and Holocaust 
remembrance or Holocaust denial in the Middle East. The first two papers 
concern Iran. Andreas Benl asks what western, leftist thinkers found so 
appealing in the writings of Ayatollah Khomeini and how this can be 
explained with the concept of cultural relativism. Stephan Grigat explores 
the important role of Holocaust denial and hatred against Israel in Iran’s 
state ideology and points out that also under president Rouhani this 
ideology is central in the formulation of Iran’s foreign policy. David 
Patterson describes current jihadist groups as the most violent and most 
aggressive antisemitic political groups. In the last paper, Esther Webman 
analyzes how public discourse on the Holocaust in the Palestinian 
territories changed in the 1990s, with an acknowledgement of the 
Holocaust on the one hand, but also a questioning of its uniqueness. 
The guest editors of this Special Issue of the Journal for the Study of 
Antisemitism are grateful to its editor Steven Baum for enabling us to 
present these papers to a wider audience. Our hope is that, in addition to the 
light they shine on a set of issues in this particular context, they may also 
give some indication of the ongoing work done by colleagues in the 
research network itself, as we seek to fill a serious gap in our collective 
understanding of a phenomenon whose continued and indeed growing 
presence in the modern world should alarm us all. 
Karin Stoegner,  
Nicolas Bechter,  
Lesley Klaff ,  
Philip Spencer 
Vienna, December, 2015 
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* Karin Stoegner teaches social theory and topics related to gender, antisemitism 
and nationalism at the University of Vienna. She has carried out numerous 
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Lancaster University and Georgetown University (Washington DC). All her work 
focuses on Critical Theory. Karin is board member of the Research network on 
Ethnic Relations, Racism and Antisemitism within the European Sociological 
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Historisch-gesellschaftliche Konstellationen (Nomos, 2014) and the Handbook of 
Prejudice (Ed., Cambria Press, 2009). 
Nicolas Bechter is a PhD student at the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Vienna and is currently working in a research project on 
“Antisemitism as a political strategy and the development of Democracy. The Case 
of the Austrian Parliament 1945-2008” Nico held a research fellowship at the 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem and focuses his research on political theory, 
parliamentarianism, antisemitism and critical theory. Nico is also a member of the 
research group FIPU (http://www.fipu.at). 
Lesley Klaff is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Sheffield Hallam University and is an 
affiliate professor of law at Haifa University. She is an associate editor for the 
Journal for the Study of Antisemitism and a member of the editorial advisory 
committee of the International Journal of the Social Research Foundation. She 
serves on the Academic Advisory Board of the Louis D. Brandeis Center for 
Human Rights under Law and the Berlin International Center for the Study of 
Antisemitism. She is also a member of UK Lawyers for Israel (UKLFI). 
Philip Spencer is Emeritus Professor in Holocaust and Genocide Studies at 
Kingston University and a Visiting Professor in Politics at Birkbeck, where he is 
also an Associate of the Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism.  He is the 
author of Genocide since 1945 (Routledge 2102), of Nationalism: A Critical 
Introduction (Sage 2002),  and of Nations and Nationalism (Edinburgh University 





Antisemitic Incidents from Around the World 
July–Dec 2015: A Selected List 
 
 
—Antisemitism gone amok.   
JULY 
Zurich 7/4/15  A Jewish man leaving a local synagogue was attacked by a 
member of the neo-Nazi band Amok. 
Paris 7/7/15 A visibly Jewish 13 year-old boy was beaten and robbed 
outside his school by six young men, who physically assaulted him while 
one shouted “take that, dirty Jew!” 
San Jose, Costa Rica 7/11/15 Jews and non-Jews demonstrated for peace in 
Israel. At the same time, during this event, a group of Palestinians also 
demonstrated. The demonstrators supporting the Palestinians began to 
shout things such as “Jews sons of bitches, murderers Jews, returned the 
land . . .” 
Paris 7/15/15 A Jewish family was assaulted and robbed in their suburban 
Paris home, injuring two parents and their daughter. 
Menton, Fr 7/19/15 Menton’s rabbbi was hit in the back and insulted by an 
Italian-speaking man. 
London 7/30/15 A visibly Jewish man was physically and verbally 
assaulted with antisemitic slurs outside a synagogue. 
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AUGUST 
Berlin 8/6/15 Antisemitic slogans were sprayed on a mural that depicts an 
Israeli flag superimposed over a German flag on a section of the former 
Berlin Wall.   
Columa, Ukraine, Uzhgoorod, Ukraine, Nyiregyhaza, Hungary 8/8/15 A 
mausoleum of the Jewish community located in a city park on Chekhov 
Street was set on fire. Nineteen headstones were vandalized as well in the 
Ukraine and in Hungary, a Holocaust memorial monument was destroyed. 
San Antonio 8/18/15 The city’s second largest synagogue Congregation 
Agudas Achim, was vandalized with anti-Semitic graffiti less than a week 
after another city synagogue and its neighborhood were similarly attacked. 
Linda Moad, executive director of the Conservative congregation, said the 
employee found two grills missing along with the words “Jew Jew” 
sprayed onto the structure. The previous Wednesday anti-Semitic graffiti 
was  spray-painted with swastikas and references to the Ku Klux Klan  at 





Lisbon 9/1/15 The Jewish Community of Porto, Portugal quashed a bill 
designed to reinstate a Jewish  army captain who had been fired and libeled 
because of his outreach to Sephardic Jews. The lawmakers who submitted 
the bill to rehabilitate Arthur Carlos Barros Basto withdrew it earlier this 
month ahead of a vote at the National Assembly after the Jewish 
community complained that it was discriminatory. The bill failed to bring 
closure to Barro Basto’s case, the community and some of his descendants 
argued, because it offered none of the financial compensation given to non-
Jewish officers who had been reinstated following persecution by the pro-
fascist dictatorship of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. The community wrote 
recently to parliament members, “Contrary to the general law of the land, 
applicable to all cases of reinstatement—this special law deplorably and 
scandalously excludes a Jew and his family.” 
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   Just in Time for the Holidays! 
Norway’s DNB issues Antisemitic Credit Cards 
 
Oslo 9/2/15 A major Norwegian bank that issued a credit card decorated 
with an anti-Semitic caricature has apologized and canceled the card. The 
Israeli advocacy group Hallelu published on Facebook Monday a photo of 
the credit card, issued by DNB to one Alexander Joseph Beckett, showing 
an ugly, large-nosed Jew wearing a black coat and prayer shawl and 
smiling at a background of gold coins. “We looked at the case immediately, 
and found out that this was produced due to a system we have where clients 
can upload their own pictures and get them printed on their card,” 
explained Even Westerveld, the bank’s executive vice president for 
communications. 
Manchester 9/5/15 Three males physically assaulted and shouted 
antisemitic comments at a group of four Jewish males. One victim, a 17-
year-old, received serious injuries and was hospitalized.  
Brussels 9/6/15 The European Jewish Congress called for the suspension of 
a Maltese European Union employee who is accused of hitting and 
attempting to strangle another EU worker while shouting anti-Semitic hate 
speech. European Commission worker Stefan Grech allegedly assaulted the 
50-year-old Italian woman in July, hitting her in the face with a metal plate 
bearing the portrait of Benito Mussolini, the Italian leader who was a 
wartime ally of Germany’s Adolf Hitler. During the incident, which 
occurred at a Brussels café at around midnight, Grech called the woman a 
“dirty Jew,” asserting that “Hitler should have killed all the Jews,” 
according to a complaint filed against him with local police by the Belgian 
League Against Anti-Semitism, or LBCA. 
Amsterdam 9/7/15 Dutch police are investigating the brutal beating of an 
elderly Amsterdam Jewish couple. Diana Blog, 86, and her husband of 56 
years Shmuel, 87, are both Holocaust survivors. Diana has scars from being 
attacked by Auschwitz guard dogs.  The August 4 attack left Shmuel blind 
and with a broken thigh bone, and Diana suffering from “extreme pains,”  
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Both have been in a rehabilitation center in the month since the attack, and 
are now confined to wheelchairs. 
Eisenach, Germany 9/11/15  A memorial to the synagogue of Eisenach was 




Cordoba 10/11/15  As a gesture to join the BDS movement, the Izquierda 
Unida de España (United Left) party presented a proposal to city counsel 
erasing all Jewish history. 
Umeå Sweden 10/11/15 The Jewish community of Sweden was not invited 
to an annual anti-Nazi event commemorating Kristallnacht due to a 
perceived security risk, the Swedish newspaper Norrköpings Tidningar 
reported.   
 
—Malmo Muslims call for Jewish blood. 
  
Concepción del Uruguay Argentina, 10/17/15 Jewish cemetery desecrated. 
Malmo 10/19/15 A large anti-Israel demonstration last Sunday in 
Sweden featured calls to “slaughter the Jews” and chants praising the 
stabbing of innocent Israelis. 
Athens 10/21/15  The main Jewish cemetery was spray painted with 
swastikas and antisemitic graffiti including the phrase “F*** Jews” 
Marseilles 10/24/15 A rabbi and two Jewish worshipers were stabbed 
outside a synagogue by an attacker shouting antisemitic slurs. 
 
NOVEMBER 
Rochdale, UK  11/9/15 A trustee of a charity called the Ghulam Mustafa 
Trust has made a video in which he claims Jews track Samsung 
smartphones by implanting secret devices in the handsets. . .  Peeling off 
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what appears to be a tracking system, he adds: ‘You should take that off 
because they are recording every photograph of yours, these ‘Fucking 
Jews. You should take this off. Look at that, they should not be on your 
phone battery.’ The Charity Commission demanded that the video be 
removed from Facebook. 
Jerusalem 11/10/15 The Shin Bet security service on Wednesday published 
the transcript of an interrogation of two cousins aged 11 and 14 from East 
Jerusalem who went on a stabbing rampage two weeks ago and wounded a 
light rail security guard. The 11-year-old, a sixth grader from Shuafat, is 
the youngest assailant arrested to date in the current upsurge of Palestinian 
terrorism. He is too young to face charges under current Israeli law; the 14-
year-old is facing charges of attempted murder. 
Gdansk, Poland 11/11/14 someone painted the word “thieves” and the 
David Star with a swastika on vb #veganburgers restaurant in Jesionowa 
Street. This is second attack during two weeks on this place.  
Melbourne  11/12/15  A Jewish man was injured when he was punched in 
the neck and called a “fucking Jew” on the corner of Carlisle. 
New York 11/12/15  Pro-Palestinian groups participating in a student 
protest against tuition increases at the City University of New York are 
blaming the high cost of education on “Zionists.” 
Milan 11/13/15  Natan Graff,  a 40-year-old Jewish man was stabbed 
Thursday night  near the kosher restaurant “Carmel.” 
Krakow 11/13/15  Protesters, during the nationalists far-right march on 
Polish Independence Day painted nine corpses-like silhouettes upon the 
pavement close to Krakow’s Ethnographic Museum.  
 
 
Jew as Syrian?  Wroclaw, Poland Nov. 18, 2015 
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Wroclaw, 11/18/15  Hundreds of Polish protesters demonstrated against the 
influx of Syrian migrants in front of city hall in the southwestern city of 
Wroclaw on Wednesday - by burning an effigy of an Orthodox Jew. 
London 11/18/15 University of London’s  School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS) displayed pictures of terrorists who murdered innocent 
Israeli civilians plastered around the entrance to the campus. The event 
titled “Vigil for Palestinian Martyrs” was attended by around 150 people 
and held on the main university steps. 
Marseilles 11/18/15 A Jewish schoolteacher was wounded in a stabbing 
attack in the southern French city of Marseilles on Wednesday night. The 
victim has been named as Tzion Saadon, a follower of Chabad in his 50s. 
Tel Aviv 11/22/ 15  The stabbing murder of Hadar Buchris Hy”d  brings to 
twenty-one the total of murders since the start of the current Arab terror 
surge. The total number of casualties evacuated to hospitals by Magen 
David Adom during this period is 213. 
 
DECEMBER 
Paris 12/7/15 A man on a train from Paris was caught on video saying: ”If 
only I had a grenade here, how do you call it, a fragmentation grenade, I 
would blow up this wagon with the f***ing Jewish bastards.” 
Bonneuil-sur-Marn Fr 12/14/15  Fourteen people attending in a synagogue 
were poisoned after the synagogue’s electronic lock was daubed with 
poison. 
Sochaczew, Pol 12/17/15 The Jewish cemetery was spray painted 
with graffiti saying  “Holocaust never happened,” “Allah bless Hitler,” 
“Islamic State was here,” “Islam will dominate,” and “F**k Jews.”  
Tehran 12/19/15 The city hall is offering a $50,000 prize for the 
best cartoon mocking the Holocaust, as part of the 11th Tehran 
International Cartoon Biennial to be held next June. 
Algiers 12/22/15 In a marching drill of the Algerian National Gendarmerie, 
soldiers chant: “Turn your guns  towards the Jews. . . in order to kill 
them. . . slaughter them. . . and skin them.” 
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Chigwell, UK 12/27/15 Police are investigating what is believed to be an 
antisemitic incident after a 91-year-old  man received his copy of the 
Jewish Chronicle covered in feces. 
London 12/29/15 Antisemitic attacks in London have increased by 61 per 
cent over the course of the last year, according to figures from the 
Metropolitan Police. Between November 2014 and November 2015, a total 
of 483 such crimes were committed, up from 299 during the same period of 
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Antisemitism After Auschwitz: 
Reflections on the Identity Politics of Myth, 
Memory and Messianism 
Eveline Goodman-Thau* 
The following essay offers an interdisciplinary reflection on the power of 
political myth in the dialectics of history, memory and messianism, inherent in 
the identity politics of Nazi ideology leading to the destruction of European 
Jewry during the Holocaust. Starting from the general problem of ‘Europe and 
the Jews’ in the secularization process of Western tradition, it proceeds to the 
question of historiography, in the dialectics of history, memory and morality, 
and calls for a political hermeneutics of culture. It proceeds to trace the roots 
of Nazi antisemitism, as part of the notion of Heilsgeschichte, with its ideal of 
self-sacrifice on the “Altar of History”, for the sake of a “New Order” and a 
“New Metaphysics”. By asking questions on the roots of modern antisemitism 
after Auschwitz, the essay deals, in a wider sense, with the human response to 
tragedy and Bauer’s notion of “the future of Europe as a community of 
interests between people who care for and respect each other’s legitimately 
different traditions. 
EUROPE AND THE JEWISH QUESTION 
The political and social upheavals of the last decade of the 20th 
century in Europe mark on the one hand the end of the East-West and 
Cold-War conflict as a last burden of World War II. At the same time they 
raise some serious and poignant questions regarding the past. It is 
becoming increasingly clear, that these questions will not be solved by 
mere social-economic answers, even if they were in the long run to offer 
positive prospects for the future. The political climate in many Western 
democracies struggling to meet the demands of a united Europe shows a 
growing concern with the diversities of opinion in terms of economic, 
social, and religiously orientated political solutions needed to mould post-
war Europe into a place where people can feel at ease and at home in a 
truly open society. 
The search for an ethos of a united and democratic Europe is closely 
linked with the loss of tradition, and thus of the historical-cultural 
consciousness in the secularisation process. Various societies have 
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experienced this in different ways in the course of the 18th and 19th 
centuries, culminating in the atrocities of two World Wars fought in almost 
every country on the continent and, under the cloak of war, resulting in the 
virtual destruction of European Jewry. 
After the failure of the emancipation of the Jews, and despite the 
partial integration of Wissenschaft des Judentums as an academic discipline 
in the 19th century, it becomes, after the Shoah of the 20th century, and 
particularly in the light of the presently alarming manifestations of a 
growing antisemitism in many parts of Europe, more than a mere scholarly 
mandate to search for a new orientation in Western Humanities and Social 
Studies. 
The question of the Jewish origin and its contribution to Western 
civilization and thought is part and parcel of 19th century historiography. It 
was then, in the wake of a historicism that tried to free religious canonical 
texts within the western Christian tradition of their dogmatic content and 
discover their historical roots, that a fundamental shift took place in 
modern Jewish consciousness as they struggled for emancipation and 
integration into Western societies. This shift affects the attitude towards the 
past, and is evident in terms of a strong desire to respond to the historical, 
political, social and cultural challenges posed by modernity. 
This essay tries to trace the roots of modern antisemitism through the 
power of political myths inherent in the dialectics of history, memory and 
messianism in Western tradition, as a response to the intellectual crisis of 
our time. 
HISTORY, MEMORY AND MORALITY IN HOLOCAUST NARRATIVE 
At the beginning of the 21st century, as we look back on the end of the 
Jewish world in Europe, especially in what was the Jewish space called 
Ashkenaz – united by the common use of the German language in all its 
cultural ramifications – we find we are no longer using the same discourse 
as before: the reflection on antisemitism after Auschwitz enlarges the 
horizon of our consciousness in a new way that enables us to confront the 
Holocaust from a human, that is a moral point of view, crossing the 
boundaries between aesthetics and ethics.1 
Although one would not deny the extraordinary character of the 
Holocaust as an historical event, there exists a considerable debate 
 
 1.  See Robert Eaglestone, “From the Bars of Quotation Marks: Emmanuel Levinas’s 
(Non)-Representation of the Holocaust,” in The Holocaust and the Text: Speaking the 
Unspeakable, ed. Andrew Leak and George Paizis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 
97-109. 
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concerning the uses and misuses of memory regarding its moral 
implications, its “moral space of figurative discourse”2 with its more 
radical one: silence. 
The problem is however not only inherent in the context of Holocaust 
writing, but even more so in reading Holocaust narrative. Thus, when 
dealing with the relationship between “how narratives are told (their 
aesthetics) and how they mean (their ‘hermeneutics’)”, Daniel Schwartz 
notes, “I see telling as a crucial act, all the more crucial because of the 
trauma of the originating cause. Because we can never trust memory fully, 
in narrative effects (how a teller presents himself or herself) sometimes 
precede cause (the explanation for why a narrator is the person he or she 
is).3 
The very act of telling the story thus creates a discontinuity with the 
historical past: the narrator chooses to place him or herself in the situation 
of those who did not live to tell their story to us, the survivors burdened 
with the task of creating continuity in time.4 
The question posed by Myth, Memory and Messianism in the context 
of antisemitism after Auschwitz is therefore: what are the political, ethical 
and, as we shall see, messianic implications of breaking the silence of 
Auschwitz, of speaking, not only the unspeakable, but the language of 
those whose voices were not heard then and cannot be recaptured to-day. 
“The disaster always takes place after having taken place” (Maurice 
Blanchot). 
Thus the remarkable fact of the Holocaust representation confronts us 
in the first place with our own lives, with the way we look, directly and 
indirectly, through the very blurred vision of our consciousness, trying at 
all costs to recapture something of the recognition of origin, to try and fill 
the gap caused by a general feeling of “world-loss”, to avoid falling in the 
abyss of meaninglessness. 
“Perhaps we should say that Holocaust narratives have become a 
genre with its own archetypes and its own cultural continuity.”5 It means 
starting at the very beginning: questioning language and narrative, 
questioning the way one writes and interprets history. 
 
 2.  Berel Lang, Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), 160-161. 
 3.  Daniel R. Schwartz, Imagining the Holocaust (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1999), 35. 
 4.  Compare the biblical injunction to remember the Exodus from Egypt It is because 
of what God did to me when I went free from Egypt. “And you shall tell your son on that 
day, saying” (Ex. 13:8). 
 5.  Daniel R. Schwartz, Imagining, p. 35. 
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Here we can encounter the convergence of political myth and the 
dialectics of history, memory and messianism in recognizing the Nazi 
perversion of values in the name of a ‘higher order’ which demanded a 
human ‘sacrifice’ on the part of the German nation, moving towards its 
intended destiny as ultimate redemption, its Heilsgeschichte, an issue we 
will deal with in depths later on in this essay. 
It means a breaking not only with the historical conventions of 
western tradition, but also seeking to bridge the gap between ethics and 
aesthetics, touching upon the question of concern versus indifference, when 
dealing with detachment and objectivity as a scholarly virtue. This search 
for truth, as the solid ground for knowledge became fractured, revealed the 
deep fissures caused by the very fact that Auschwitz really happened. 
Dealing with this historical fact, thus poses a moral burden which is 
normally hidden from the eye, when dealing with historical experience 
from an ethical point of view: “. . . on the brink of morality without 
institutions.” 
Emmanuel Levinas names this the Conditio Judaica – the Jewish 
Destiny: 
“When temples are standing, the flags flying atop the palaces, and the 
magistrates donning their sashes, the tempests raging in individuals’ heads do 
not pose the threat of shipwrecks. They are perhaps but the waves stirred by 
the winds of the world around well-anchored souls within their harbors. The 
true inner life is not a pious or revolutionary thought that comes to us in a 
stable world, but the obligation to lodge the whole of humankind in the shelter 
- exposed to all the winds - of conscience . . . But the fact that settled, 
established humanity can at any moment be exposed to the dangerous situation 
of its morality residing entirely in its “heart of hearts” its dignity completely at 
the mercy of a subjective voice, no longer reflected or confirmed by any 
objective order - that is the risk upon which the honor of humankind depends. 
But it may be this risk that is signified by the very fact that the Jewish 
condition is constituted within humanity. Judaism is humanity on the brink of 
morality without institutions.”6 
The dignity of humanity is, as Levinas points out, not lodged in stable 
institutions, but “at the mercy of a subjective voice no longer reflected or 
confirmed by any objective order”, because “Judaism is humanity on the 
brink of morality without institutions”. He reflects then on the price the 
Jewish people have paid for this “exposure” and concludes: 
 
 6.  Emmanuel Levinas, Proper Names, transl by Michael B. Smith, London 1996, p. 
122. 
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“But that condition, in which human morality returns after so many centuries 
as to its womb, attests, with a very old testament, its origin on the hither side of 
civilizations. Civilizations made possible, called for, brought about, hailed and 
blessed by that morality - which can, however, in its part, only know and 
justify itself in the fragility of the conscience. . .”7 
Conscience is, in fact, fragile, because knowledge breaks down in the 
face of each individual and becomes relevant where the “personal” meets 
the “general”, the “religious” meets the “profane”. Our debate on 
“Antisemitism after Auschwitz” therefore cannot avoid the question of the 
nexus between power and memory.8 Dealing with the Jewish Question after 
Auschwitz is thus not only a political issue, a form of restitution or 
reparation, but rather about the intellectual survival of society as a whole, 
and particularly about the necessary consideration of the renewed role of 
the humanities in countries experiencing antisemitism as the late 
consequences of a rupture of civilization, especially in those countries 
where Jews are no longer a present force to help carry the burden of values. 
It means addressing the question of the relevance of traditional texts – be 
they religious or secular – which, to paraphrase William James,9 reveals the 
impact of the varieties of historical experiences and their transformations, 
offering an opportunity to study and research the tradition-founding 
elements in the various traditions that have shaped European identities, and 
their cultural connection with Judaism. This would be a common task for 
all, to make a new beginning out of destruction, to confront the historic 
hour and therefore history. It would allow us to delve into the Archives of 
Memory and Morality rather than History to extract the deep layers of 
amnesia and strategies of denial inherent in human nature, to free the spirit 
from the burdens of forgetting, as an act of resistance to any form of 
totalitarianism, because “The struggle against power is the struggle of 
memory against forgetting”10 
It means a coming to terms, not merely with the historical fact of the 
annihilation of European Jewry, the conscious killing of six million 
innocent men, women and children under the cloak of war, but also with 
the way we look at life and history, how we judge our actions and those of 
others, and how we practice political activism and social critique. In short, 
it poses the question of the politics of history and memory, and urges us to 
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reflect on the means and ways to move towards, what I would call, A 
Political Hermeneutics of Culture. 
THE THIRD REICH AND THE JEWS 
When considering the problem of antisemitism in myth, memory, and 
messianism after Auschwitz, the question of European Jewry after the 
Enlightenment thus becomes important: Jews were murdered in the ‘Third 
Reich’, not because they were criminals or deviants – not even solely for 
their riches in Germany and other parts of Europe – but for the simple 
reason that they were Jews: Europe had to be made “Judenrein” for the 
establishment of the Third Reich – Das Heilige Roemische Reich 
Deutscher Nation – on the threshold of the Third Millennium. 
Beyond the question of good and evil, the politics of myth, memory, 
and messianism do not find their answer in reflecting on the premises of 
legal and philosophical concepts or pseudo-conventions such as ‘etiquette’ 
and ‘political correctness,’ nor in an attempt to hide behind learned 
discussions concerning the correct facts and figures, nor in the use of 
language borrowed from the lexicon of religious canon, such as 
‘martyrdom’, ‘victim’ or ‘suffering’. (It is for this reason that I find the 
word Holocaust – Greek: burnt-offering – so problematic since Jews were 
not given a choice in Auschwitz to die for Kiddush Haschem, the 
Sanctification of God’s name: they were murdered in the name of duty for 
‘Fuehrer und Vaterland’.) 
But representation entails a serious reflection on accepting the onus to 
rethink, not only the Shoah,11 but the very project of the Humanities as a 
discipline, in the light of history, language and the self12, directed towards 
finding a cultural paradigm which breaks down our preconceived notions 
of reason, of reality, and of normality, and critiques our normative values 
and standards. “The universe of dying that was Auschwitz yearns for a 
language purified of the taint of normality”13 writes Lawrence Langer. But 
the question arises: was it a “universe of dying” and can this universe 
“yearn for a language purified of the taint of normality”? Can a universe 
yearn at all, when those who were murdered cannot speak, but still move 
our lips? Our mourning and yearning for them is much stronger than any 
act of memory that can possibly heal the universe by way of language. – 
 
 11.  Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002). 
 12.  Eveline Goodman-Thau, Aufstand der Wasser. Jüdische Hermeneutik zwischen 
Tradition und Moderne (Berlin: Philo Verlagsges, 2002), 9-10 and 15-31. 
 13.  Lawrence Langer, Admitting the Holocaust: Collected Essays (New York: Oxford 
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“Manchmal freilich stirbt der Himmel unseren Scherben voraus” (Paul 
Celan).14 – Looking up to Heaven thus makes no sense and is to no avail 
when we are left to gather the pieces which have rained down on us from 
the broken sky: the flight into an outdated metaphysics – or theology – is 
no longer possible. 
Documents show, that the murder of the Jews was a political program 
of Nazi ideology, and cannot be surmised under the rubric of anti- Marxism 
or anti-Semitism. In the words of Martin Bormann at the end of 1944: 
“National Socialist doctrine is totally anti-Jewish, which means anti-
Communist and anti-Christian: everything is linked to National Socialism and 
everything concurs towards the fight against Judaism.”15 
Although one might argue about the historical, political, and 
sociological reasons for the extermination of the Jews of Europe, the fact 
remains that one single group was singled out – the Jews – who would not 
have a place in the redemptive notion of “the world to come”: the “New 
Order” of Europe.16 
The emancipation of the Jews had to a certain degree guaranteed their 
equal status before law, but not their acceptance as members of European 
society, sharing a common ethos of justice, framed by the universal values 
of equality and human rights. The social and cultural implications of this 
tension became most poignantly evident for Jews in Germany against the 
 
 14.  “Surely, Heaven sometimes dies ahead of our shards.” 
 15.  In: Adolf Hitler, Libres propos sur la guerre et la paix, vol. 2, (Paris: Flammarion, 
1954); quoted from Saul Friedlaender, Some Aspects of Historical Significance of the 
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Jewish demand for a home was soon transformed into the ecstatic illusion 
of being at home.”17 
This hope was cruelly shattered as the “symbiosis” between Jews and 
Germans failed the test of social reality: “Society”, as Hannah Arendt 
observed correctly, “confronted with political, economic and legal equality 
for the Jews, made it quite clear that none of its classes were prepared to 
grant them social equality, and that only exceptions from the Jewish people 
would be received.”18 
When considering the destruction of European Jewry, we are indeed 
probing the limit, not only of representation while witnessing the inversion 
of human values, but also touching upon the identity politics inherent in 
Nazi ideology. 
An illustration of this can be found in Heinrich Himmler’s famous 
1943 Posen speech to upper-level SS-officers, revealing the importance and 
function of the annihilation of the Jews in shaping the German psyche. 
After announcing to his comrades that he is going to speak of “a really 
grave matter”, Himmler continues: “Among ourselves, this once, it shall be 
uttered quite frankly; but in public we will never speak of it.” He reminds 
them of the beginnings, when almost ten years before, on June 30, 1944, 
they carried out their duties as ordered “to stand against the wall comrades 
who had transgressed, and shoot them, also we have never talked about this 
and never will. It was the tact, which I am glad to say is a matter of course 
to us that made us never discuss it among ourselves, never talk about it. 
Each of us shuddered, and yet each one knew that he would do it again if it 
were ordered and if it were necessary.” And then Himmler comes to the 
main point: “I am referring to the evacuation of the Jews, the annihilation 
of the Jewish people. This is one of those things that are easily said. . . 
Most of you know what it means to see a hundred corpses lie side by side, 
or five hundred or a thousand. To have stuck this out, and – accepting cases 
of human weakness – to have kept our integrity, that is what has made us 
hard. In our history, this is an unwritten, never-to-be-written page of 
glory. . . All in all, we may say that we have accomplished the most 
difficult task out of love for our people. And we have not sustained any 
damage to our inner self, our soul and our character.”19 
We see here, that Himmler was well aware of the moral burden of the 
atrocious acts of his officers, but in evoking their memory of the events, he 
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justifies those as a just punishment against those “who had transgressed”. 
And yet it had to remain secret, not only because later generations would 
not understand, but because indeed then “each of us shuddered” and even 
now “he would do it again if it were ordered and if it were necessary”.20 It 
meant a following of orders in the name of necessity, i.e. higher “Order of 
Things”, which “we” didn’t discuss even “among ourselves”: “In our 
history, this is an unwritten, never-to-be written page of glory” – a sublime 
act without memory, never to be written, never to be remembered, but to be 
repeated again, if necessary. The act of remembering would present a moral 
burden as an obstacle to what was “the most difficult task out of love for 
our people”:21 the ultimate sacrifice of memory in the name of love. . .” 
The last sentence of our quote is perhaps the most telling and chilling 
of all: the extermination of the Jews, the singling out of each and every 
member of this specific group to be wiped from the face of the earth, this 
task was accomplished without any moral damage “to our inner self, our 
soul and our character” but “out of love for our people”. 
Himmler understood perfectly well that “this glorious page in the 
history of the German nation” needed to remain secret. The concern he 
expressed was not whether future generations might bring a moral 
consciousness to bear on their collective memory of events; rather, he was 
alluding to the significance of Nazi ideology as a “New Heaven and a New 
Earth” – albeit not in the sense of a “New Testament”, but through the 
power of political myth, as an act of “self-sacrifice”. As executioners of the 
Jews, they sacrificed themselves in a redemptive act on the “altar of 
history”: they offered themselves up as a burnt-offering of memory itself: 
the Jews must die so that we can live. This freedom from “damage”, to 
their inner selves, their souls and their character was “proof” – as 
paradoxical as it may sound – of the “moral character of their acts”, for the 
Reich to be saved from oblivion by the chosen few until the end of days, as 
a messianic paradigm. 
In his well-known critique of German ideology, The Jargon of 
Authenticity, Theodor W. Adorno exposes the Nazi corruption of the notion 
of authenticity and its devastating effects: 
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“The armored man was so conscious of his unprotected places that he preferred 
to grasp at the most violent arrangement of arguments, rather than call 
subjectivity by its name. He plays tactically with the subjective aspect of 
authenticity: for him authenticity is no longer a logical element mediated by 
subjectivity but is something in the subject, in Dasein itself, something 
objectively discoverable. The observing subject prescribes whatever is 
authentic to the subject as observed: it prescribes the attitude towards death. 
This displacement robs the subject of its moment of freedom and spontaneity: 
it completely freezes, like the Heideggerian states of mind, into something like 
an attribute of the substance ‘existence’. . . the category of authenticity, which 
was at first introduced for a descriptive purpose, and which flowed from the 
relative innocent question about what is authentic in something, now turns into 
a mythically imposed fate. . . Jews are punished for being this destiny, both 
ontologically and naturalistically at the same time.”22 
The jargon of authenticity functions as an ideology of language, 
rendering it an aura of Dignity and Death. “There was a time when the 
subject thought itself a small divinity, as well as a law- giving authority, 
sovereign in the consciousness of its own freedom.”23 This freedom is now 
sacrificed on the altar of Being, as a kind of messianism of Dasein as the 
core of Heidegger’s New Metaphysics. 
“Sacrifice means farewell from the existent on the way to the preservation of 
the favor of Being. Nevertheless, sacrifice can be prepared in the working and 
effecting (Leisten) within the existent, yet such action can never fulfill the 
sacrifice. The fulfillment of sacrifice stems from the urgency out of which the 
action of every historical man rises – by means of which he preserves the 
achieved Dasein for the preservation of the dignity of being.”24 
Here, historical man is instrumentalized for the purpose of an eternal 
and true goal: “Sacrifice is at home in the essence of the event. In the form 
of the event being claims man for the truth of Being.” There is no room for 
human judgement or calculation of any kind since it “disfigures the nature 
of sacrifice”. All considerations and desires for a higher or lower purpose 
had to be suspended for the sake of the “clarity of the courage for sacrifice, 
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which is marked by an awe which really fears; and which has taken upon 
itself to live in the neighborhood of that which is indestructible.”25 
The displacement of reality between perpetrator and victim now 
becomes apparent: the Jew became a substitute for the moral consciousness 
of the German soul, and the act of killing the Jew a substitute for messianic 
self- sacrifice, with its devastating consequences not only for the fate of 
European Jewry but for post-holocaust Germany and other parts of Europe, 
as witnessed by increasing antisemitism with its specific characteristics in 
East and West.”26 
MODERN MESSIANISM IN GERMAN ROMANTICISM 
The annihilation of European Jewry was thus an act of vindication that 
would once and for all inscribe the German nation in history. It is from here 
also, that the struggle against communism becomes evident, as one 
ideology confronts another, and it can be called the irony or rather the List 
der Geschichte (as variant of “List der Vernunft”) that pitched the West 
against Communism for 40 years after the war. One sees this, especially in 
retrospect, knowing that Hitler was not much better than Stalin, because 
both were dictators and tyrants, with perhaps one difference: Stalin 
persecuted those who were his political opponents, Hitler those who were 
his moral and thus religious, that is, messianic opponents. 
Thus, when considering the dialectics of history and memory in the 
context of the politics of power in myth, memory and messianism, the issue 
of responsibility and leadership gains an immense importance. It poses the 
question of moral responsibility, in particular that of the individual and its 
impact on the course of history. Is the excuse of hiding behind ‘rules and 
regulations’ an avoidance of responsibility, or does it carry, at its very core 
the surrendering of individuality altogether? The question must thus be 
formulated as follows: To what degree is the human act – in any given 
circumstance – an expression of individuality and responsibility, and above 
all, in which way does it impact human freedom to choose, and exercise the 
one quality that is given to humans as a birthright: to express through 
action the difference between right and wrong, on history’? 
Now, it should be borne in mind that the notion of responsibility was 
for a long time left out of the discourse of western tradition. Before the 
Enlightenment, the outcome and impact of human action was discussed in 
Christian-theologica1 terms, informed by the notion, that our actions 
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(Werke) were redeemed in the light of the death of the Messiah Jesus 
Christ, a belief that carried western society from Augustine’s Civitas Dei to 
Luther’s “Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms” (Zwei-Reiche-Lehre) with the 
possibility of redeeming all acts of Man in the coming Kingdom of God.27 
The Enlightenment tried to reinstate the individual – cogito ergo sum 
(Descartes): by way of reason one was to know right from wrong. The 
backlash came from Romanticism, meant to regain a sense of origin, lost 
through historicism, with its heritage in the humanities of intrinsic 
ambivalence in regard to the relevance of traditional texts.28 
When considering this development in regard to the question of moral 
responsibility and leadership, we see, that, in contrast to the Enlightenment 
and Historicism, it was in Romanticism that the question of leadership 
became important: the leader was declared to be the incarnation of the 
spirit of the nation, that is, the “Kingdom of Man”, as the incarnation of the 
“Kingdom of God”. Hence the romantic attraction on the part of the Nazis 
and their misuse of Nietzsche for political purpose; the “Death of God” 
paved the way for the “Life of Man”. Therefore, Jews – not only the Jew, 
but Jesus of Nazareth, Messiah of the Christians – had to die, “so that we 
may live”: The notion of leadership thus became extremely important, 
because the leader incorporated the Law and the Nation, and his orders had 
to be followed unconditionally. 
Seventy years later, as the Drang for normalcy and integration in post-
war Europe has blotted out personal reflection and civil responsibility, 
complacency has replaced critical consciousness, resulting in a flight 
towards deliberate ignorance: the admission of possible collective guilt is 
sublimated by a desire for vindication. A reflection on antisemitism after 
Auschwitz in the context of identity politics of myth, memory, and 
messianism thus touches upon the very foundations of human existence and 
may open new perspectives for the future. As one of the foremost 
Holocaust scholars puts it: 
“We have much to learn yet about the Holocaust in this, as well as in other 
inquiry. But as we all know, the question is no less important than the answer. 
We are asking about the human response to tragedy, about the feeling of 
community between groups and individuals, about the community of interests 
between people who care for and respect each other and each other’s 
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legitimately different traditions. The Holocaust is a touchstone of such 
inquiry.”29 
 
* Founding director of the Herman Cohen Academy for European Studies and 
Austria’s first woman rabbi. 
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Israel as Neo-Colonial Signifier? 
Challenging De-Colonial Anti-Zionism 
Julia Edthofer* 
This contribution discusses post- and de-colonial academic perspectives on the 
relation of antisemitism and racism in the light of Holocaust-and colonialism-
remembrance and their contentious entanglements with political stances 
regarding the Middle East conflict. It is illustrated how the discussion of past 
and current victimizations intermingles with biased views on the conflict and 
especially the Israeli state. Expanding on the last point, it is demonstrated that 
the de-colonial framing of Israel as a “Western colonial project” can blur with 
antisemitic stereotypes—for instance when Israel is depicted as a neo-colonial 
evil par excellence and “Jewish complicity” with Western (neo)-colonialism is 
postulated. Adopting societal-theoretical approaches for the analysis of (new) 
antisemitism to post- and de-colonial perspectives is proposed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The turn of the last century brought about a wave of anti-Zionist 
activism within global leftist politics. With the Second Intifada in 
September 2000 the peace process in the Middle East definitely came to an 
end and in the following year, the UN World Conference against Racism in 
Durban showed massive anti-Israeli protest culminating in the claim to 
define Zionism as special form of contemporary racism. A few days after, 
the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 heralded the 
Bush administration’s “War on Terror”. The following attack on 
Afghanistan and, later, the invasion of Iraq led to growing anti-war 
organizing among left-wing social movements worldwide, and thus to 
global protest against the Bush administration and the US, but also against 
the Israeli reaction to the Intifada. In the same period, post-colonial and de-
colonial perspectives gained ground in various academic institutions in the 
Global North. First established in Anglophonic academia, the theoretical 
approach travelled to Europe during the 1990’s and led to the emergence of 
post- and de-colonial perspectives as an academic part of progressive leftist 
politics. 
Since anti-Zionism is widely regarded as the “leftist ticket”, big parts 
of the post- and de-colonial spectrum take a critical stance towards Israel. 
Most prominently, such debates occur at the intersection of academic 
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knowledge production and anti- or post-colonial political activism in the 
Global North, predominantly in US-American and British academia, but 
constantly rising within other European academic and artistic contexts. The 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS)1 plays a decisive role 
regarding this conjunction. Established mainly by the US-based Palestinian 
Diaspora in 2005, it soon became active also in the European context. It 
peaked for the first time in 2009 following the escalation of violence in 
Gaza at the turn of the year, and again after the Israel-Gaza conflict in the 
summer of 2014. 
The de-colonial perspectives in focus relate to BDS-activism and thus 
can be seen as exemplary for such academic-political debates. 
Symptomatic for this political stance is a “correspondence-theoretical”2 
view on contemporary antisemitism that considers “new”, Israel-related 
antisemitism solely as an outcome of the Middle East conflict. By ignoring 
the Holocaust as one historical reason for its foundation, the Israeli state 
rather is presented as US-backed settler colony and is occasionally even 
framed as an outstanding “perpetrator state” and “spearhead” of the neo-
colonial capitalist world system. In this context, biased views on current 
political events intermingle with narratives on the contentious relation of 
the Holocaust and colonial genocides: the Holocaust is depicted as a 
hegemonic “Western” remembrance paradigm that would blank out the 
latter. Such “competitions of victimhood” form one part of the anti-Israeli 
narratives that frame Israel as a “Western” colonial project. Following 
David Hirsh’s illustration of “discursive antisemitism” within anti-Zionist 
academic-political articulations, I aim to relate such framing to theoretical 
perspectives on antisemitism that focus on its function as a discursive 
resource for a false pseudo-explanation of capitalist—or in this special 
case—colonialist exploitation and injustice. For this purpose, I correlate 
frame analytical methodology3 to theoretical perspectives on antisemitism 
 
 1. See: http://www.bdsmovement.net/; http://www.pacbi.org/; http://www.usacbi.org/; 
see for the “One State Declaration” endorsed by the BDS-movement: 
http://electronicintifada.net/content/one-state-declaration/793 [accessed 15/02/15]. 
 2. According to Klaus Holz, “correspondence-theoretical” explanations of 
antisemitism disregard the fact that the resentment has nothing to do with “real” Jews and 
their actions, but seek to explain it partially by “Jewish behavior”. In doing that, the 
semantic construction of the resentment is confused with historical facts and social 
structures, which ultimately perpetuates the resentment. See Klaus Holz. Nationaler 
Antisemitismus. Wissenssoziologie einer Weltanschauung (Hamburg: HIS-Verlag, 2010), 
op. cit., 72f. 
 3. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social 
Movements. An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611-
639. 
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and illustrate how anti-Zionism can blur with age-old antisemitic 
narratives. 
2.  LINKING ANTI-ZIONIST FRAMES TO SOCIAL THEORETICAL ANALYSES 
OF ANTISEMITISM 
The first to address the specific societal function of antisemitism were 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, who wrote the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment in the shadow of the Holocaust, and analyzed modern, 
bourgeois antisemitism as a “socially necessary illusion” to camouflage 
domination within capitalist production. The exclusive location of 
exploitation in the sphere of circulation together with the “historical 
confinement” of Jews in exactly this sphere, turned Jewish communities 
into the perfect target for pseudo-anticapitalist projections.4 
Following this insight, Moishe Postone developed the projective 
dimension of antisemitism further in relating it to Marx´s notion of the 
fetish of the commodity and the abstract dimension of capitalist production, 
which in his view is attached to Jewish collectives in order to render it 
(pseudo-)graspable. This “biologization” of the abstract sphere constitutes 
the core of the antisemitic racialization: 
“On the level of the capital fetish, it is not only the concrete side of the 
antimony which is naturalized and biologized. The manifest abstract dimension 
is also biologized—as the Jews. The opposition of the concrete material and 
the abstract becomes the racial opposition of the Arians and the Jews. 
Modern anti-Semitism involves a biologization of capitalism—
which itself is only understood in terms of its manifest abstract 
dimension as International Jewry.5 
Since Jews were not only identified with the sphere of money 
exchange, but rather with the abstract dimension of value itself, the 
antisemitic ideology provides an all-encompassing pseudo-explanatory 
potential. From such a theoretical perspective, it almost logically serves as 
a discursive resource for “explaining” the modern capitalist system: 
Modern anti-Semitism is characterized [. . .] by its claim to explain the 
world—a world which had rapidly become too complex and threatening for 
many people. [. . .] The modern antisemitic worldview [. . .] is a form of 
thought in which the rapid development of industrial capitalism with all of its 
social ramifications is personified and identified as the Jew. [. . .] In other 
 
 4. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung. 
Philosophische Fragmente (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 2004), op. cit., 182f. 
 5. Moishe Postone, “Anti-Semitism and National Socialism. Notes on the German 
Reaction to ‘Holocaust’,” New German Critique 19 (1980): 112. 
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words, the abstract domination of capital, which— particularly with rapid 
industrialization—caught people up in a web of dynamic forces they could not 
understand, became perceived as the domination of International Jewry.6 
Both dimensions of antisemitic thought are related to what Adorno 
called “rumors about Jews” or in other words to various imaginations or 
framings of Jews and/or Jewishness. These are constituted by discursive 
elements like tropes and topoi7 that draw on the attribution of abstractness 
and artificiality on the one hand, and of power and domination on the other. 
Postone´s first quote above very well illustrates one essential 
discursive element or “frame”of such a “structurally antisemitic” world-
view: namely, the false distinction between the sphere of production and 
the sphere of circulation into “productive” and “parasitic” capital, which 
basically corresponds to the opposition of abstract and concrete. It 
articulates in anti-modern resentments such as the distinction between 
“naturally grown” national cultures and artificial, cosmopolitan and mostly 
urban “Jewish intruders”. Associated with this is the distinction between 
“exploited” and “exploiters”, with the latter being projected onto Jews. The 
notion of the “parasitic” and “disintegrating” Jew can be attached to 
concrete figures, such as the famous merchant Shylock or Baron 
Rothschild, or articulated as a vaguer signifier that evokes the imagination 
of a bigger domination, for instance when the “US East Coast” is 
addressed. Such tropes eventually relate to a second crucial discursive 
element of antisemitic thought, which is reflected in Postone´s second 
quote and is linked to imaginations of being overwhelmed by 
uncontrollable “colonizing” forces. Alienation and feelings of 
disempowerment and helplessness in the face of capitalist modernity are 
(pseudo-) explained by the domination executed by a hardly graspable, 
abstract super-power, identified in the trope of a “Jewish world 
domination”. 
Both discursive figures culminated in the national socialist ideology 
that constructed Jews not only as subversive internal thread, but as 
“colonizers” of the German nation and ultimately seeking world 
 
 6. Ibid., 107. 
 7. Following a discourse-analytical perspective, “trope” is used to indicate metaphors 
that objectify antisemitic imaginations; e.g. “Shylock”, the “Imperial Jew”, the “US East 
Coast”, or the “Zionist Lobby”. As tropes are often connected to certain imagery, they can 
also be traced in concrete images like the examples in the appendix. The term “topos” on the 
other hand, reflects the Foucauldian insight that no wording happens coincidentally, but 
rather reflects the logics of thought of a certain statement. Topoi are thus to be understood 
as vaguely formulated imaginations, which indicate the underlying framing of the object in 
question. Examples would be the unquestioned linking of Zionism and colonialism and/or 
colonial racism and Apartheid, or the framing of the Israeli state as “Western” oppressive 
settler colony. 
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dominance. Nazi ideology revealed the paranoid and eliminatory potential 
of antisemitism in the most horrific manner and, after Nazi Germany’s 
defeat, research and re-education should have put an end to this oldest 
hatred. Although open antisemitic hate-speech gradually declined, its basic 
frames have been persisting in modified forms until today. The most 
essential transformation of post-war antisemitism is its blurring with anti-
Zionism, that peaked for the first time following the Six-Day-War in 1967.8 
Since that time, antisemitic frames have formed a part of anti-
imperialist anti-Zionist discourse, rising anew in the wake of the Second 
Intifada.99 Such frames can also be traced in post- and de-colonial 
perspectives; for instance, when a criticism of Israeli politics conflates with 
narratives regarding the colonialist “nature” and imperialist role of the 
Israeli state. With reference to selected articles in the de-colonial journal 
Human Architecture,10 I illustrate how such frames re-emerge in academic-
political text production as a form of “discursive antisemitism”. Focus is 
given to debates on the historical and current relations of antisemitism and 
racism in the light of the Holocaust and colonial genocides and their—
anything but coincidental—interconnection with recent developments of 
the Middle East conflict. 
3. DE-COLONIAL DEBATES ON NEW ANTISEMITISM AND ISRAEL IN THE 
SHADOW OF THE HOLOCAUST AND POST SEPTEMBER 11 
As a reaction to the Bush administration’s proclamation of a “War on 
Terror” following the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, post- and 
de-colonial perspectives increasingly focus the question of neo-colonial 
geopolitics. As from 2006, scholars associated with the collaborative 
project “Modernity/Coloniality”11 and the de-colonial Journal Human 
Architecture, organized two international conferences—both directly 
related to “The post-September 11 New Ethnic/Racial Configurations in 
Europe and the United States”. The first took place in 2006 and debated 
rising anti-Muslim resentment. Its proceedings focus on the “Othering” of 
 
 8.  e.g. Jean Améry, “Der ehrbare Antisemitismus,” In Werke. Aufsätze zur Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2005 [orig. 1969]); Léon Poliakov, Vom 
Antizionismus zum Antisemitismus (Freiburg: Ça-ira, 1992). 
 9. e.g. Thomas Haury, “Der neue Antisemitismusstreit in der deutschen Linken,” In 
Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte, ed. Doron Rabinovici, Ulrich Speck and 
Natan Sznaider (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 143-168.   
 10. See: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/ [accessed 20/02/15]. 
 11. See:http://www.pacarinadelsur.com/home/abordajes-y-contiendas/108-
modernidad—colonialidad—descolonialidad-aclaraciones-y-replicas-desde-un-proyecto-
epistemico-en-el-horizonte-del-bicentenario; see for Europe: 
http://decolonialityeurope.wix.com/decoloniality [accessed 20/02/15]. 
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Islam as a hegemonic neo-colonial project: enunciating a century-old 
entanglement of “Islamophobia” 12 and European colonialism, the rise of 
anti-Muslim racism is interpreted as current signature of neo-imperialism 
and its critique as a de-colonial necessity.13 The second conference was 
organized in 2007 and addressed “new” antisemitism. The proceedings of 
this conference discuss the transformation of the resentment after 
Auschwitz and set a main focus on new, Israel-related antisemitism. 
However, in contrast to the discussion of “Islamophobia”, which is framed 
as a “Western” ideology directed against a “non-Western subaltern”, new 
antisemitism is presented as an outcome of the imperialist establishment of 
the Israeli state and of the entanglements of Israeli anti-terror policies with 
global counter-terrorism in the wake of the Second Intifada and the War on 
Terror— with both being framed as neo-colonial, imperialist politics.14 
Selected articles of this special issue form the basis of my critique of de-
colonial Israel-criticism and its blurring with antisemitic stereotypes. I 
focus on four contributions by Marc Ellis, Ramón Grosfoguel, Walter 
Mignolo and Santiago Slabodsky that explicitly relate the discussion of 
antisemitism and racism to the Holocaust and colonialism and refer to the 
Middle East conflict in the light of these past and current victimizations.15 
 
 12. Since the British Runnymede Report coined the term “Islamophobia” in 1997, there 
is scholarly and political debate re: anti-Muslim resentment —if denominated in this way or 
analyzed as racism Scholars who follow this terminology, such as Chris Allen, Elizabeth 
Poole or Junaid Rana, refer to Edward Said´s criticism of a clash of cultures between “the 
West” and the “Islamic world” and thus conceptualize “Islamophobia” from an Orientalist 
political stance. Conceptual criticism of the term “Islamophobia” regards its lack of clarity 
and the individualizing and pychologizing consequences of conceptualizing resentment as 
phobia. “Anti-Muslim racism” is proposed as counter-concept by scholars following Etienne 
Balibar´s and Immanuel Wallerstein´s thesis of a culturalization and ethnicization of class 
and “race-thinking” in the second half of the 20th century; proponents would be Nasar Meer, 
Tariq Modood or, for the German-speaking context, Yasemin Shooman. Critics of this 
approach, such as German-Turkish scholar Necla Kelek, argue that “Muslims” would not be 
race and thus the term “racism” would be an inappropriate terminology but rather impeding 
a justified and necessary “criticism of Islam”. Such criticism, however, negates the 
processes of culturalization and racialization described early on by Balibar and Wallerstein 
and also overlooks its own entanglement with hegemonic anti-Muslim discourse. In my own 
terminology, I adopt the term anti-Muslim racism to denominate the resentment against 
Muslims. 
 13. Mohammad H. Tamdgidi, “Othering Islam,” Human Architecture: Journal of the 
Sociology of Self-Knowledge 5, no 1 (2006); Ramón Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants, “The 
Long-Durée Entanglement between Islamophobia and Racism in the Modern/Colonial 
Capitalist/Patriarchal World-System. An Introduction,” 
Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 5, no. 1 (2006): 29-38. 
 14. Mohammad H. Tamdgidi, “Historicizing Anti-Semitism,” Human Architecture: 
Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 7, no. 2 (2009): VII-X. 
 15. Mark Ellis, “On Jewish Particularity and Anti-Semitism: Notes from a Jewish 
Theology of Liberation,” 
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I discuss the authors´ perspectives as specific to de- and post-colonial 
debates in the context of anti-Zionist boycott activism, mostly related to the 
BDS movement. Since the Lebanon war in 2006 and more so due to the 
Gaza war in the winter of 2008/09, such campaigns have received 
increasing attention within European and American left-wing contexts, 
whereby the colonial framing of the Middle East conflict is at the heart of 
the political debates.16 
It is in this specific political context that the texts of Human 
Architecture are to be understood: as de-/anti-colonial political 
interventions, they position themselves critical not only to Israeli politics, 
but also to the state itself. In mixing up theoretical discussions with 
criticism of Israel, polemics supersedes political analysis and the lines 
between anti-Zionism and antisemitism can blur. Such blurring is most 
obvious in the contributions by the Argentinian literary scholar Walter 
Mignolo and the Puerto Rican sociologist Ramón Grosfoguel. The first 
discusses historical genealogies of antisemitism and colonial racism(s) 
within the framework of the Holocaust and colonialism remembrance, and 
the latter new antisemitism in the light of the so-called “Operation Cast 
Lead”. Starting with Mignolo´s contribution, I illustrate crucial omissions 
and misinterpretations regarding the analysis of antisemitism and their 
linkage with Mignolo’s depiction of the Holocaust as Western, euro-centric 
remembrance paradigm. Comparing the text with the perspective of de-
colonial scholar Santiago Slabodsky, I show how both authors fail to 
analyze new antisemitism and argue correspondence-theoretically when it 
comes to the question of Israel, and how Mignolo even reproduces the 
resentment. 
 
Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge VII, no. 2 (2009): 103-
122; Ramón Grosfoguel, “Human Rights and Anti-Semitism after Gaza,” Human 
Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 7, no. 2 (2009): 89-102; Walter 
Mignolo, “Dispensable and Bare Lives: Coloniality and the Hidden Political/Economic 
Agenda of Modernity,” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 7, 
no 2 (2009a): 69-87; Santiago Slabodsky, “But there are no longer any anti-Semites! 
Vicious Circles, Jewish Destinies, and a Complementary Framework to Read De-colonial 
Discourses,” 
Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 7, no. 2 (2009): 35-53. 
 16. Camilla Bassi, “ ‘The Anti-Imperialism of Fools’: A Cautionary Story on the 
Revolutionary Socialist Vanguard of England’s Post-9/11 Anti-War Movement,” ACME: An 
International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 9, no. 2 (2010): 113-137. 
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3.1 GENEALOGIES OF RACIALIZATION, “CONSTANTINIAN JEWS” AND THE 
LIMITS OF ANALYSIS 
In his text Dispensable and Bare Lives, Walter Mignolo works on the 
genealogies of racialization within what he calls the European “colonial 
matrix”. He analyses the transition from religious Othering to biological 
racialization starting in the late 15th century, and connects this development 
to the emergence of the imperialist-colonialist world system. His main 
argument regards the difference between colonial racism(s) and 
antisemitism, which he discusses in the light of European colonialism and 
the Holocaust. Whereas the first subjected individuals to commodification 
and found its culmination point in the slave system, the latter racialized 
Jews as prototypical others within Europe and culminated in the Holocaust. 
Drawing on Giorgio Agamben and Hannah Arendt, Mignolo denominates 
the first type of racialization as “dispensable” and the latter as “bare” 
lives.17 
The author´s following discussion of racist genealogies, however, 
shows problematic omissions and biases when it comes to the specificity of 
antisemitism and the interrelated analytical perspective on the Holocaust as 
a “rupture in civilization”.18 Mignolo draws on Hannah Arendt’s analysis 
of the connection between colonial “race thinking” and radicalizing 
antisemitism within late 19th century Europe, but misinterprets her analysis. 
Instead of dealing with Arendt´s historical argument, Mignolo claims that 
she simply dismisses the analysis of colonial racism(s) in privileging the 
Jewish experience in the light of the Holocaust.19 He presents Aimé 
Césaire’s postulate of the Holocaust being nothing more than a 
“boomerang” of colonialist atrocities and genocides coming back to 
Europe, as a non-Eurocentric counter-perspective to her view and thus as 
the more adequate analysis. Thereby, he not only leaves out Arendt´s 
discourse-analytical approach, but even omits that it was actually she who 
coined the boomerang-term.20 
 
 17. Mignolo, 2009a, op. cit., 76f. 
 18. Dan Diner, Zivilisationsbruch: Denken nach Auschwitz (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 
1988). 
 19. Mignolo 2009a, op. cit., 81f. 
 20. In her book on the Origins of Totalitarianism Hannah Arendt analyses the South 
African Boers as a prototypical society, organized according to the social category of 
“race”. In the English edition of her book she denominates the influence of this racist 
organizing principle on European societies as “boomerang effects”. Furthermore, in her 
view, this “race thinking” would set the ground for the triumph of National Socialism and 
would later become an essential element of national-socialist ideology. See Hannah Arendt, 
The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1966 [orig. 
1951]), 158ff, 183, 206. 
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Besides, Césaire´s perspective has two crucial analytical 
consequences: discussing the Holocaust exclusively as choc en retour of 
colonial atrocities and genocides leaves out Arendt´s analysis of the 
specific nature of antisemitism—in particular, her insight that it is a 
(distorted) “imperial” or “colonial” framing of Jews that constitutes one 
main dimension of antisemitic thought. In line with this, Mignolo´s 
argument does not aim at an understanding of the Holocaust as paranoid 
culmination point of the specific antisemitic racialization in Europe, but 
rather uses it to underpin his criticism of a dismissal of colonial atrocities 
and genocides within “Western” remembrance discourse. In this sense the 
author makes use of the Holocaust for his political argument that the 
Eurocentric focus on this special genocide would blank out Europe´s 
sanguinary and deadly colonial past. 
This dismissal of the very functionality of antisemitic racialization 
ultimately relates to one core element of de-colonial misconceptions 
regarding the relation of antisemitism and racism(s)—namely to the 
discursive “whitening” of Jewish collectives when compared with other 
racialized groups. Such de-racialization that comes along with the framing 
of Jewish communities as being part of (Western) dominant societies is a 
common feature of post- and de-colonial perspectives with consequences 
on two levels: As illustrated just now, it is linked to a competitive view on 
past victimizations concerning colonialism and the Holocaust by framing 
globalized remembrance as a zero-sum game, in which the Holocaust 
would monopolize colonialism remembrance. Second, it relates to current 
victimizations in discussing the relation of contemporary antisemitism and 
racism(s) incorrectly, especially with regard to anti-Muslim racism. 
Beginning with the first level, such “competitions of victimhood”21 run like 
a common thread through Mignolo´s account and the author uses the 
Holocaust in order to make the argument of an omission regarding colonial 
victimizations. The interconnection with an ascription of “whiteness” can 
be illustrated best with reference to the author´s reception of Césaire’s 
famous quote, claiming that what Europe could not forgive Hitler were not 
his crimes against man as such, but his crimes against “the white man, and 
the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then 
had been reserved only for the Arabs of Algeria, the c*22 of India and the 
 
 21. Ronald J. Berger, Fathoming the Holocaust. A Social Problems Approach (New 
York: de Gruyter, 2002). 
 22. Following Araba Johnston-Arthurs interventionist approach, I do not write out in 
full the pejorative denomination in order not to re-inscribe the racist violence of the wording 
by repeating it. See Araba Evelyn Johnston-Arthur, ´Es ist Zeit, der Geschichte selbst eine 
Gestalt zu geben . . . Strategien der Entkolonisierung und Ermächtigung im Kontext der 
modernen afrikanischen Diaspora in Österreich´, In re/visionen. Postkoloniale Perspektiven 
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n* of Africa”.23 The second level regards the discussion of modern and 
“new” antisemitism. In proclaiming that Jewish emancipation in the 18th 
and 19th century would have led to a secularization that is to be analyzed as 
a historical turning point and as the end of Jewish racialization and 
exclusion, he again fails to analyze the specificity as well as the variability 
of antisemitism. Regarding modern antisemitism, such a view blinds out 
the coercion to “assimilate”, the fact that only a very small percentage of 
Jews were partly integrated and—above all—that this differential inclusion 
furthermore fed into the transformation of antisemitism to a “cultural code” 
that ultimately culminated in the Holocaust.24 Regarding new, Israel-related 
antisemitism after Auschwitz, however, Mignolo does not stop at the level 
of misconception. In addition to his analysis of a “whitening” of European 
Jews, he also claims “complicity” between secular Jews and Western 
imperialism and concludes that current antisemitism would be a 
consequence of a “collaboration” between “Western (neo) liberalism”, 
“secular capitalism” and (secular) Jewish communities: 
Secular Jewness [sic]25 joined secular Euro-American economic practices 
(e.g., imperial capitalism). The major consequence of the complicity between 
secular Jews and Euro-American economic and political practice ended up in 
the construction of the State of Israel—what Marc Ellis describes as 
“Constantine Jews.” Anti-Semitism today is clearly a consequence of the 
historical collusion between Western (neo) liberalism and secular capitalism, 
backed up by Christianity, on the one hand, and “Constantine Jews,” on the 
other.26 
Such a view not only disregards post-Holocaust changes in 
antisemitism, from an openly expressed and group-related stereotyping to 
state-related anti-Zionism; moreover, it also reproduces the resentment. 
 
von People of Color auf Rassismus, Kulturpolitik und Widerstand in Deutschland, ed. Kien 
Nghi Ha, Nicola Lauré al-Samarai, and Sheila Mysorekar (Münster: Unrast, 2007), 423-445. 
 23. Césaire quoted in Mignolo 2009a, 77, my emphasis. 
 24. Shulamit Volkov, “Antisemitism as a Cultural Code. Reflections on the History 
and historiography of Antisemitism in Imperial Germany,” In Yearbook of the Leo Baeck 
Institute, XXIII (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 25-45. 
 25. Mignolo adopts the term “Constantinian Judaism/Jewishness” coined by US-
American liberation theologist Marc H. Ellis, who differentiates between what he calls a 
“Constantinian Jewish establishment”, “Progressive Jews” and “Jews of Conscience” with 
regard to inner-Jewish political debates about Israel and Anti-/Zionism. Mignolo, however, 
receives Ellis´ terminology in a distorted way in reproducing it as “Constantine Jewness”. 
“Jewness”, though, is a pejorative expression. Relating to Hannah Arendt it could be 
translated as “Jüdischkeit”; a term, by which she denominated the partial incorporation of 
anti-Jewish ascriptions as one possible psychological reaction to the constant exposure to 
antisemitism (Arendt 1986, 165, 169). 
 26. Mignolo 2009a, 87. 
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Alleged “Jewish complicity” with the European imperial project, 
especially, culminating in the establishment of the Israeli state, clearly 
relates to the above-described antisemitic topoi—and in line with this, also, 
Mignolo´s misconception of Mark Ellis´ figure of “Constantinian Jews.” 
Relating to inner-Jewish dissent about Israel and Anti/Zionism, Ellis 
proposes the three empirical categories: “Progressive Jews”, “Jews of 
Conscience”, and “Constantinian Jews”, with the latter corresponding to 
right-of-center and conservative political positions.27 Ironically, the 
authors´ own hint to the risk “Jews of Conscience” face, namely that their 
criticism of Israeli politics gets twisted to fuel antisemitic prejudices, can 
be illustrated with regard to Mignolo´s reading of the categories: the author 
only refers to the subject position of “Constantinian Jews” and does this in 
such an essentialist and ontological way, that he presents them as a general 
“Jewish” category that would provoke new antisemitism.28 In that way he 
re-evokes the modern antisemitic stereotype of rich and well-established 
Jews collaborating with the capitalist and colonial world order. A frame-
analytical look on Mignolo´s account thus shows how biased de-colonial 
perspectives not only fail to grasp antisemitism, but rather reproduce it. 
Comparing Mignolo´s view with the contribution of the Argentinian de-
colonial philosopher Santiago Slabodsky can substantiate this critique 
further. 
In the same issue of Human Architecture, Slabodsky illustrates the 
historical legacies and post-1948 transformation of antisemitism from a de-
colonial perspective. Like Mignolo, he analyzes the biological racialization 
of Jewish collectives as associated with modernity and colonialism, but 
without missing the specificity of antisemitic racialization. Slabodsky 
elaborates the changing role of what he calls the “figure of the (imperial) 
Jew” within the colonial context. He illustrates that it shifted from 
representing prototypical otherness within Europe towards the role of being 
a “pseudo-European” (and white) proxy for colonization. Drawing on 
Albert Memmi,29 he points out that the discursive shift came along with 
the—not least very material—placing of Jewish communities in an 
intermediate position between colonizer and colonized, which ultimately 
turned them into perfect scapegoats for colonialism: “Rephrasing this 
phenomenon [the “use” of “Jewishness”, J.E.] from the 16th to the 20th 
centuries, the use of the Jew within colonial discourses takes the following 
path: first, Jews are being projected as the paradigm of universal otherness 
to comprehend the foreign; second, certain groups are separated from 
 
 27. Ellis 2009, op. cit., 108f. 
 28. Mignolo 2009a, 87. 
 29. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991 
[orig. 1957]). 
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others in virtue of their “Judaism” in order to reflect an intermediary and 
advanced force of imperialism.”30 In explicating the discursive function of 
Jewish racialization within the colonial and imperialist world system, 
Slabodsky indicates the crucial difference between colonial racism(s) and 
anti-Semitism: namely the attribution of abstract power and domination, in 
this special case relating to the topos of an advanced force of imperialism. 
Albeit also arguing from an Israel-critical stance, Slabodsky´s argument 
thus critically engages with the antisemitic trope of the “Imperial Jew”. 
Such analysis is of urgent need within post- and de-colonial perspectives, 
as they tend to negate the resentment by advocating its supersession by 
“Islamophobia”31, or even to perpetuate it. 
Slabodsky is well aware of that there is a lack of theoretical 
understanding of antisemitism within anti-Zionist post- and de-colonial 
perspectives. In his view, “the critique of [. . .] the ticket of the colonial 
knowledge engages only partially with the problem. It does trace Jewish 
responsibility, but does not include a full analysis of the function of its 
figure [i.e., the discursive figure of the “Imperial Jew” - J.E.] in colonial 
discourses, which might reveal new hints regarding racialization”.32 
Slabodsky proposes to extend the analysis of antisemitism to include its 
specificity, but he does not address the Israel-related reproduction of the 
resentment. He analyses the trope of the “Imperial Jew” as antisemitic, but 
fails to transfer this insight onto the colonial framing of the Israeli state and 
does not address biased narratives regarding Israel as symbol for neo-
colonial oppression. In order to fill this gap, I illustrate intersections 
between such imperial narratives and de-colonial anti-Zionist stances. 
3.2 ISRAEL AS A NEO-COLONIAL SIGNIFIER 
As mentioned in the introduction, de-colonial perspectives on the 
Middle East conflict regard the Israeli state as an oppressive settler colonial 
project, and thus, as the cause for antisemitism after Auschwitz. Only Mark 
Ellis critically points to the shortcomings of this perspective, but does not 
go further in his analysis—all other authors regard Israel as (more or less) 
oppressive settler colony. In this argument, Zionism is disentangled from 
the background of its historic evolution as the idea of Jewish national 
liberation facing radicalizing European antisemitism, and is regarded as a 
veritable anti-thesis to a “national liberation movement”. This framing 
relates to the crux of the matter: to the interconnection of the discursive 
 
 30. Slabodsky 2009, 45, my emphasis. 
 31. e.g. Ramón Grosfoguel, “Epistemic Islamophobia and Colonial Social Sciences,” 
Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge VIII, no. 2 (2010): 29-38. 
 32. Slabodsky 2009, 40. 
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whitening of Jewish communities and the colonial framing of the Jewish 
state. 
Mignolo’s direct line from (white) secular—or Constantinian—Jews 
to the foundation of the Israeli state clearly illustrates the framing of Israel 
as an installed settler colony, backed up by “the West” with the US on its 
forefront, and constituting a “foreign body” within the ´naturally´ evolved 
Arab nations surrounding it. This narrative corresponds to the first 
discursive feature of antisemitism—namely, to the anti-modern 
imagination of a Jewish subversion of ethno-national entities, tied together 
by blood, culture and shared soil. Furthermore, de-colonial perspectives 
ignore the fact that the majority of the Jews arriving in the 1930s in the 
British Mandate for Palestine fled Europe, and thus again dismiss the 
Holocaust. Lastly, the ahistorical perspective blanks out the much more 
complex, and also anti-colonial elements of the Israeli nation building 
process, as well as civil alliances between Jewish and Arab communities 
prior to the establishment of the Israeli state.33 
Such omissions are meaningful, as they contribute to the transfer of 
the discursive whitening of Jews and Jewish communities onto the Israeli 
nation state. This narrative is not restricted to the historical nation-building 
process, but also reflected in de-colonial views on the current state that do 
not take into account its diverse population. In leaving out of the picture 
Arab and Sephardic Jews, Yemenite and Ethiopian communities, or 
Palestinian Israelis, which actually represent one fifth of the population, 
again the state is presented as a “white” European colonial project. Hence, 
the whole (Jewish) Israeli population is equated with colonialists and the 
huge tensions that the question of the settlements causes within Israeli 
society is ignored. Israeli geographer Oren Yiftachel criticizes such 
“Sa’idian inspired accounts” for their biased views, their “diminution of 
local agency, and the subsequent overlooking of the dialectics of violence, 
which come to their sharpest contrast in the deadly dance of state and local 
terror”.34 Here again the omission is not coincidental, but a systematic 
feature of de-colonial accounts: Israel is portrayed as colonial apartheid-
state and the Palestinians as subaltern victims. The open antisemitism of 
actors like Hamas and Hezbollah, or Palestinian terrorism, are either 
ignored or exclusively discussed as legitimate anti-colonial violence. 
Yiftachel concludes that such narratives ironically perpetuate exactly what 
the critique of Orientalism pointed out with regard to imageries of the Arab 
 
 33. e.g. Ariella Azoulay, “Civil Alliances – Palestine, 1947–1948,” Settler Colonial 
Studies 4, no. 4 (2014): 413–433; Tom Segev, One Palestine, complete. Jews and Arabs 
under the British mandate (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000). 
 34. Oren Yiftachel, “(Un)settling colonial presents,” Political Geography 27, no. 3 
(2008): 368. 
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world: framing the (Israeli) “Other” as monolithic, undifferentiated and 
threatening.35 In extreme cases the colonial framing intermingles with a 
demonizing political discourse that compares Israeli politics with National 
Socialism. The interrelatedness of the colonial frame with such demonizing 
narratives and with the topos of Jewish power is illustrated in the following 
paragraph with regard to the contribution of Ramón Grosfoguel.36 
In his text Human Rights and Anti-Semitism after Gaza Grosfoguel 
discusses “global consequences” of the “latest Israeli massacre in Gaza” 
with regard to “human rights and global antisemitism”. His principal 
argument is that the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2008/09 would have put a 
symbolic end to the hegemonic—Western global/colonial— human rights´ 
regime by unmasking its imperialist function.37 First, the military 
intervention in Gaza was “the most visible example of the colonial 
consequences of the ´War against Terrorism´ used today as the main 
mechanism of state terrorism around the world to fight liberation 
movements”. 38 Second, the author claims that the United Nations´ (non-
)reaction to the escalation revealed their role as tool of imperialist and 
colonial oppression, and the notion of “universal human rights” thus would 
have to be challenged by progressives around the globe.39 In both 
conclusions the Middle East conflict is presented as a focal point of a 
global conflict between the “Western” neo-colonial world order and the 
 
 35. Ibid., op. cit., 367. 
 36. It should be noted here that non-academic political symbolism linked to the 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement employs far more explicit antisemitic images 
and demonizing tropes regarding the Israeli state, “Zionism”, or concrete political actors. 
Images of the Brazilian cartoonist Carlos Latuff for instance get regularly used in BDS-
campaigns or by other anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist groups around the globe; another 
source of antisemitic imagery is the internet platform DeviantArt 
(http://www.deviantart.com/browse/all/), where numerous anti-Zionist political cartoons and 
images are uploaded. Such imagery for instance includes the portrayal of a somehow 
personified imagination of “Zionism” that would kill Palestinians in an excessively cruel 
way and in this context an emblematic equation of Zionism with National Socialism is 
frequently drawn. The first annexed figure below is such an image of personified “Zionism” 
depicted as a hand holding a gas can, and pouring gas on an already burning Palestinian 
child (fig. 1); another example illustrates the equation of National Socialism and Zionism 
(fig. 2). Regarding political actors, examples predominantly relate to world domination 
tropes, such as portraying late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a “puppet master” influencing 
US-politics (fig. 3), or his successor Binyamin Netanyahu as a butcher slaughtering the 
Palestinian people, while silencing the rest of the world in order not to awake the Arab 
League (fig. 4). Extreme examples also include direct NS-linkages such as a portrayal of 
Ariel Sharon as member of the SS (fig 5). For all caricatures see the appendix. [accessed 
24/02/15]. 
 37. Grosfoguel 2009, 89. 
 38. Ibid., 91, my emphasis. 
 39. Ibid. 
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subaltern resistance of “the Rest”. In putting Israel at the center of 
worldwide injustices, Grosfoguel relates to the antisemitic framing of an 
omnipotent Jewish power with the potential to influence events on a global 
scale. Such a view is not restricted to this text, but also advocated by 
Mignolo who likewise presents Israel and the Middle East conflict as a 
symbolic forefront of the (neo-) colonial global split into the “West” and 
the “Rest,”40 or as a paradigmatic example for (cultural) genocidal 
colonialism.41 To sum up this framing, it can be concluded that the Israeli 
state functions as a signifier for colonial oppression and genocide. 
In this respect, the Holocaust is used again—namely, when 
Grosfoguel compares Israeli policies with National Socialism. First, he 
proclaims that Zionism after Gaza definitely would be demasked as a 
“racist, apartheid, settler colonialist project resorting to ethnic cleansing 
and Nazi-like atrocities”.42 Following his biased view on Zionism as a 
racist ideology, Grosfoguel poses the question to what extent the term 
“Hitlerism” could be adequately used for Israeli politics towards the 
Palestinians. In this respect he concludes, that “Gaza is today the equivalent 
continuity of the Warsaw ghetto.”43 Such statements are not only 
historically wrong and highly problematic; they also delegitimize the Israeli 
state on a symbolic level. In this way the author supports the general claims 
of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement, which basically call 
for the dissolution of Israel´s existence as a Jewish state due to its racist 
foundation. The depiction of Zionism as inherently racist and colonialist 
again illustrates the “whiteness” frame and the biased view very well—it 
only makes sense if Israel gets constructed as a “natural” anti-thesis to 
subaltern national liberation, which once more is related to the trope of the 
“Imperial Jew”. In the words of conflict researcher Herbert Kelman, such a 
framing is thus not only illegitimate, but also antisemitic.44 
The last discursive feature of the colonial frame regards the ascription 
of power and influence embodied in the trope of “the Israel Lobby”. Albeit 
there is no doubt that pro-Israeli lobbying exists, it is depicted as far more 
 
 40. Walter Mignolo, “The Enduring Enchantment: (Or the Epistemic Privilege of 
Modernity and Where to Go from Here),” The South Atlantic Quarterly 101, no. 4 (2002): 
934. 
 41. Walter Mignolo “Coloniality: The Darker Side of Modernity,” In Modernologies. 
Contemporary Artists Researching Modernity and Modernism, 2009b, 40, 
http://www.macba.cat/PDFs/walter_mignolo_modernologies_eng.pdf [accessed 14/03/15]. 
 42. Grosfoguel 2009, 92, my emphasis. 
 43. Ibid., 93, my emphasis. 
 44. Herbert C. Kelman, “Antisemitismus und Zionismus in der Debatte der 
Palästinafrage,” In Zwischen Antisemitismus und Islamophobie. Vorurteile und Projektionen 
in Europa und Nahost, eds. John Bunzl and Alexandra Senfft (Hamburg: VSA, 2008), 238-
25, 247. 
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influential and intimidating than the rapidly increasing anti-Israeli activism, 
especially in US-academia, would actually suggest. Nevertheless, a 
recurring motive regarding the public reception of BDS-activism is the hint 
to a politics of “censorship” that presents substantial Israel-criticism as a 
precarious and suppressed endeavor, and the “accusation of antisemitism” 
as part of imperialist politics.45 In an open letter signed, among others, by 
Walter Mignolo, this perspective is explicitly related to the powerful lobby 
proclaiming that “a factor that dissuades many from refusing complicity 
with apartheid and occupation is the might of the Israel lobby in the U.S.”46 
Along with the colonial framing, Israel-criticism thus develops into a 
matter for brave and truly insurgent and somehow “subaltern” activists; 
whereas, the other camp cowardly abstains, and thus acts in complicity 
with the neo-colonial world order. 
Such “Orientalist” narratives can be taken as exemplary for de- and 
post-colonial Israel-criticism, as the biased (pseudo-)anti-colonial political 
stance and the monolithic caricature of the Israeli state is traceable in 
numerous anti-Zionist calls for boycott, divestment and sanctions. Almost 
every call functions according to such patterns: Artists, scholars and 
activists are called on to stand on “the right side of history”, end “Israeli 
Apartheid” and fight the “ongoing genocide” of the Palestinian people.47 In 
this somewhat simple equation, Islamist political groups such as Hamas 
and Hezbollah are correspondingly portrayed as anti-imperialist national 
liberation movements.48 In this way, Israel functions as a symbol for neo-
colonialism, and the willingness to support boycotts turns into a 
 
 45. e.g. Judith Butler, “The Charge of Anti-Semitism. Jews, Israel, and the Risks of 
Public Critique,” In 
Precarious Life. The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2006), 101-128; 
Jasbir Puar, “Citation and Censorship: The Politics of Talking about the Sexual Politics of 
Israel,” Feminist Legal Studies 19, no. 2 (2011): 133-142. 
 46. http://pulsemedia.org/2010/05/09/boycott-israel-amitav-ghosh-the-dan-david-prize/ 
[accessed 16/03/15]. 
 47. For exemplary calls see: http://boycottisrael.info/; http://www.pacbi.org/ on the 
PACBI website see for instance: “PACBI Salutes All People of Conscience who have 
Recently Adopted BDS: Accelerate the Boycott! End Israeli Colonialism and Genocidal 
Aggression” August 2014 [accessed 16/03/15]. 
 48. Most prominent in this context is a statement by queer theorist and BDS-activist 
Judith Butler made at Berkeley University during a “Teach in against the War” in March 
2008. The teach in was organized as a reaction to the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War and 
discussed BDS´ political strategies. Asked about the role of Hezbollah and Hamas in the 
global struggle for a “free Palestine”, Prof. Butler answered that it would be important to 
consider both movements as progressive and part of a global left that should be entered into 
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precondition, or a “ticket”, for being part of a global, progressive left. This 
logic of either/or—either being on the right side of history, or backing up 
neo-colonialism—is ultimately connected to the “Orientalist” monolithic 
colonial framing that substitutes analyses with narratives. In the concluding 
section, I ask why Israel lies at the heart of such narratives. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHY ISRAEL? 
Summing up this criticism, it can be concluded that de-colonial 
accounts produce certain narratives of the Israeli state, portraying it as 
colonial endeavor with genocidal potential. Thereby the Holocaust is used 
for two interrelated arguments: on the one hand it is portrayed to lead to the 
dismissal of colonial racism(s) and their post-colonial continuities; on the 
other hand, comparisons with National Socialism serve as demonization of 
Israel as genocidal settler colony. The colonial framing of Israel not only 
lacks empirical grounding, but also reveals the discursive function of the 
discussion about the Middle East conflict and Israel. The key question in 
this regard is: why does the Israeli nation-building process and the state get 
framed in such a different way to any other nation? Why, as David Hirsh 
remarks, is only the analysis of one kind of racism excluded from anti-
racist discourse, namely antisemitism that takes the form of Israel-
criticism?49 One answer would relate this to Israel´s function as a (sub-) 
cultural code or signifier of (neo-)colonialism, a framing that is ultimately 
connected to the blurring of anti-Zionism and antisemitism. 
A frame-analytical investigation shows how “old” and “new” 
antisemitism refer to the same topoi and tropes—differences regard the 
projection surface rather than the frames. Mignolo reproduces classical 
modern antisemitism with group-related stereotypes, main discursive 
features of which are alleged “complicity” with the capitalist and 
colonialist world order, which basically correspond to the notion of 
(parasitic) exploitation, and the attribution of power and artificiality or 
abstractness. One specific post- or de-colonial feature is the attribution of 
“whiteness” to Jewish communities, usually contrasted with the 
“Islamophobic” racialization of Muslim communities that are framed as 
subaltern. In such a view, the currently observable Islamization of 
antisemitism is also explained correspondence-theoretically as an outcome 
of the Middle East conflict or—more explicitly—as “anti-colonial 
resistance”. The whiteness-frame thus shifts the traditional opposition 
between the (exploiting) ruling class and the (exploited) subaltern to an 
ethnicized and racialized level. 
 
 49. David Hirsh, “Hostility to Israel and Antisemitism,” Journal for the Study of 
Antisemitism 5, no. 1 (2013): 23-45. 
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Pertaining to the attribution of whiteness is the colonial framing of the 
Israeli state. Main discursive features are the depiction of Israel as a racist, 
colonial apartheid-state, whereby extreme articulations compare the Israeli 
“perpetrator state” with National Socialism. Part of such inappropriate 
comparisons is the challenge to the idea of the Holocaust as a rupture in 
civilization, and the use of that challenge to make political claims about the 
dismissal of colonial atrocities. A look at European remembrance culture 
shows that such competitions are indeed connected to the ongoing 
suppression of the remembrance of colonialism, while the Holocaust in the 
second half of the 20th century gradually turned into a signifier for a unified 
Europe that has come to terms with its genocidal past. Victorious colonial 
powers especially, such as France, framed themselves as liberators from 
fascism and National Socialism while contemporaneously suppressing 
Maghrebian anticolonial movements after World War II.50 Such a 
silencing, however, is due to political decisions on the level of ideological 
state apparatuses and their influence on the hegemonic discourse, and 
surely not an outcome of the alleged privileging of Jewish suffering as it is 
presented in biased post- and de-colonial accounts. Furthermore, the 
depiction of a privileged suffering of Jewish communities due to their 
“whiteness” is intrinsically linked to de-colonial narratives of the 
establishment of the Israeli state as colonial endeavor—and, as shown 
above, this framing can blur with antisemitic tropes and topoi. Most 
decisive in this context is the portrayal of Israel as the spearhead of the 
“War against Terror” and thus as forefront of the neo-colonial world order. 
In this way, the Middle East conflict—and especially the Israeli state—
function as an anti-colonial symbol for the neo-Colonial evil. Such focus 
on Israel as a symbol for neo-colonialism feeds into the antisemitic trope of 
the “Imperial Jew”, and relates to imaginations of a Jewish super-power 
and thus ultimately to fantasies of world domination. 
In conclusion, one can say that the colonial framing of the Middle East 
conflict and Israel is fundamentally an anti-political one; it relates to 
dichotomous narratives of politics rather than to its analysis. As shown 
above, the formula is quite easy: Neither can Jewish communities be 
subaltern, nor can the Jewish state be other than a colonial construction 
imposed on “naturally” grown ethno-national collectives—a framing that 
has to be analyzed as part of an antisemitic pseudo-analysis of the current 
neo-colonial world system. In this sense, biased post- and de-colonial 
perspectives can be theoretically linked to Moishe Postone´s concept of 
“structural antisemitism”. Instead of providing a distorted and false 
explanation for capitalism, however, they produce an abridged and false 
 
 50. See  for  instance  Dan  Diner,  Gegenläufige Gedächtnisse. Über Geltung und 
Wirkung des Holocaust (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007). 
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explanation of colonialism. As this critique indicates, such theoretical 
analysis is urgently needed within post- and de-colonial perspectives. 
Antisemitism has to be analyzed as a negative leitmotif of modernity that 
follows certain patterns and frames.51 Such a frame-analytical view clearly 
shows that both the discursive “whitening” of Jewish communities and the 
imperial role of the Israeli state are (relatively) new, post-Holocaust 
features of structural antisemitism. 
  
 
 51. Samuel Salzborn, Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne. 
Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien im Vergleich (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2010). 
 



































































Holocaust Education in Austria in the Light of the 
Frankfurt School 
Elke Rajal* 
This article examines Holocaust Education in Austria, employing a Frankfurt 
School approach. It raises the question of what Holocaust Education can learn 
from Critical Theory as presented by Theodor W. Adorno. First, I outline the 
research design of a qualitative interview-study of Holocaust Education in 
Austria. Second, I explain the theoretical underpinnings, above all the ideals 
and goals of education and some concrete suggestions for education about the 
past from a Frankfurt School perspective. Then, I give a brief overview of the 
history and development of Holocaust Education in Austria. Finally, the 
findings of the qualitative interview-study are presented. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In 2010 I conducted a study into how the subjects of National 
Socialism and the Shoah are presented to school pupils in Austria1 My 
central objective was to determine the nature – the self-conception, content 
and pedagogical approaches – of what is known as “Holocaust Education” 
in Austria. I asked whether it made a contribution to the development of 
critical and mature subjects as defined by Critical Theory2, as described by 
Adorno3 To this end, I outlined the principles of education after Auschwitz 
 
 1. Elke Rajal. 2010. “Erziehung nach/über Auschwitz. Holocaust Education in 
Österreich vor dem Hintergrund Kritischer Theorie”, University of Vienna. Accessed July 
13th, 2015. http://othes.univie.ac.at/9158/1/2010-04-05_0307509.pdf. 
 2. I use the terms “Critical Theory” (in German “Kritische Theorie”) and “Frankfurt 
School” synonymously to mean a specific tradition of understanding society following 
Adorno, Horkheimer and other scholars of the Institute for Social Research. In this paper I 
mostly refer to Theodor W. Adorno.  
 3. E.g. Theodor W. Adorno. Minima Moralia. Reflexionen aus dem Beschädigten Leben 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1951); Erziehung zur Mündigkeit. Vorträge und 
Gespräche mit Hellmut Becker 1959-1969 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970); 
Studien zum autoritären Charakter (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973); “Schuld 
und Abwehr. Eine qualitative Analyse zum Gruppenexperiment”, in Gesammelte Schriften 
Bd. 9, ed. Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986a), 122-324; “Zur 
Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus heute”, in Vermischte Schriften II. Gesellschaft, 
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as defined within the framework of Critical Theory and, on this basis, 
conducted ten qualitative, problem-centered interviews4 with a variety of 
stakeholders in Holocaust Education in Austria: representatives of the 
Austrian Ministry of Education, personnel of the Austrian Interior Ministry 
(which is responsible for the Mauthausen Memorial) and members of 
several NGOs that organize educational activities related to National 
Socialism and the Shoah for students. Furthermore the findings of the 
qualitative content analysis of these interviews were contextualized by a 
document analysis of school curricula, programmatic texts and scholarly 
literature.5 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The theoretical foundations of my study were as follows. In the first 
place, I examined the position of education within the thought of the 
Frankfurt School (in particular in the work of Adorno). I analyzed and 
argued why and how education after Auschwitz should be pursued. I also 
investigated how education could contribute to combatting anti-Semitism. 
Then I compared and contrasted these findings with the term and concept 
of “Holocaust Education”. 
Adorno does not offer a specific theory of education. Nonetheless, a 
variety of pedagogical considerations play a role in his work. Moreover, 
much of relevance to the subject of education can be found in his non-
explicitly educational writings – above all, as regards the social, political 
and economic conditions for education. Education is the central topic of a 
number of lectures and discussions from the 1950’s and 60’s, including 
“Education to maturity” (1970), “Education after Auschwitz” (ibid.), 
“Education for debarbarization” (ibid.), “Education - what for?” (ibid.), 
“Taboos about the teaching profession” (ibid.) etc. 
In these writings, Adorno links education to the effort to shape mature 
and more or less autonomous subjects in order to prevent a relapse into 
barbarism. But, in his view, education cannot be understood in a social 
vacuum or as a cure-all for social and economic inequality. The potential of 
education is therefore seen as limited. However, Adorno also noted that: 
“Since the possibility of changing the objective – namely societal and 
political – conditions is extremely limited today, attempts to work against 
 
Unterricht, Politik, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 20, ed. Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986b), 360-384. 
 4. Jochen Gläser and Grit Laudel. Experteninterviews und Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse 
als Instrumente Rekonstruierender Untersuchungen (Wiesbaden: Vs Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2004). 
 5. For this paper I have updated my research findings to include more recent 
documents and texts. 
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the repetition of Auschwitz are necessarily restricted to the subjective 
dimension.”6 He concluded from this that education and the turn to the 
subject (defined below) were destined to play an important role in 
preventing attempts to repeat Auschwitz. So Adorno’s categorical 
imperative is: “The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz 
not happen again.”7 In the light of this imperative, the goals of education 
are seen as the following8: 
 Education for maturity (understood as independent and conscious 
decision-making); 
 Education towards critical self-reflection; 
 Education towards a strengthening of the ego (in the Freudian sense); 
 Strengthening of resistance rather than strengthening of adaptation; 
 Autonomy, understood as the power of reflection, self-determination 
and non-conformity; 
 Encouragement of individuality and prevention of blind identification 
with the collective; 
 Education for the ability to experience; 
 Education for imagination; 
 Education for disgust or shame about violence (without denying the 
necessity of violence for the purposes of anti-barbarism); 
 Education for the ability to recognize ideology as such. 
 
 6. Theodor W. Adorno. “Education after Auschwitz”, in Can One Live after 
Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader, ed. Theodor W. Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 20. 
 7. Ibid., 19. The essay “Erziehung nach Auschwitz” was only translated into English 
in 1997. For further information see: Matthias Heyl. 1999. “ ‘Holocaust Education’: 
Internationale Tendenzen im pädagogischen Umgang mit der Geschichte des Holocaust”, 
Forschungs- und Arbeitsstelle “Erziehung nach/über Auschwitz.” Accessed July 10, 2015. 
http://www.fasena.de/download/heyl/Heyl%20(1999).pdf. 
 8. For a more detailed treatment of the goals of education about the past see: Andreas 
Peham and Elke Rajal. “Erziehung wozu? Holocaust und Rechtsextremismus in der 
Schule”, in Jahrbuch 2010. Schwerpunkt: Vermittlungsarbeit mit Jugendlichen und 
Erwachsenen, ed. Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstands (Vienna: DÖW, 
2010), 38-65. 
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These goals also include the rejection of educational ideas which 
promote order, authority, collectives, adaptation and toughness –
represented above all by notions of masculinity. 
Adorno also provides some suggestions about how to achieve these 
goals: 
 Education means a turn to the subject, but, besides the concentration 
on individual education, great importance is given a to the 
enlightenment of society as a whole in order to create an intellectual, 
cultural and social climate in which a recurrence of Auschwitz would 
no longer be possible. 
 The turn to the subject means seeking to understand the mechanisms 
that render people capable of atrocities, explaining these mechanisms 
to people and awakening a general awareness of them. 
 One has to start with education in early childhood since this is when 
the foundations are laid for the development either of autonomous 
and reflective characters able to experience or, on the other hand, of 
authoritarian characters. This means minimizing the role of authority 
which is not understandable to the child and minimizing coldness and 
hardness. Adorno knew that you cannot preach love, but you can gain 
an insight into the conditions that determine coldness and attempt to 
combat them. 
 Adorno highlights the importance of pre-school education in order to 
respond to signs of ethnocentric reactions from the children. 
 The second focus is on political education. This is understood as 
sociology, meaning education about social dynamics (the relationship 
between the state - or society as a whole - and the individual). 
 Moreover, Adorno calls for an education in an ability to be critical 
towards the culture industry. 
These are Adorno’s ideals and suggestions as regards education at a 
general level. He also provides some further suggestions which can be very 
useful for education about the past (or in more specific terms, about 
National Socialism and the Shoah). Let me mention just some of them: 
 According to Adorno, you should not appeal to values  (over which 
those who are capable of atrocities merely shrug their shoulders). 
 He says that you should not stop at the accusation, but confront the 
horror. 
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 He problematizes the approach of personalized Holocaust 
Education.9 
 He also indicates the risk of personal encounters in situations where 
participants are unable to put aside their prejudices and allow human 
experiences. He notes that the idea that personal encounters with 
Jews could prevent antisemitism is bound up with the assumption that 
antisemitism has something to do with the Jews. For the same reason, 
you should also not refer to the assumed positive attributes of the 
victims. Adorno does not believe that enlightenment about positive 
qualities possessed by persecuted minorities would be of much use. 
 So one of his most important ideas is that the roots must be sought in 
the persecutors and not the victims. 
 Therefore, as previously mentioned, Adorno emphasizes the 
importance of awareness of the subjective mechanisms that enabled 
Auschwitz and education about them. 
 According to him, the first requirement is the education of the 
educators and also reflection by them about their profession and their 
role – and I would add, the institution they are working in too. 
To summarize: Education happens under definite social, political and 
economic conditions. Therefore its possibilities are limited. The Frankfurt 
School does not believe in education as a cure-all for social injustice, but 
that it can play an important role in the process of debarbarization. The 
categorical imperative for all education is to work against the recurrence of 
Auschwitz. The general goals of education are maturity, individuality, 
critical self-reflection, strengthening of the ego and so on. Adorno 
highlights not only early-childhood education, but also political education 
understood as sociology. In addition, he gives a lot of thought to 
antisemitism, offers proposals for combating it, and identifies some of the 
risks of the different approaches. 
Now, let’s look at what is known today as Holocaust Education. What 
similarities and differences can we find between the conception of 
Education after and also about Auschwitz as indicated by Adorno and 
contemporary theories of Holocaust Education? 
Holocaust Education is the contemporary term for teaching and 
learning about National Socialism and the Shoah. It is not only a practice, 
 
 9. Adorno cites the example of a woman who, after having seen a play about Anne 
Frank, said that they should have spared this one. See: Theodor W. Adorno, Erziehung zur 
Mündigkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), 26. 
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but also a pedagogical discourse about the conveyance not only of 
knowledge about the Shoah, but also of values10 
Education after Auschwitz, in Adorno’s eyes, is more than education 
about Auschwitz or Holocaust Education. Nonetheless both conceptions 
share the concern to enlighten people about Auschwitz and both share an 
ethically based imperative. Holocaust Education (in most conceptions) does 
not only embrace the transfer of knowledge but also of certain values. 
These include the promotion of democratic behaviors, and the reduction of 
prejudice, aggression, and so on. So, we can already see that the 
conceptions of “Education after Auschwitz” and of “Holocaust Education” 
have quite a bit in common (especially as regards the goals), but later we 
will see that there are also a lot of differences and that there are some 
things Holocaust Education could learn from the Frankfurt School. 
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HOLOCAUST EDUCATION IN AUSTRIA 
Immediately after the war the Austrian educational system was in a 
very bad way. Most school buildings had been damaged and, most 
significantly, there was a lack of non-Nazi teachers. National Socialism had 
been well-established in public education: overall, around 80% of grade 
school teachers were members of the NSDAP. So, while after the liberation 
of Austria many teachers were suspended, most were soon re-engaged.11  
Re-education did not really work in Austria.12 
 
 10. Angela Kühner, Phil C. Langer and Robert Sigel. “Ausgewählte Studienergebnisse 
im Überblick”, in Einsichten und Perspektiven. Bayrische Zeitschrift für Politik und 
Geschichte, Themenheft 01/2008, Holocaust Education. Wie Schüler und Lehrer den 
Unterricht zum Thema Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust Erleben, ed. Bayrische 
Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit (Würzburg: Bayerische Landeszentrale für 
politische Bildungsarbeit, 2008), 76. 
 11. Dieter Stiefel. Entnazifizierung in Österreich (Wien/München/Zürich: 
Europaverlag, 1981), 161f. 
 12. The term ‘re-education’ refers to the educational activities of the Allies in post-war 
Germany and Austria aimed at building democratic societies. In Austria these attempts were 
soon dropped in the course of the establishment of the victim myth. For the differences 
between Austria and Germany see: Werner Bergmann, Rainer Erb and Albert Lichtblau, 
Schwieriges Erbe. Der Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Antisemitismus in Österreich 
und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1995). For postwar 
education in Austria see: Peter Utgaard, Remembering and Forgetting Nazism. Education, 
National Identity, and the Victim Myth in Postwar Austria (New York/Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2003). 
 
2015] HOLOCAUST EDUCATION IN AUSTRIA 59 
Moreover, the myth of Austria as the first victim of the German 
aggressor was soon established and as a result Austrians were not held 
responsible for all the atrocities.13 
From the 1960’s onwards, National Socialism was mentioned in the 
official curriculum for Austrian schools. However, in practice, National 
Socialism and the Shoah were often not taught in the classroom – and when 
they were, it was from the point of view of the victim-myth with a focus on 
conservative or social-democratic resistance movements and fighters. 
The 1970’s saw a couple of changes. The Mauthausen Memorial 
Museum was opened, the Ministry of Education established a service that 
provided contemporary witnesses for schools and Political Education 
became a so-called ‘teaching principle’14 
Starting in the 1980’s, Hermann Langbein, a Holocaust survivor, 
organized seminars about National Socialism for teachers. In the same 
decade, because of the Waldheim affair, the victim-myth also began to 
crack and Austria began to take some responsibility.15 
As a consequence, in the 1990’s, several initiatives and NGOs were 
founded and a number of museums opened or reopened their doors (the 
“Jüdische Museum Hohenems”, the “Mauthausen Komitee Österreich”, the 
“Verein Gedenkdienst”, and others). At the end of the 1990’s “erinnern.at” 
was founded. This is a platform financed by the Austrian Ministry of 
Education that offers teachers further training in the field of National 
Socialism.16 
Since 2000, one or two groups of teachers have been sent each year to 
Yad Vashem for further training. In 2001, Austria joined the “Task Force 
for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and 
Research” (ITF) (now called the “International Holocaust Remembrance 
Alliance”). In 2007, the Mauthausen Memorial established an educational 
department. And more and more NGOs working with school classes were 
also founded. 
 
 13. Heidemarie Uhl. “The Politics of Memory: Austria’s Perception of the Second 
World War and the National Socialist Period”, in Austrian Historical Memory & National 
Identity, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1997), 64-94. Or: Judith Beniston, “‘Hitler’s First Victim?’ Memory and Representation in 
Post-War Austria: Introduction,” Austrian Studies 11, (2003): 1-13. 
 14. This means that it is not a teaching subject in itself but appears within several 
different subjects. 
 15. Regarding the Waldheim debate and its consequences also see Uhl, H. “The 
Politics of Memory: Austria’s Perception of the Second World War and the National 
Socialist Period”, in Austrian Historical Memory & National Identity, ed. Günter Bischof 
and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 64-94. 80ff. 
 16. Austrian Federal Ministry for Education, Arts and Culture. 2015. erinnern.at 
Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust: Gedächtnis und Gegenwart. Accessed July 10, 2015. 
http://www.erinnern.at. 
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What really happened in schools during all these years, of course, we 
don’t know. One of my interviewees even called it a “black hole”. 
CONTEMPORARY HOLOCAUST EDUCATION 
Today Holocaust Education mostly takes place during history classes 
or in school projects in 8th grade, at the age of about 14. The curriculum 
suggests 5 to 10 class hours of teaching on this subject. If young people 
continue general education they will learn about National Socialism and the 
Shoah again at the age of about 17. This does not, however, apply to those 
young people who start to work right after compulsory school or who 
attend vocational school. 
Teachers learn how to teach about National Socialism and the Shoah 
at a teacher training college or university. The Ministry of Education has a 
big influence on the colleges where grade school and secondary modern 
school teachers are educated and is currently trying to expand training in 
teaching about National Socialism. The university courses allow students to 
choose whether they want to learn about Auschwitz: future teachers have to 
take two classes in contemporary history, but none of them has to be about 
National Socialism or the Shoah17 If teachers want to learn more about 
teaching these topics they can attend workshops, for instance those offered 
by the platform erinnern.at, but this is not compulsory either. 
So, we have a very patchy situation: There are some very well trained 
and motivated teachers involved in teaching about National Socialism. 
There are others who have not even learnt about teaching National 
Socialism at university and who don’t want to attend voluntary advanced 
training. Some schools organize time-intensive projects and others provide 
some hours of not very well informed teacher-centered teaching about the 
Shoah. Many of them send their pupils quite unprepared to a former 
concentration camp18 and believe that this will provide effective 
immunization against racism, antisemitism, right wing extremism, or 
 
 17. Linda Erker, “Holcaust und Öffentlichkeit: Zur Wissensvermittlung in Österreich”, 
in Der Holocaust in der Deutschsprachigen Geschichtswissenschaft. Bilanz und 
Perspektiven, ed. Michael Brenner and Maximilian Strnad (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 
2012), 145-161. 
 18. According to a study of school field trips by students of Vienna University’s 
Institute for Communication Science from 2009, 57% of pupils involved were totally or 
almost unprepared when they came to Mauthausen. See: Gundula Säckl. 2008. 
“Projektbericht. Mauthausen Memorial – Auswertung der BesucherInnenbefragung 
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whatever. So, it is very hard to describe the reality of Holocaust Education 
in Austria, as it is extremely diverse. 
For my study19, I conducted interviews with leading or highly 
motivated people active in the field of Holocaust Education in Austria. I 
asked them about: 
 their own definition of Holocaust Education; 
 why and to what ends they promote Holocaust Education; 
 the relevance of societal, political and economic conditions for the 
teaching of the Shoah in Austria; 
 the content they consider important within Holocaust Education, as 
regards perpetrators and victims; antisemitism; and National 
Socialism as a political, economic and social system, and, finally; 
 how teaching and learning about National Socialism and the Shoah 
should be conducted. 
The answers from my interview partners were as diverse as the general 
situation. 
Concerning the Definition of Holocaust Education 
Their definitions differed, but nearly all of them said that it meant not 
only learning about but also learning from the Holocaust. Some of them 
rejected the term Holocaust Education to describe their work, preferring the 
term “historical-political education”. None of them referred to “Education 
after Auschwitz” as described by Adorno. 
Concerning the Goals of Holocaust Education 
Here, there were three different fields: First, the transfer of knowledge 
about National Socialism and the Shoah. Second, the formation of 
character attributes to enhance the capacity for empathy and third, 
democracy and human rights education. Most, but not all, mentioned all 
three fields. All in all, it became apparent that in most cases the goals for 
Holocaust Education are as ambitious as the goals for education after 
Auschwitz described by Adorno. 
Concerning the Relationship between  
 
 19. Rajal, Erziehung nach/über Auschwitz. 
 
62 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [VOL. 7:53 
Holocaust Education and Social Structures 
I asked my interview partners about the effect of social structures on 
the opportunities for and effectiveness of Holocaust Education and about 
the specifics of Holocaust Education within a post-National-Socialist 
society. Most interview partners said that Holocaust Education is seen by 
society as something like a fire brigade to be called after antisemitic or 
racist incidents. They themselves see Holocaust Education more as a 
learning opportunity than as a magic bullet even though their goals are very 
ambitious. One interview partner (representing the NGO Gedenkdienst) 
said that a critique of society ought to be an explicit requirement of 
Holocaust Education. On the other hand, two interview partners 
(representing the NGOs “March of Remembrance and Hope” and “A Letter 
to the Stars”) were very optimistic about reaching their goals. One even 
said that pupils would extract a lot of humanity from the big Holocaust 
Education events that his NGO organizes. Most did not mention the need 
for a critique of society. 
The same line of divide was also apparent in relation to the specifics 
of Holocaust Education in a post-National-Socialist-society: Some of the 
interview partners adopt a universalistic approach, seeing Holocaust 
Education as a matter of humanity, tolerance and civil courage, while 
others emphasized the importance of regional history and the specifics of 
Holocaust Education in Austria. One interview partner (the representative 
of “erinnern.at”) criticized the dehistorization of the Shoah and claimed to 
follow a “history & presence-principle” that maintained a constant focus on 
the history of National Socialism and its contemporary relevance. 
Concerning the Content of Holocaust Education 
Most of my interview partners said that, especially in the 1990’s, 
educators had become aware of the importance of making greater use of the 
stories of the victims. Perpetrator issues, they said, ought to play a 
subordinate role, but school books still often show things from the 
perpetrators’ point of view. Some of my interviewees insisted on the 
importance of incorporating the findings of perpetrator research. Others 
said that it was more important to present the biographies and positive 
qualities of the victims. 
A very interesting finding of my interview-study is that the theme of 
antisemitism does not play an important role in Austrian Holocaust 
Education. Even though all my interviewees emphasized the contemporary 
relevance of Holocaust Education, contemporary antisemitism was not 
mentioned. This is also a finding of the document analysis: in school 
books, antisemitism is mentioned in connection with the crusades and then 
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there is nothing until the 19th century or even the NS era. You cannot find 
anything about antisemitism in connection with conservative parties, 
Catholicism or anti-capitalism and so on. Moreover, antisemitism is not 
mentioned in the curricula of Austrian schools although Jewish life has 
been included since 2008. However, in 2012 “erinnern.at” published 
teaching materials with the title “A human being is a human being. Racism, 
antisemitism and you name it” which are an adaptation of teaching 
materials from the “Anne Frank Center Amsterdam” and the “Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights” of the OSCE.20 But all in all, 
the history, presence and functions of antisemitism seem to be neglected. 
Likewise National Socialism as a social system seems to be subordinated to 
personal stories. 
Concerning how to teach and learn about National Socialism and the 
Shoah: Holocaust Education in Austria takes place at school, in projects 
and on field trips. But we can also find mass events based on the idea that 
collective experiences are of special value. Moreover, in addition to a lot of 
teacher-centered learning, there are also some projects that adopt a peer-to-
peer-approach or use external trainers. 
CONCLUSION 
As regards the goals, we can find many similarities between 
“Education after Auschwitz” as it is described by Adorno and “Holocaust 
Education” in Austria. It is striking that almost all actors refer to the 
categorical imperative of Adorno but hardly at all to the Frankfurt School’s 
other assumptions and findings. 
While Adorno views “Education after Auschwitz” as a project 
beginning with early-childhood education and in terms of the 
enlightenment of society as a whole, Holocaust Education lasts for periods 
ranging from a few hours to a semester. Nevertheless, Adorno sees more 
limits at the level of goals than many actors in the field of Holocaust 
Education. 
All but two of the interviewees affirmed the effectiveness of 
Holocaust Education as a tool for human rights and democracy education. 
They believed that democratic values could be learned through studying 
National Socialism and the Shoah. In the light of the Frankfurt School’s 
ideas, I would be very skeptical that Holocaust Education is really the right 
 
 20. Werner Dreier, Maria Ecker and Albert Lichtblau. “A human being is a human 
being. Racism, anti-Semitism and you name it”, erinnern.at. Austrian Federal Ministry for 
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tool for this. In my opinion, you cannot learn much about democracy from 
studying National Socialism. Human rights and civil courage are better 
learned in early childhood, when the foundations of prejudices are laid, and 
perhaps through Civic Education. These issues need to be addressed 
independently and cannot be replaced by Holocaust Education. 
What is clearly discussed too little in Holocaust Education is 
antisemitism, especially its mechanisms and functions. Antisemitism is 
often addressed as a subform of racism, rather than seen in its uniqueness, 
and is often taught as if of solely historical interest. Taking historical as 
well as contemporary antisemitism seriously, sensitizing the youth to it so 
that they can identify it within themselves, political debates and the media 
would be an important lesson from the Shoah and a goal which could be 
realistically achieved. 
The same applies to National Socialism as a social system and notably 
the school system under National Socialism. These topics are clearly 
underrepresented although they would provide plenty of connecting factors 
with the present and the student’s everyday life. It would also sensitize 
students to long-term effects and continuities and therefore promote a more 
critical perspective on Austrian society, politics, and institutions. 
Concerning the education of the educators: There is education of the 
educators concerning the Shoah, but at university level it is voluntary. 
Further training is offered but that too is voluntary. Education of the 
educators should be intensified in the two above-mentioned areas —
antisemitism and National Socialism as a social system. 
What the comparison of “Education after Auschwitz” and “Holocaust 
Education” shows is that the Shoah should not be taught in order to make 
young people better democrats but because it happened. In view of what 
happened, there should be no need for further reasons or justifications. 
Some of the goals connected with Holocaust Education are simply not 
within reach, so it should not be overloaded or played off against other, 
also necessary approaches and topics (such as human rights education). 
Also the environment of Holocaust Education should be considered more 
seriously. It is paradoxical to teach disobedience within a strongly 
hierarchical school system. In order to reach at least some of the ambitious 
goals it is necessary to reflect on the education system and the social 
climate as a whole. In the light of the Frankfurt School’s insights, 
Holocaust Education appears as a useful but limited effort. It is just one 
part of what Adorno called “Education after Auschwitz”. 
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Blurring the Boundaries: 
What’s New in the New Antisemitism? 
Holger Knothe* 
This article addresses whether there has been a qualitative change in the nature 
of antisemitic resentment in Germany and of the interpretation of this change. 
Overshadowing this debate is the potential for secondary antisemitic reactions 
in post-Holocaust Germany. The article also reflects on the term “new 
antisemitism” which suggests qualitative differences between an old European 
antisemitism, and a so-called “new antisemitism.” Yet there is little clarity 
about the characteristics of this alleged qualitative change or whether they 
justify talk of a “new antisemitism” The article examines whether the changes 
amount to a change in the structural characteristics of antisemitic resentment 
and the main features of the changes themselves and goes on to discuss the 
“newness” in the light of antisemitism’s protean, manifold and flexible nature. 
The question whether current manifestations of antisemitism exhibit 
different characteristics from those of older manifestations is not only a 
scholarly, but also a political one since it bears on the adequacy of both 
scholarly and political efforts to combat contemporary antisemitism. The 
link between scholarship and politics can be seen in the results of a 
representative survey conducted in 2009 which registered the change in the 
nature of antisemitic resentment. The survey revealed that 13% of 
Germany’s population question Israel’s right to exist. The challenge to 
Israel’s very right to exist goes far beyond any so-called “acceptable 
criticism of Israel”; it indicates antisemitic resentment. So far so bad, one 
might say. Even more interesting is another number from the same survey: 
Among supporters of the German Left Party (Die Linke) 28% or over a 
quarter denied Israel’s right to exist.1 This suggests an erosion of the once 
commonplace equation of terms and attitudes like “left” and “progressive” 
on the one hand, and “non-antisemitic” on the other. It can of course be 
argued that the history of the political left does not in any case support the 
assumption of such an equation, especially in the German context since 
1967. Yet within the self-perception of the political left the equation does 
 
 1. Stern, Jeder zweite nennt Israel aggressive, 2009; 
http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/stern-umfrage-jeder-zweite-nennt-israel-aggressiv-
651466.html [accessed 27/08/2014]. 
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exist and is still meaningful. This small example does not offer any hints 
about the driving forces of this erosion but it does indicate a mingling of 
what we might have expected to be incompatible attitudes. Things seem to 
be in flux. This is reflected somewhat in the term “new antisemitism,”2 
which suggests qualitative differences between an old antisemitism, and a 
so-called “new antisemitism”. 
Yet the distinction between old and new antisemitism is the subject of 
manifold and often confusing debates, in which the positions range from an 
ardent conviction of the existence of a qualitative change3 to total rejection 
not only of the change itself but even of its antisemitic character,4 with 
some describing the accepted newness not as antisemitism but as 
Judeophobia.5 In short there is confusion not only as regards the observed 
phenomena but also at the level of scholarly debates. Moreover, the 
scholarly controversy in all its sharpness is clearly related to distinct 
political positions. So not only for scholarly, but also for political reasons, 
it would be helpful to establish what is “new” in “new antisemitism” and 
what the characteristics of the qualitative change in fact are. Do these 
characteristics justify the talk of a “new antisemitism”? Or is the distinction 
“much too rigid”6 on the scholarly level, and a “dangerous and potentially 
misleading exercise”7 on the political level? In other words: Is there 
anything “new” here at all? To answer these questions we need briefly to 
recall what the so-called “old antisemitism” is all about. 
 
 2. Doron Rabinovici, Ulrich Speck, and Natan Sznaider, eds., (2004). Neuer 
Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004). 
 3. Alain Finkielkraut, “Im Namen des Anderen. Reflexionen über den kommenden 
Antisemitismus.” in Doron Rabinovici, Ulrich Speck, and Natan Sznaider, eds., Neuer 
Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), 119-132; Robert 
S. Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession. From Antiquity to the Global Jihad (New York: Random 
House, 2010). 
 4. Brian Klug, “The Collective Jew: Israel and the New Antisemitism,” Patterns of 
Prejudice, 37, no. 2 (2003): 117-138; Brian Klug, “Is Europe a Lost Cause? The European 
Debate on Antisemitism and the Middle East Conflict,” Patterns of Prejudice, 39, no. 1 
(2005): 46-59; Brian Klug, “Interrogating “New Anti-Semitism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
36, no. 3 (2013): 468-482; Steven Beller, “In Zion’s Hall of Mirrors: A Comment on Neuer 
Antisemitismus?,” Patterns of Prejudice, 41, no. 2, (2007): 215-238. For an instructive case 
study of the French “antisémitisme nouveau” see Timothy Peace, “Un Antisémitisme 
Nouveau? The Debate about a ‘New Antisemitism’ in France,” Patterns of Prejudice, 43, 
no. 2, (2009): 103-121. 
 5. Pierre-André Taguieff, Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004). 
 6. Yehuda Bauer, Antisemitism and Antizionism–new and old. In Robert Wistrich, 
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STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTISEMITISM 
Antisemitism as a generic term for all common and known types of 
enmity against Jewry includes very different resentments, prejudices and 
attitudes. From an antisemitic perspective, for example, Jews have been 
held responsible for the murder of Jesus Christ, the excesses of capitalism, 
and for plotting the communist world revolution. The wide range of 
different and even contradictory resentments comprised by antisemitism is 
a crucial and basic characteristic of an antisemitic mindset. At the same 
time, it is also a major reason for the attraction of antisemitism. The 
logically incoherent mixing up of prejudices with different historical roots 
points to an ideological formation capable of interpreting the world without 
regard for real societal developments. Thus antisemitism can be seen as an 
explanatory model “for the not understood development trends in civil 
society.”8 
Over and above the historical taxonomies which refer mostly to 
visible manifestations of antisemitic resentment such as, e.g., “religious 
antisemitism”, “racist antisemitism”, “secondary antisemitism”, “anti-
Zionist antisemitism”, and “Islamist antisemitism,”9 it would be useful to 
analyze the structural characteristics of antisemitism. According to Haury,10 
three structuring principles characterize the ideology of antisemitism: First 
there is a Manichean separation, in both the perceptible and the imaginary 
worlds, into two parts: good and evil. This duality continuously encodes all 
experience. Only good and evil exist and both sides are connected only by 
struggle, not negotiations. Typical examples of this dichotomy are such 
common antisemitic contrasts and contradictions as the one described by 
the German terms Schaffen vs. Raffen - which basically means work vs. 
greed, physical labor vs. intellect, or naturalness vs. artificiality or the 
contrast between so-called “organic” industrial capital and “parasitic” 
financial capital. The confrontation between the concrete world, which is 
celebrated, and the abstract world, which is denigrated, becomes 
fundamental. The solution to this conflict can only be reached by erasing 
one side, in this case the evil (Jewish) side.11 
 
 8. Reinhard Rürup, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus. Studien zur „Judenfrage” der 
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), 91. 
 9. Samuel Salzborn, “Die Genese des Antisemitismus in Europa,” in Samuel 
Salzborn, Antisemitismus. Geschichte, Theorie, Empirie (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 11-
23. 
 10. Thomas Haury, Antisemitismus von Links. Kommunistische Ideologie, 
Nationalismus und Antizionismus in der früheren DDR (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 
2002), 105. 
 11. In coining the phrase „Erlösungsantisemitismus” (redemptive antisemitism), Saul 
Friedländer [“Erlösungsantisemitismus. Zur Ideologie der ‘Endlösung,’” in: Saul 
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Personification, as the second structuring principle of antisemitic 
ideology, is connected with the first one, the Manichean dichotomy, since 
complex societal processes are not only resolved into a dichotomy of good 
and evil, but also attributed personally. In this way, these complex societal 
processes can be made graspable and manageable. Reducing complexity by 
personification is of course not exclusive to an antisemitic world view and 
is frequently encountered in daily interactions, for instance in the common 
practice of blaming “the politicians” for the complex problems of modern 
society. This does not, however, affect the essential role personification 
plays as a basic structuring principle of antisemitic ideology, especially 
when it comes to collective affiliations. So, according to a conspiracy 
theory-minded perception, Jewry is directly responsible for the disturbing 
consequences of modernization. 
Thirdly, this homogenizing ascription of the “other,” produces an 
imaginary homogeneous collective and for the antisemite it is a social 
entity that is naturally harmonious. Particularly in times of social 
uncertainty, the importance of the identity-forming function of the 
homogenizing process cannot be overstated. The irony in this procedure 
lies in the inversion of cause and effect: It is the alleged threat to the 
community by the enemy construction of “Jewry” that enables the 
community to exist in the first place. 
MAIN FEATURES OF THE QUALITATIVE CHANGE 
Awareness of the structuring principles is a sine qua non for a 
discussion of a possible qualitative shift towards a new antisemitic 
resentment. Different authors identify varying numbers of developments 
expressing the qualitative change. Judaken,12 for example, mentions five 
vectors of transmission: 1) Holocaust denial; 2) Judeophobia in the Islamic 
World; 3) the anti-Israel bias of the radical left; 4) anti-Israel anti-racism; 
and 5) antizionism as antisemitism. Within this multi-level perspective on 
the process of qualitative transformation, one could say that the qualitative 
change in antisemitic resentment itself can be discussed in relation to three 
developments: 
Firstly, many antisemitic narratives refer to the State of Israel, which 
is claimed to be responsible for all sorts of crises in the globalized world. 
So in the year 2003, for instance, 65% of Germany’s population believed 
that the state of Israel was the biggest threat to world peace. According to 
 
Friedländer, den Holocaust beschreiben (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007), 28-53] highlighted 
the metaphysical and religious dimensions of this structural element.  
 12. Jonathan Judaken, “So What’s New? Rethinking the ‘New Anti-Semitism’ in a 
Global Age,” Patterns of Prejudice, 42, no. 4-5 (2008): 538. 
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this perception Israel ranked equal with North Korea and ahead of Iran.13 In 
other words, as Irvin Cotler14 pointed out, Israel has become the “collective 
Jew among the Nations”. The focus on and overestimation of the relative 
importance of this Middle Eastern hot spot results in a “double standard” in 
the judgement of Israeli politics, and offers a major discursive opportunity 
for antisemitic narratives. The location of the first development on the 
permeable boundary between anti-Zionism and antisemitism is by no 
means surprising. It is, on the contrary, integral to the discussion on the 
“newness” of the “new antisemitism”. According to Laqueur the whole 
discussion on “new antisemitism” can be reduced “to the question of 
whether antisemitism and anti-Zionism are two entirely distinct phenomena 
or whether anti-Zionism can turn into, in certain circumstances, 
antisemitism.”15 However, while the anti-Zionist perception of Israel is 
indeed a key element in contemporary antisemitic resentment, it is not the 
only one. 
Secondly, the integrative function of antisemitism is again 
increasingly coming to the fore compared to previous decades. 
Antisemitism can be seen as a unifying bond between political parties and 
positions like those of the extreme right, political Islam, parts of the radical 
left, and the middle-class centre that otherwise might seem irreconcilable.16 
Thus antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and anticapitalism can merge into one 
discursive formation. This attribute of antisemitic ideology cannot be 
considered as new. On the contrary, it is an essential as well as structural 
component, since a substantial characteristic of antisemitism’s paranoid 
structure lies in the simultaneous presentation of completely contradictory 
stereotypes and assumptions. From a historical point of view this structural 
element has always played an essential part in antisemitism’s success. So, 
for example, from the antisemitic perspective, Jewry as such was held 
responsible both for the excesses of capitalism and for plotting communist 
world revolution. 
Thirdly, there is the intermingling of anti-racist, human-rights-based, 
and emancipatory claims on the one side, and antisemitic and anti-Zionist 
narratives on the other. This was clearly apparent at the 2001 UN 
 
 13. European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 151. Iraq and Peace in the World. 
Full Report, 2003; 73; http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl151_iraq_full_report.pdf 
[accessed 22/05/2015]. 
 14. Irvin Cotler, (2009). Global Antisemitism. Assault on Human Rights. ISGAP 
Working Paper Series, 2009; http://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ISGAP-Working-
Papers-Booklet-Cotler-09-copy.pdf [accessed 03/07/2015]. 
 15. Walter Laqueur, The Changing Face of Antisemitism. From Ancient Times to the 
Present Day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 7. 
 16. Monica Schwarz-Friesel, and Jehuda Reinharz, Die Sprache der Judenfeindschaft 
im 21. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013). 
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sponsored Antiracism Conference held at Durban, South Africa. At the 
initiative of anti-racist NGOs, a final declaration of this “World Conference 
on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and related Intolerance” 
was charging Israel with genocide— the only nation to be cited.17 
The confusion between genuine anti-racist arguments and antisemitic 
narratives that became apparent during this and the follow-up conference in 
2009 (Durban II) does indeed suggest a different quality of antisemitic 
resentment.18 This assumption of a different quality unfolds against the 
background of the quantitative strength of antisemitic resentment within 
Germany’s population. According to one representative survey from 2011, 
nearly half (49%) of all Germans agreed with the statement “Jews try to 
take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era.”19 
Concurrently, anti-Zionism is still strong within Germany’s population. 
According to the same survey 48% of Germany’s population agree with the 
statement “Israel is conducting a war of extermination against the 
Palestinians”. Surveys repeatedly reveal the same picture, and it is hardly 
likely that the constant level of approval of secondary and anti-Zionist 
coded antisemitic narratives within the German population will change 
significantly. 
WHAT’S NEW IN THE NEW ANTISEMITISM? 
Do these features and characteristics justify the talk of a “new 
antisemitism”? Or, to put it another way, “Is there anything new in new 
antisemitism? Following every crisis in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 
Six-Day War, books or articles by activists or scholars20 have appeared 
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with titles referring to the “newness” of “new antisemitsm.”21 This does not 
in itself prove an absence of newness but rather reflects scholars’ efforts to 
characterize, and the difficulties in characterizing, the differences between 
contemporary antisemitism and its classical European form. 
So when we address the issue of the “new” in “new antisemitism”, we 
should consider the breaks and continuities within antisemitic resentment, 
since a focus on these breaks and continuities enables us to make temporal 
distinctions, to separate those elements that persist from those that change, 
and to distinguish those that have vanished from those newly arisen. In this 
perspective, viewed from the present, the breaks relate primarily to the 
forms of appearance and the political actors. A hundred years ago, for 
instance, the likelihood of antisemitic resentment being expressed in the 
terms of a human rights discourse was very small, because at that time it 
was first and foremost expressed in racial terms. The structuring principles 
of antisemitic ideology - Manichean separation, personification and 
homogenization - however remain basically the same while being 
refreshed, updated and extended by this new constellation of forms of 
appearance and political actors. 
There is indeed a different antisemitism at the level of forms of 
appearance, discursive opportunities, and political actors that blurs the 
boundaries, but in the end it is old wine in new bottles. Even so, new 
approaches are needed to tackle these new contemporary forms of 
antisemitism at both the theoretical and political levels. 
At the theoretical level the qualitative change has implications for the 
term antisemitism itself: It has become increasingly clear that a narrow 
definition of the phenomenon is unable adequately to explain its dynamics. 
For example, it is of little analytical value to apply the label of antisemitism 
to those who demonize the state of Israel, using anti-Zionist or antisemitic 
narratives. In analogy to other forms of resentment like racism, one can 
unintentionally utter antisemitic narratives and terms. A sociologist should 
not focus on intention or motive, but on analysing the antisemitic effect of 
such demonization in view of its societal resonance.22 This means a 
reconstructive focus on the issue of if and how anti-Zionist and antisemitic 
narratives are becoming socially acceptable. In the words of David Hirsh: 
“Antisemitism should be understood as a social phenomenon that is not 
reducible to the intent or the self-consciousness of the social actors 
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involved. Antisemitism is a social fact that is produced through shared 
meanings and exclusions; it is not an individual moral failing.”23 
So the question must be: Which factors promote and which factors 
prevent the development of an anti-Zionist and antisemitic hegemony in 
public discourse, bearing in mind that a general acceptance of anti-Zionist 
narratives will increase the likelihood of openly antisemitic movements? 
Another problem is that we are confronted with a blurring of the 
boundaries between classical and modern antisemitism. I follow here the 
approach and ideas of Dan Diner, who stated some years ago that the once 
clear-cut ideology of antisemitism is splintering into manifold und plural 
forms,24 with various side effects: 
The Holocaust led to the destruction of the classic (. . .) faith driven form of 
antisemitism. Morally broken, it cannot be reconstituted in conceptually 
similar terms. Without the appropriate conceptual density however it is hard to 
describe the negative sentiments extended towards Jews qua Jews. All that 
remains are particles of resentment emerging from the disintegrating mass, 
which are covered by what is imagined to be antisemitism. Like mildew these 
then cover the various incriminated phenomena which have somehow to be 
associated with the Jews. When seen against the earlier, historic density the 
nature of these particles of resentment should perhaps be described not as 
being antisemitic but rather as antisemitising. This characteristic however does 
seem to be quite ubiquitous.25 
Discrete elements of the classic antisemitic ideology therefore diffuse 
and combine with other narratives. The blurring of the boundaries between 
antisemitic narratives suggests an increase in the opportunities for political 
actors to articulate a somewhat encoded antisemitic resentment within the 
public sphere,26 especially given the latent antisemitic resentment within 
the German population. For instance, antisemitic stereotypes presented in 
the guise of criticism of Israel carry no or less stigma in Germany and thus 
can be expressed publicly.27 
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In the year 2002, for instance, the German politician Möllemann from 
the German Liberal party (FPD), at that time a key player in German 
politics, tried this during an election campaign by blaming Ariel Sharon for 
everything that had gone wrong in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather than 
making openly antisemitic remarks, he employed anti-Zionist narratives 
and secondary antisemitic ones in order to mobilize and gain more votes.28 
The outcome of this story can be seen in two ways: firstly, the strategy was 
not successful at short notice. The German Liberal Party did not win the 
following election. In fact, their result was disappointing in relation to their 
expectations and the polls. Secondly, it took the rest of Germany’s political 
and cultural elite a very long time to recognize Möllemann’s behaviour as 
antisemitic and scandalous. Both results do not mean that there will be no 
testing of the boundaries in the future by a mainstream politician in 
Germany, especially given the latent antisemitic resentment referred to 
above. 
Thus clarification is needed regarding the scope for gaining political 
influence offered by the use of structural antisemitic codes in the political 
arena. On the other hand, in response to the blurring of the boundaries of 
antisemitic ideology, institutional efforts have been made to take the 
blurring into account. The so-called “Working Definition on Antisemitism” 
proposed by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights29 is a 
good example of these efforts. In this “Working Definition” the following 
criteria for distinguishing between legitimate criticism of Israel and 
antisemitism are offered: firstly, the direct equation of the democratic state 
of Israel with the Nazi Regime; secondly, the use of classical antisemitic 
stereotypes such as “Old Testament-based hardness” or “vengeful Israel”; 
thirdly, the delegitimization of Israel; and fourthly the use of double 
standards such as talking about “Israeli State Terrorism” while 
simultaneously denying the “terrorist character of Hamas.”30 
Despite these institutional efforts to redraw the boundaries between 
legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism a dynamic grey area with 
 
 28. Samuel Salzborn and Marc Schwietring, “Antizivilisatorische Affektmobilisierung. 
Zur Normalisierung des sekundären Antisemitismus,” in Michael Klundt, Samuel Salzborn, 
Marc Schwietring, and Gerd Wiegel, eds., Erinnern, verdrängen, vergessen. 
Geschichtspolitische Wege ins 21. Jahrhundert (Gießen: NBKK, 2003), 43-76. 
 29. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Working Definition of 
Antisemitism, 2005; http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/AS/AS-WorkingDefinition-
draft.pdf [accessed 24/12/2007]. 
 30. Lars Rensmann, “Zwischen Kosmopolitanismus und Ressentiment. Zum Problem 
des sekundären Antisemitismus in der deutschen Linken,” in Matthias Brosch, Michael Elm, 
Norman Geißler, Brigitta E. Simbürger & Oliver von Wrochem, eds., Exklusive Solidarität. 
Linker Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Vom Idealismus zur Antiglobalisierungsbewegung 
(Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 172. 
 
78 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [VOL. 7:69 
nuances and ambiguities between latent and manifest antisemitism and 
between anti-Zionism and antisemitism still exists. In 2013 the Working 
Definition was dropped by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency, a 
decision that seems to mirror the dynamic and contested character of the 
grey area between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism on an 
institutional level. 
Structurally the qualitative change is related to the fact that not only in 
Germany, but also in Western Europe as a whole, the use of openly 
antisemitic resentment expressed in traditional ethnic terms in the public 
sphere is widely tabooed.31 Antisemitic resentment must, if it wants to be 
heard and recognized, take on different forms which are not discredited by 
the Shoah. 
As a result the resentment splinters into manifold different forms that 
are legitimate in public discourse. Does this justify the talk of a “new 
antisemitism”? 
Given the fact that antisemitism is an integral part of Western 
civilization and German society, whenever a “new antisemitism” or –even 
better –an “imported antisemitism” is discovered, one needs to ask about 
the function of this discovery especially in the German context. The talk 
about newness and especially about new antisemitic actors like Muslim 
youth all too often serves a discursive function of exculpation and 
externalization for a latently antisemitic society like the German one.32 
From this perspective, antisemitism does not only come from abroad via, 
e.g., Islamist cable TV-stations, but is also always the ‘antisemitism of the 
other’ regardless of whether it is considered “old” or “new”. 
Yet the splintering of antisemitism’s once coherent ideology into 
multiple antisemitisms and the mingling with the human rights discourse is 
only one side of the coin. On the other side more political and practical 
matters are to be found. And here the question of the consequences is 
important. 
HOW TO DEAL WITH IT POLITICALLY? 
So what are the implications for action? In my opinion, taking the 
blurring boundaries thesis seriously implies that the simple rejection of 
“classical” “old” antisemitism does not logically lead to immunity from 
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involvement in other of its multifarious and contemporary forms. Rather, 
the resulting manifoldness and ambiguity demand an effort of reflection. 
What would such a reflexive and sensible position look like? I want to 
illustrate this briefly with an example: In 2003, 20 Neo-Nazis attended a 
rally in Munich, organized by an anti-globalization network called 
“Attac”33 against the then forthcoming war against Iraq. Attac of course 
regards itself as anti-fascist and anti-racist and therefore anti-antisemitic. 
The question then is how this anti-globalization network reacted to the 
presence of openly antisemitic neo-Nazis in their demonstration. A 
qualitative content analysis of Attac’s own publications, comments, 
statements, etc. reveals the emergence of two main positions within the 
network over how to deal with this issue.34 One side, which was by far the 
stronger one, the so-called majority position, stressed the argument that you 
cannot prevent applause from the wrong quarter. They put it even more 
elaborately and in post-modern terms, “that there are no definite signs 
anymore and thus these can adopt a variety of meanings.”35 
In other words, the communication process itself is to blame. But 
Attac as a political actor is helpless against takeovers in general. The 
question of the reasons for the wrong quarter’s applause is suppressed, 
although neo-Nazis do not tend to join any and every rally or 
demonstration. This was exactly the question raised by the other, the so-
called minority position: the sometimes hard necessity to examine and 
revise one’s own agenda, when it has proved to be in some way attractive 
to neo-Nazis.36 
As one can see from this small example of political actors and 
movements, a protean, manifold, flexible resentment like antisemitism 
needs a reflexive approach if it is to be effectively addressed politically. 
This is of course even more vital if one wants to achieve a scientific 
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approach to the subject in order to identify changing forms of antisemitism 
and to “. . .marshal active resistance to it.”37 
 
 
* Holger Knothe is a scientific assistant in the Dept of Sociology at Ludwig-
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“You Cannot Be Jewish and Feminist” 
From Feminist Antisemitism to Post-Feminist 
‘Post-Zionism’ 
Ljiljana Radonić* 
For decades, dominant parts of Germany and Austria’s New Women’s 
Movement’ dismissed female perpetrators of the Third Reich viz., 
concentration camps overseers, welfare workers and denunciators 
enthusiastically participated in the antisemitic outlawing and extermination of 
Jews. By the 1980s feminist publications finally addressed the topic depicting 
Nazi women  as “birthing” and “surveillance” machines who had suffered “just 
like the Jews.” Few questioned the ‘perpetrator-victim reversal’ at that time. 
Matriarchal researchers blame Judaism for the destruction of matriarchy, the 
dominance of violence and the Shoah. While those theoreticians of the 
matriarchy were not representative for the feminist movement, the idea of 
Judaism as a patriarchal religion was put forth. This idea, paired with the 
secondary antisemitism of German and Austrian women blamed Jewish 
feminists saying Jewish and feminism were incompatible. As a result, many 
left for less hostile nations. From the early 1990s numerous studies on female 
Nazi perpetrators have been published, but female antisemitism still avoids 
scrutiny. Judith Butler reiterates that being Jewish and post-feminist is 
impossible—even today. 
It’s been over a decade since I published my analysis of how the ‘New 
Women’s Movement’ dealt with the question of female perpetrators in the 
Nazi era.1 I argue that, after decades of silence about this topic, the 
prevailing narrative in the 1980s was that of female victimhood; a 
perpetrator-victim-reversal in the course of which women were depicted as 
victims of mass murder. In the following discourse analysis of feminist 
texts from the 1980’s, I will show that this denial, called “Schuld und 
Erinnerungsabwehr” by Theodor W. Adorno, has been paired with the idea 
that Judaism was an especially patriarchal religion. The idea of female 
victimhood was dominant in different currents of the feminist movement in 
Germany and Austria in the 1980s – and at that time questioned only by a 
few marginalized and severely attacked critics. Yet some theoreticians of 
 
 1. Ljiljana Radonić, Die friedfertige Antisemitin? Kritische Theorie über 
Geschlechterverhältnis und Antisemitismus (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004). 
 
82 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [VOL. 7:81 
the matriarchy went even further by accusing Judaism of destroying a 
matriarchal system which, some scholars claimed, pre-dated monotheism – 
and ended up blaming Jews for the Shoah. The article argues that in the 
1980’s non-gender-specific elements of secondary2 antisemitism, like 
“anti-fascist anti-Zionism,” or the “reputable antisemitism” as Jean Améry 
has called it, became paired with feminist ideas such as that of Judaism 
being an especially patriarchal religion. Thus, while ‘the feminism’ does 
not exist, a specifically feminist form of secondary antisemitism does, 
despite all the significant differences between different currents. This 
atmosphere made Jewish feminists realize that is seemed impossible to be 
both Jewish and feminist in a German context. 
Later on, from the 1990’s onwards, several promising studies were 
published on female perpetrators, but the question of female antisemitism 
was either ignored or discussed in a highly ideological way, as the works of 
Margarete Mitscherlich3 showed, which I discussed in my book in 2004. 
Recently, two books have made me reappraise the state of the debate since 
they have shown that there are still some open questions regarding the 
relation of gender and antisemitism: Wendy Lower’s Hitler’s Furies. 
German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields (2013) and Judith Butler’s 
Parting ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism (2013). I will finish 
by taking a look at the question of how female anti-Semitism is discussed 
today in literature dealing with female Nazi perpetrators. And, given the 
fact that Butler is Jewish and a ‘post-feminist’ queer theoretician, the 
question must be asked: how compatible are these two factors today? 
FEMALE NAZIS 
During World War II, especially in Eastern Europe, Hitler’s Furies (as 
they were called in Lower’s 2013 book) experienced the daily routine and 
the attractiveness of the Ausnahmezustand4 as a new autonomy. The US 
 
 2. Elements of modern antisemitism were modified after 1945 when one could not 
openly say any more that Jews ruled the world and had to be annihilated. This secondary 
antisemitism “not despite, but because of Auschwitz” includes the denial of guilt and 
memory and claims that one has suffered “just like the Jews”, who will never forgive “us” 
Auswitz. By trend, to the Right the need to be able to identify with Germany again seems 
decisive while for the Left the predominantly anti-Zionist denial of responsibility becomes 
possible through e.g. arguing that Isrealis are the new Nazis –a perpetrator-victim reversal. 
Lars Rensmann, Kritische Theorie über den Antisemitismus. Studien zu Struktur, 
Erklärungspotential und Aktualität (Berlin/Hamburg: Argument, 1998). 
 3. Margarete Mitscherlich, Die friedfertige Frau. Eine psychoanalytische 
Untersuchung zur Aggression der Geschlechter (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1989). 
 4. This text regularly touches upon questions of German philosophy and ideology 
which lack direct translations into English. The term ‘Ausnahmezustand’ was coined by 
Carl Schmitt in the 1920s and later used for the Nazi regime – ultimately in an apologetic 
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historian Wendy Lower paints a convincing picture of the Ostrausch, the 
“intoxication of the East – (. . .) an imperial high that increased the violence 
of war and genocide”5, the picnics at the sites of mass murder, the Jew-
hunting societies, and the wives and mistresses of high-ranking Nazis 
looting in the ghetto. For the typical secretary who volunteered to ‘go east’, 
typing deportation lists was – as Lower showed – as much a part of the 
daily routine, as sparing people who they still needed in some way, e.g., the 
secretary who saved her Jewish hairstylist or the women “had not finished 
knitting a sweater for her”6 from deportation. The majority of those 
approximately 500.000 ‘ordinary women’ had volunteered for deployment 
in ‘the East’. 
The most prominent female perpetrators were the concentration camp 
overseers, trained mostly at Ravensbrück. We learn from Goldhagen that 
even in the end phase of the war, when orders often did not get through, the 
overseers acted on their own initiative: While everyone else got clothes and 
shoes for the death marches, Jewish women did not.7 On the home front, 
only caregivers murdered directly. This began with the T4 euthanasia 
program,8 but did not have an antisemitic background. In contrast to that, 
antisemitism was very much present among welfare workers 
(“Fürsorgerinnen”) who came to the conclusion that one could not visit 
Aryans after breathing the air from a Jewish flat.9 The field in which 
women were most strongly represented was among denunciators, around 
30 percent of whom were female.10 Such sometimes deadly activism was 
accompanied by the responsibility for making sure that neighbors did not 
buy from Jews. While some German women held rallies for their Jewish 
husbands, others organized themselves in the Stahlhelmfrauenbund (Steel 
 
way. The conventional translation as ‘state of emergency’ aims at democratic states, 
whereas the ‘Ausnahmezustand’ moves to the foreground the idea of imminence, first of all 
through the ‘Gegenvolk’. All the translations from German contained in this paper are mine. 
 5. Wendy Lower, Hitler’s Furies. German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields (New 
York: HMH, 2013) 
 6. Ibid., 105. 
 7. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitlers willige Vollstrecker. Ganz gewöhnliche Deutsche 
und der Holocaust (Berlin: Siedler, 1996), 413; Simone Erpel, ed., Im Gefolge der SS: 
Aufseherinnen des Frauen-KZ Ravensbrück (Berlin: Metropol, 2011). 
 8. Ernst Klee, “Euthanasie” im NS-Staat. Die “Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens” 
(Frankfurt: Fischer, 2011), 24. 
 9. Emilija Mitrovic, “Fürsorgerinnen im Nationalsozialismus: Hilfe zur 
Aussonderung,” in Opfer und Täterinnen. Frauenbiographien des Nationalsozialismus, ed. 
Angelika Ebbinghaus (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1996), 50. 
 10. Gisela Diewald-Kerkmann, Politische Denunziationen im NS-Regime oder Die 
kleine Macht der “Volksgenossen” (Bonn: Dietz, 1995), 131. 
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helmet women’s union) or the Arbeitsgemeinschaft völkisch gesinnter 
Frauen (Working committee of racially aware women).11 
Furthermore, Dagmar Herzog has shown that the official mother’s cult 
gives a false impression about Aryan sexuality in the Nazi era,12 which was 
actually characterized by a Nazi version of libertinage, especially when it 
came to the Bund Deutscher Mädel (BDM): it included the proliferation of 
condom machines and sex guidebooks which stressed the role of the clitoris 
and the importance of male and female orgasms. Conservatives and 
representatives of religious movements were strongly opposed by those 
who wanted to redefine sexual liberty as an Aryan privilege and free it 
from any association with Jews or Marxism.13 According to Herzog it was 
considered a priority in the 1950’s to establish a very different (sexual) 
morality – and to remove the condom machines – in order to delimit the 
Nazi era and restore marriage and family values. Yet, although even Viktor 
Klemperer wrote about the hospitals full of BDM girls suffering from 
gonorrhea, the dominant image of sexuality in the Nazi era today goes in an 
opposite – and quite delusional – direction. A group called A.G. Gender-
Killer stressed that the BDM focused on issues such as toughening girls up, 
group games, gymnastics, obedience, and a modest appearance without 
luxury, make-up or high-heels – the list is endless and includes everything 
but fun and sexuality.14 The authors claimed that the same applied to 
grown-up women who were clean, decent and disciplined, loyal 
housewives “desexualized and subordinated to biological expedience”15 
Herzog insightfully explains this shift in the narrative as a result of the 
‘normalization process’ of the 1950s, when it seemed impossible to admit 
in front of one’s children and the rest of the world that the Third Reich was 
in any way fun.16 
 
 11. Claudia Koonz, Mütter im Vaterland. Frauen im Dritten Reich (Freiburg: Kore, 
1991), 163–165. 
 12. Dagmar Herzog, Die Politisierung der Lust. Sexualität in der deutschen Geschichte 
des 20. Jahrhunderts (München: Siedler, 2005), 36. 
 13. Herzog, Politisierung der Lust, 24. 
 14. A. G. Gender-Killer,”Geschlechterbilder im Nationalsozialismus. Eine Annäherung 
an den alltäglichen Antisemitismus,” in Antisemitismus und Geschlecht. Von 
“maskulinisierten Jüdinnen”, “effeminierten Juden” und anderen Geschlechterbildern, ed. 
A.G. Gender-Killer(Münster: Unrast,2005) 37–38. 
 15. Ibid., 29–31. 
 16. Yet, Herzog does not discuss that the Nazi libertinage – understood in 
psychoanalytic terms – must been seen as one that wipes out the partial drives, which leads 
to a highly battered sexuality. (Ljiljana Radonić, “Genitalfixiert statt polymorph-pervers. 
Politisierung von Sexualität im Nationalsozialismus und heute,” Unique 11, 2012, 
http://www.univie.ac.at/unique/uniquecms/?p=2792. 
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GERMANY’S ‘NEW WOMEN’S MOVEMENT’ AND THE NAZI PAST 
While the state of research on the role of women in the Nazi era is 
satisfying today, this issue was largely ignored for decades after 1945. In 
the 1980’s, a lot of works were published, but the ‘New women’s 
movement’ in Germany and Austria largely turned a blind eye to female 
perpetrators in the Third Reich and depicted women as victims reduced to 
their role as mothers, as Angelika Ebbinghaus was one of the first to point 
out in 1987: “This might be explained by the fact that women’s 
historiography is often pursued with the goal to build a sense of identity.”17 
In 1990, Lerke Gravenhorst added that there had been individual cases of a 
feminist public confrontation with the Nazi period. “Jewish feminists 
contributed significantly to these discussions. But it seems that this has not 
led to a broad discussion of the issue.”18 
These publications broke with the myth of female victimhood, but 
they remained heavily criticized, since, until the late 1980’s, feminist 
publications had depicted women in the Nazi era predominantly as victims. 
So while the few critical publications until the 1990’s are of singular 
character, the examples I will quote in the following are picked from a high 
number of similar, repeating argumentations. Some authors denied that 
women had been perpetrators at all, like Annette Kuhn, who depicted 
Nazism as evil outside and a “dissident women’s culture inside”.19 Other 
feminist authors understood the crimes committed by women to be a result 
of female victimhood. Renate Wiggershaus depicted female overseers in 
concentration camps as “surveillance machines ready to function”. Just like 
“birthing machines”, they were simply women instrumentalized by men.20 
 
 17. Angelika Ebbinghaus, ed., Opfer und Täterinnen. Frauenbiographien des 
Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1996), 9. 
 18. Lerke Gravenhorst, “Nehmen wir Nationalsozialismus und Auschwitz ausreichend 
als unser negatives Eigentum in Anspruch? Zu Problemen im feministisch-
sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskurs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in Töchter Fragen. 
NS-Frauengeschichte, eds. Lerke Gravenhorst and Carmen Tatschmurat (Freiburg: Kore, 
1990), 18. 
 19. Annette Kuhn, “Zur Täterschaft von Frauen im NS,” in Dokumentation der AG 
“Täterinnen im Nationalsozialismus” des aktiven Museums, ed. Aktives Museum 
Faschismus und Widerstand in Berlin (Berlin: Verein aktives Museum, 1992), 12. Gerda 
Szepansky went in the same direction, arguing that the female struggle for survival was 
“resistive by its very nature” (“in sich widerständig”) since the struggle for survival meant 
struggle against the war and that opposition to the war was resistance against the system 
(Gerda Szepansky, “Blitzmädel”, “Heldenmütter”, “Kriegerwitwe” (Frankfurt: Fischer, 
1986), 70). 
 20. Renate Wiggershaus, “Frauen unterm Nationalsozialismus,” in Terror und 
Hoffnung in Deutschland 1915–1933. Leben im Faschismus, ed. Johannes Beck et al. 
(Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1980), 365. 
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This idea of female hench(wo)men was very popular in the 1980’s: “In 
1933 women had already internalized and accepted the basis of the 
patriarchal argumentation. From this point of view the misogynistic Nazi 
ideology and policy could be misunderstood as a departure towards a 
period of ‘equality’ and ‘tribute’ to women. This is how the victims could 
become hench (wo)men (Handlanger) of the perpetrators.”21 
The role of women in the Nazi era was often portrayed in a 
contradictory way, as the works of the famous psychoanalytic Margarete 
Mitscherlich show. In her book about “memory work”22 she both argued 
that women in the Nazi era came “just before cows”23 and that it is a pity 
that “today’s generation of young women does not identify with the 
mothers of the war and post-war years who learned to live independently, 
but with the women of the 1950s who blended into the earlier un-
pugnacious subordinated role and thus supported the regressive anti-
enlightening consolidation of family and gender relations.”24 So, did 
women in World War II live independently or were they subordinated 
almost like cows? Is Mitscherlich aware of female perpetrators when she 
mourns that young women do not identify with the women of the war 
years? She calls the gender relations of the 1950s anti-enlightening, 
ignoring the fact that the emancipation of women in the Third Reich was 
only possible due to their enhanced status as partners in the murderous 
Nazi politics. In her famous book titled The peaceful anti-Semitic woman25 
Mitscherlich at least tackled the question of female antisemitism, but came 
to the conclusion that women are not “really” antisemitic, and it is rather 
the case that they . . . 
“lapse into antisemitism as a consequence of their identification with male 
prejudices because they are afraid of love deprivation. . . . They comply 
acquiescently when confronted with inconsistent demands in the Third Reich: 
from a doe [Weibchen] at the stove that is supposed to give birth to sons for the 
Führer, to a BDM leader, munitions worker or even concentration camp 
overseer.”26 
Since the historical chapter above has shown that women did not only 
“comply”, but acted with self-initiative in an antisemitic and racist way, 
 
 21. Marianne Lehker, Frauen im Nationalsozialismus. Wie aus Opfern Handlanger der 
Täter wurden – eine nötige Trauerarbeit (Frankfurt: Materialis, 1984), 93. 
 22. Margarete Mitscherlich, Erinnerungsarbeit. Zur Psychoanalyse der Unfähigkeit zu 
trauern (Frankfurt: Fischer 1993). 
 23. Ibid., 152. 
 24. Ibid., 11. 
 25. Mitscherlich, Friedfertige Frau. 
 26. Ibid., 157. 
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Mitscherlich’s argumentation must be understood as denial of 
responsibility in order to create positive identification for women, her-story 
as opposed to history. 
Another element of this victimhood narrative is the idea of a 
Holocaust on Jews and women. According to Gisela Bock, who was not a 
feminist bigot from some kind of radical fringe but a history professor who 
rendered outstanding services to the institutionalization of gender history, 
one percent of both men and women were sterilized starting from 1934. 
Yet, she argues that this numerical parity served only “in order to hide” that 
the mass murder was part of Nazi politics especially against women.27 The 
death of the sterilized women “was not only an invidious ‘by-product’ of a 
birth policy aiming ‘only’ at sterilization and ‘not’ at murder, but planned 
and conscious mass murder. For women the sterilization program was not a 
pre-stage, but the beginning and the first stage of mass murder on women 
and men.”28 She claims that sterilized German women as well as murdered 
female Jews and Roma were part of the racist Nazi “birth war” – thereby 
mixing racial persecution with other reasons in order to construct an overall 
female victimhood. This peaks in the formula that – next to the “final 
solution of the Jewish question” – the Nazis planned a “solution of the 
women’s question”29 Since she demands that the treatment of female 
minorities must be understood as indicative for the “overall situation of the 
female gender”30, female perpetrators become unthinkable. The imagined 
mass murder of women is a specifically feminist form of the mechanism of 
perpetrator-victim reversal,31 demonstrated best by the feminist journal 
Schlangenbrut (“Brood of Vipers”) who declared 1988 the “year of the 
Holocaust on woman,” defined as “the destruction of our self-esteem, the 
fear that still burns inside of us as a result of the patriarchy”.32 
 
 27. Gisela Bock, Zwangssterilisation im Nationalsozialismus(Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1986), 12. 
 28. Ibid., 380. 
 29. Ibid., 18. 
 30. Ibid., 13. 
 31. The German term ‘Täter-Opfer-Umkehr’ is more precise than its common 
translation as ‘blaming the victim’ since it focuses more on the fact that the perpetrator or a 
group of perpetrators imagine themselves as victims (Max Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der 
instrumentellen Vernunft (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1997), 314). 
 32. Susanne Heschel, “Konfigurationen des Patriarchats, des Judentums und des 
Nazismus im deutschen feministischen Denken,” in Der feministische “Sündenfall”? 
Antisemitische Vorurteile in der Frauenbewegung, eds. Charlotte Kohn-Ley and Ilse 
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FEMINIST ANTISEMITISM AND ANTI-ZIONISM 
This mechanism went hand in hand with the idea that Judaism was an 
especially patriarchal religion, an argument which can be considered 
dominant among different feminist fractions.33 Yet, theorists of the 
matriarchy like the Catholic theologian Gerda Weiler went even further 
when they argued that Judaism had destroyed matriarchy: 
For our modern set of problems the history of the ‘chosen people’ has an 
exemplary character: Dissolved away from their ancestral ground this people 
leaves the tolerant Weltanschauung of their mothers, demonizes the all-
pervasive love of matriarchal religion, carries out destructive acts of 
aggression and strives for supremacy in the Middle East through a brutal 
‘extermination program’. On the flip side of power there is powerlessness. 
Israel is devastated and stops existing as a state. We can learn from this path 
that a total claim to power has to lead to doom and total annihilation.34 
Judaism is depicted as a morbid notion of a patriarchal God. As the 
feminist theologian and Jungian psychoanalytic Hanna Wolff put it: 
Whoever is familiar with literature on the morbid notion of God “does not 
wonder about wartime atrocities, concentration camps, the Holocaust or the 
newest excesses and is painfully forced to think about the relationship of 
such perverse violence to the morbid notion of God.”35 Since Judaism was 
responsible for the morbid notion of god and since this notion led to the 
Holocaust, the Jews were therefore themselves responsible for their 
annihilation. Furthermore, Wolff depicted Jesus as representative of female 
values and as the greatest Holocaust victim, “scarred and martyred through 
2000 years of our projections.”36 
The Protestant theologian Christa Mulack claimed that Jahwe had 
murdered the goddesses: 
The goddesses of revenge disappeared together with matriarchy and the just 
and holy anger of female power. This automatically made the regime more 
authoritarian, while power and law became absolute values. The last 
consequence of this process materialized in the Nazi system, in which ‘German 
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sons’ were trimmed to harass and kill Jewish mothers, children and fathers. 
This clearly shows how right the goddesses of revenge were when they 
prophesied: ‘A new law means upheaval [“Umsturz”] when the law of the 
mother’s murderer and perdition gain the upper hand.37 
These theologians obsessively repeated the analogy between the 
ancient crimes of Jews and the Holocaust. Mulack claimed that the 
Holocaust was only one of the numerous results of patriarchal thinking 
which was not only to be found in the Hebrew bible and was not only 
harmful towards Jews, “but first of all harmful to women. They are all 
tragic victims of the patriarchy in the same way.”38 Mulack accused her 
critics of mistaking anti-patriarchalism for antisemitism, which proved that 
they were still caught in patriarchal chains.39 The above-mentioned journal 
Schlangenbrut also claimed that those who accused the theorists of the 
matriarchy like Weiler or Mulack of anti-Semitism were showing 
themselves to be agents of the patriarchy who wanted to burn their sisters at 
the stake in order to succeed in the patriarchal system.40 
I argue that it is an expression of a specific female form of secondary 
antisemitism when matriarchal researchers blame Judaism and old Israel’s 
murderous program for the destruction of matriarchy and depict it as an 
especially patriarchal religion. This narrative is needed in order to 
understand all this to be an explanation for the Holocaust – and thus blame 
it on the Jews. Of course other feminist publications quoted above did not 
go so far as to blame the Jews for the Holocaust, but it would be too easy to 
understand these authors only as part of the religious anti-Jewish tradition, 
to ignore the secondary antisemitic element while putting their ‘feminism’ 
in inverted commas. 
Furthermore, Charlotte Kohn-Ley stresses the good relationship 
between German church-feminist and left-feminist groups who had anti-
capitalism and anti-Zionism in common.41 The specific feminist element is 
combined with the general anti-Zionist anti-Semitism predominant in left 
wing movements after the Six Days War up until today – a phenomenon 
Charlotte Kohn insightfully called “antifascist anti-Zionism”: 
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A thorough analysis of the development of the feminist movement after 1968 
shows that anti-Fascism and anti-Zionism became one ideological basis. All 
feminist efforts were based on this consensus: feminist theologians, theorists of 
the matriarchy, leftist groups, the feminist peace movement, the ecologists and 
women campaigning for the Third world, all of them were self-evidently 
antifascist anti-Zionists.42 
After the Six Days War numerous women’s conferences passed 
declarations in which they condemned Zionism as the worst form of 
racism. Phyliss Chesler describes such a conference in Copenhagen in 1980 
as her “first post-modern ‘pogrom’”, dominated by PLO women who not 
only made it impossible for Jewish women to speak about their 
persecution, e.g. in Iraq, but who totally dominated the events, even 
making it impossible for non-Jewish speakers to broach the issue of 
persecution of women. Although the Palestinian women did not even 
pretend to be feminists, their agenda was successful again and again since it 
met the anti-Zionist consensus first of all of the leftist feminists – 94 
members voted for the condemnation of Zionism as – next to Apartheid – 
one of the greatest evils of our time, only four voted against the declaration. 
Anti-Zionism which was not a feminist specific was conflated with the idea 
of Jews as especially patriarchal and thus developed a dynamic that often 
overshadowed discussions about the discrimination of women.43 The same 
happened five years later, at the world women’s conference in Nairobi in 
1985, where Israeli women were hushed by calls of “Do away with Zionist 
terrorists!” and Zionism was equated with Nazism, while no one bothered 
to be scandalized that the Kenyan president opened the conference by 
calling women “creatures of the human kind”.44 
In reaction to that, Jewish feminists often claimed that it had become 
impossible to be Jewish and feminist in (secondary antisemitic) Germany 
or Austria. 
Before leaving Germany, Maria Bader addressed the emotional cost of 
Jewishness. 
“This summer I will move to New York. This is the end of a part of my history 
which is . . . part of women’s history in Western Berlin and of Jewish history 
in post-war Germany. . . . I am tired of working myself into the ground in the 
German context. I don’t want to have to endure being Jewish here.”45 
 
 42. Ibid., 218. 
 43. Phyllis Chesler, Der neue Antisemitismus. Die globale Krise seit dem 11. 
September (Berlin: Schwartzkopff Buchwerke, 2004), 58–59. 
 44. Kohn-Ley, “Antisemitische Mütter – antizionistische Töchter?”, 227. 
 45. Maria Baader, “Zum Abschied. Über den Versuch, als jüdische Feministin in der 
Berliner Frauenszene einen Platz zu finden,” in Entfernte Verbindungen. Rassismus 
 
2015] FEMINIST ANTISEMITISM TO ‘POST-ZIONISM’ 91 
In Longing for Israel Leah C. Czollek described German Jewish 
experience in greater detail: 
Then, in Western Berlin, I come in touch with feminist therapists. I learn from 
them that Judaism is a patriarchal religion that one should categorically 
disapprove of. A Jewish woman and a feminist, that’s impossible. My identity 
is questioned. Germans still and repeatedly define what and who is Jewish . . . 
One of them feels persecuted in Germany like the Jews, because she is a 
feminist. I am either oversensitive or aggressive. And anyway, what do I have 
to do with ‘it’, what do they have to do with ‘it’? We were all born ‘after it’. 
German therapy is somehow universal. Me, the Jew, must not speak out. Still, 
they love to talk with me about the Nazi period. . . . Sometimes I don’t want to. 
Then there is my arrogance again. I become a ‘you [Jews]’. I keep being asked 
what ‘we’ think of something. I have hoped to find political allies in feminist 
circles. The private in the political seems to be conceptualized on a level I 
don’t understand.46 
These findings might today sound like a state of affairs which is long 
over, or something specific for the German post-Nazi society, but is it 
really so simple? When working with these two texts in my courses I 
learned that they still provoke secondary antisemitic reactions, are assessed 
as “extreme” or as motivated by hatred towards “all Germans”. Scholarly 
debate has moved further, and Gisela Bock revised her ideas about the 
mass murder of Jews and women in the second half of the 1990s, but in 
what direction did the debate develop? 
FEMALE ANTISEMITISM 
It is certainly true that from the early 1990’s onwards feminist 
publications from different currents have critically discussed the issue. 
Several studies on female Nazi perpetrators have been published47 as well 
as detailed research on female victims of Nazism that do not serve the old 
collective victims narrative.48 The relationship between antisemitism and 
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gender has been more closely scrutinized,49 yet has predominantly targeted 
gender-specific anti-Semitic projections on Jews and Jewesses. The 
question of female antisemitism still remains insufficiently analyzed, as 
Wendy Lower’s recently published book on Hitler’s Furies: German 
Women in the Nazi Killing Fields showed. She asked if there was a “female 
form of antisemitic thinking and expression, specific to women’s roles, 
their place in the Nazi system and society,”50 and wisely referred to The 
Authoritarian Personality (Studies in Prejudice), a book by a team around 
Theodor W. Adorno, in order to answer the question. Yet, – while referring 
to Adorno – Lower ended up withdrawing her insights about the freedom 
of decision and the Ostrausch which she formulated in the rest of her book. 
“For many women of the Nazi era, the father, the husband and the Führer 
were all authoritarian figures that shaped their lives in different stages. 
Erna Petri’s father disapproved of Horst, her Nazi husband, but eventually 
Erna chose to align herself with a brutish mate instead of a protective 
father. The postwar testimony of many female defendants exhibits a fear of 
authority and the belief that one must obey or fulfill one’s duty.”51 Lower 
excluded the most important insight of the study, the psychological benefit 
of antisemitism, and turned the theory into a kind of excuse. Furthermore, 
when she wrote that no psychological experiments on women were 
published, she was not aware of a preparatory study for The Authoritarian 
Personality, in which predominantly female probands were questioned. 
Else Frenkel-Brunswik and Robert N. Sanford tested students of a US state 
university in 1944 – mostly women, because many men were in the army. 
They did not doubt that there were authoritarian personalities among 
women in the first place, so they commented only briefly – but insightfully 
– on the gender specifics. They came to the conclusion that there are 
similar mechanisms of male and female antisemitic projections, but the 
contents of these projections differ. Antisemitic women showed a 
conventional female façade, but were full of latent, suppressed aggressions, 
while men appeared to be male, aggressive and hard-bitten, but were 
longing for passivity and dependency.52 
Another insight provided by Lower’s book, beside the need for studies 
dealing with female antisemitism, is that the idea of female perpetrators has 
not become common knowledge yet. The reviews of Lower’s research on 
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13 biographies of women who ‘went East’ and often committed cruel 
crimes show how newsworthy her results are: the reviewers did not seem 
so much upset about the fact that Jewish children were thrown from 
balconies or slammed against ghetto walls, but found it particularly tragic 
that this was committed by housewives, young mothers or pregnant 
women.53 
JEWISH FEMINISTS AND POST-JEWISH POST-FEMINISTS 
When we think back to what Leah C. Czollek experienced in the 
1990’s, we can ask if it is possible to be Jewish and feminist today, even if 
the question itself might sound absurd when we think about the Israeli 
feminist movement. But has the relationship between gender and 
antisemitism/anti-Zionism changed decisively in the post-modern era and if 
so, how? Isn’t the leading figure of queer-theory, Judith Butler, herself an 
“antifascist anti-Zionist”, as Kohn has put it? She definitely is a declared 
(Jewish) representative of “anti-Zionism” or “post-Zionism” – she uses 
both self-attributions in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of 
Zionism. By justifying a dozen times why she refers to Jewish authors in 
her book in the first place she gives the impression that being Jewish and 
post-feminist is impossible, even nowadays. This is just one of numerous 
examples from quite similar passages: 
By claiming there is a significant Jewish tradition affirming modes of justice 
and equality that would, of necessity, lead to a criticism of the Israeli state, I 
establish a Jewish perspective that is non-Zionist, even anti-Zionist, at the risk 
of making even the resistance to Zionism into a ‘Jewish’ value and so 
asserting, indirectly, the exceptional ethical resources of Jewishness. But if the 
critique of Zionism is to be effective and substantial, that claim of 
exceptionalism has to be refused in favor of more fundamental democratic 
values. However important it may be to establish Jewish oppositions to 
Zionism, this cannot be done without a critical move that questions the 
sufficiency of a Jewish framework, however alternative and progressive, as the 
defining horizon of the ethical. The opposition to Zionism requires the 
departure from Jewishness as an exclusionary framework for thinking both 
ethics and politics.54 
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Referring to Jewish values, Butler imagines she could be accused of 
what she seems to fear most: “You attempt to depart from Jewishness, but 
you cannot!” One might now argue that Butler is against any kind of 
identity (politics), but this is obviously not true when it comes to the 
Palestinians; it is always the Jewish and the American identity she 
criticizes. So her anti-Zionism – often denied or marginalized by the 
recipients of her gender theory – does not link directly to queer theory. 
There is yet one passage in the book where the two topics connect. Butler’s 
greatest role model for co-habitation with the Palestinians, Hannah Arendt, 
had a different concept of Jews and of gender. Arendt wrote in a letter to 
Gershom Scholem about her Jewishness which she calls an “indisputable 
fact in my life”: 
I have never pretended to be anything else or to be in any way other than I am, 
and I have never felt tempted in that direction. It would have been like saying 
that I was a man and not a woman – that is to say, kind of insane. . . . There is 
such a thing as a basic gratitude for everything that is as it is; for what has been 
given and not made; for what is physei and not nomos.55 
Arendt regarded it as “insane” to try to deconstruct either her 
Jewishness or her gender, which leaves Butler only able to ask: “Does she 
overstate the case? . . . One can, after all, refuse those categories, disown 
Jewishness or change gender.”56 What Butler does not discuss, however, is 
that Arendt not only considered being Jewish as something “pre-political” 
(a word that is missing in the English translation of the letter), but also did 
not reject her Jewishness, no matter what she thought about Israel and 
Eichmann at that time. In contrast to Butler, Arendt was well aware that the 
“circumstances of Jewish politics” (mentioned in the part of the letter 
Butler omits in her quote) are defined by antisemitism and that the Third 
Reich taught us that one cannot “disown Jewishness”. Arendt also saw the 
danger of Jewish self-hatred and Jewish identification with the aggressor. 
At the end of Judith Butler’s deconstruction process, on the other 
hand, stands the end of Jewishness. Here is how she develops this 
argument: She does not speak about the “old Israel” anymore, but blames 
today’s “illegitimate”, “racist” Israel for its impending destruction due to 
“an ongoing process of deportation”57 and “concentrating colonialism”58 
She only refers to the Holocaust in order to implicitly compare it to the fate 
of the Palestinians which produces some quite awkward formulations like 
“Jewish population, when not explicitly destroyed, were certainly 
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dispossessed from home and land under the Nazi regime.”59 She refuses to 
equate Israel with the Third Reich numerous times throughout the book, 
but only because this would be “unwise” and because there is a difference 
in the grade of oppression, expulsion and murder. Just like the different 
feminist groups from the 1980’s, Butler seems to be proud of her “anti-
fascist anti-Zionism”, as Kohn-Ley called it. 
While the incongruity of feminism and Jewishness was forced upon 
Leah C. Czollek from the outside, the incongruity of Jewishness and 
Butler’s post-feminism is internalized here. The theorists of the matriarchy 
projected all evil onto Judaism as the murderer of the matriarchy, the 
annihilation of Jews being their own fault. Butler implicitly ascribes this 
patriarchal aspect to the violent Jewish state and depicts the Diaspora as the 
only “ethical” form of Jewishness. “Jewishness can and must be understood 
as an anti-identitarian project insofar as we might even say that being a Jew 
implies taking up an ethical relation to the non-Jew.”60 But she ends up 
deconstructing Jewry when she elaborates on the meaning of exile or 
Diaspora: “In this sense, to ‘be’ a Jew is to be departing from oneself, cast 
out into the world of the non-Jew, bound to make one’s way ethically and 
politically precisely there within a world of irreversible heterogeneity.”61 
Butler demands that even the Diaspora needs to “disperse” itself in order to 
remain “ethical”, “to locate Jewishness in the moment of its encounter with 
the non-Jewish, in the dispersing of the self that follows from that 
encounter.”62 
Despite the possible impression that I am comparing apples and 
oranges here by comparing German non-Jews with a Jewish US-based 
theorist, the continuity of the problem of being Jewish in a first feminist, 
later post-feminist, queer context seems evident. 
CONCLUSION 
When Maria Baader, one of the Jewish feminists quoted above, co-
founded the “Lesbian-Feminist Shabbat Circle” in Western Berlin in 1984, 
she found that the group provoked aggressions from their feminist audience 
immediately because of its name, and that all the members were identified 
as Jewish although several members had explicitly stated they were non-
Jews. This took place in a period when most publications I was able to 
trace that dealt with the role of women during the Nazi period supported 
the narrative of female victimhood. This first big wave of disencumbering 
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publications showed typical elements of secondary anti-Semitism, claiming 
that ‘we’ also suffered during the war “just like the Jews” – or were even 
the greatest victims. Jewish women already caused irritation by their very 
existence, since they reminded the non-Jews of the crimes generally 
referred to as the Holocaust. This phenomenon could be observed in 
German and Austrian society in general – anti-Zionism being a dominant 
element especially in leftist political groups since the Six Days War. But 
when Jewish women openly identified themselves as feminist and Jewish, 
they faced strong aggression and were told that this was an impossible 
combination, since Judaism was a particularly patriarchal religion. This 
specific feminist anti-Semitic element was sometimes even connected with 
the idea that the Jews were responsible for the Holocaust because they had 
killed matriarchy and introduced violence. Non-Jewish feminists, who 
opposed this dominant mechanism, like Baader’s friends from the Shabbat 
Circle, were either identified as Jewish and/or faced harsh critique, and 
were accused of burning their sisters at the stake. Karin Windaus-Walser, 
Lerke Gravenhorst, Charlotte Kohn-Ley, Angelika Ebbinghaus and a few 
others who publicly opposed the perpetrator-victim-reversal were by no 
means the dominant voices among the feminists – and just like Baader and 
Czollek they were fed up at some point. 
The secondary antisemitism of Weiler, Mulack and co., but also the 
denial of female antisemitism in World War II and the perpetrator-victim-
reversal of Bock and Mitscherlich, allowed to think of women and 
feminism as something solely unproblematic with a focus on earlier 
‘innocent’ victimhood. Yet once telling history as ‘herstory’ became 
established in the 1990’s, narratives other than those that serve the inner 
identity of the movement(s) became acceptable and the way was paved for 
a critical assessment of the role of women in the Nazi era. What was still 
missing when I published my book in 2004 was the question whether anti-
Semitism worked for women in the same way as for men. So I tried to 
close this gap by discussing psychoanalytic approaches, Adorno’s critical 
theory and the concept of the “authoritarian personality” showing that 
antisemitism satisfies different needs depending on the different gender 
images of men and women. I assumed that the trend to critically confront 
the Nazi past and the institutionalization of gender history weakened the 
need to idealize and exculpate the role of women in the Third Reich. While 
this seems to still be true, it recently struck me that Judith Butler’s book 
from 2013 showed that being Jewish and queer/post-feminist stills seems 
impossible for her, which Butler internalized with the effect of becoming a 
Jewish leading figure for the anti-Zionist movement. In no way does this 
mean that ‘the feminism’ or queer theory (for which Butler cannot stand 
pars pro toto) is antisemitic ‘by nature’, but this article makes the case for 
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continued high awareness of antisemitic and/or anti-Zionist tendencies due 
to the history of the movement(s). 
 
* Ljiljana Radonić teaches in the Department of Political Science at the University 
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Antisemitism and the Swedish School System 
Anna Sarri Krantz* 
This article analyses a case study of antisemitism, directed towards a young 
Jewish girl and the Stockholm school system. The girl defines herself as a 
Third Generation Survivor, a concept examined from a social anthropological 
perspective.  The methodology during the research process includes collection 
of data about antisemitic attitudes in school and in-depth interviews with the 
subject of the case study.  There are a multitude of studies on antisemitism in 
Sweden and Europe but there are seldom, if ever, accounts of how the affected 
individuals respond to the manifestations. The upper secondary school 
mentioned failed to follow the legislation, failed to address the problem and 
failed to take sufficient action when an antisemitic action occurred. The article 
proposes that improved strategies for handling undemocratic manifestations 
should focus on knowledge and education, as they are two of the most critical 
aspects when fighting prejudice and misconceptions. 
In Swedish upper secondary schools one can find visible Nazi 
symbols in the general landscape of the school buildings. When you walk 
around Swedish schools today you see them on the walls of the classrooms, 
on school benches and in the corridor walls. This article will focus 
specifically on one example of an antisemitic outbreak, which was directed 
towards a particular high school student, inside the school. This teenage 
student, who went to one of the larger, and very popular upper secondary 
schools in the Stockholm city centre, one day found the Nazi Swastika on 
the door to her locker. She was shocked and the school reported the 
incident to the police. When the shock had dissipated she decided to visit 
other upper secondary schools in Stockholm to tell the story of her life as a 
Third Generation Survivor, and of her belonging to a Jewish family with 
grandparents who survived the extermination camps during the Holocaust, 
but also to a family in which some relatives were murdered. She decided 
she wanted to tell her story and let others, of her own age, take part in it. 
She thereby took part in an ongoing remembrance of the Holocaust 
discussed by for example Hirsch, Webber, Balf, Waxman1 and her story 
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became part of a larger narrative about the Holocaust that is taking place in 
Europe: see for example Assman, Kingsepp, Kirshemblatt-Gimblett and 
Shandler2 This article will concentrate on the case study and the visible 
antisemitism directed toward her and the school system. The aim is to 
discuss the specific case and the long tradition of antisemitism in Sweden. 
There is a manifold field of studies on antisemitism in Sweden and Europe, 
but there are seldom, if ever, accounts of how the individuals who are 
exposed to the outbursts react, reflect and respond. The article presents and 
explores this aspect without any possibility of statistical generalizations. 
Swedish schools are governed by a system of laws and legislation 
specifically focusing on events related to violations of the human rights. 
Since the 1990’s the school curricula clarify the necessity to respect the 
rights of the individual and oblige Swedish schools to create a democratic, 
tolerant, and respectful environment. I will show that the Swedish school 
curricula is a result of the ever present antisemitism in Sweden by using 
evidence from research conducted by the historian Heléne Lööw and 
exemplifying how the regulations were violated using the mentioned 
example3 
Over the period of one year, the focus for the research has been the 
concept of the Third Generation Survivor, with an analysis of this concept 
from a social anthropological perspective. Social anthropology focuses on 
exploring, understanding, and interpreting, among many other things, 
concepts. Social anthropologists attempt to understand why a concept has 
been created and explain the phenomena and enable the opportunity to 
“study the relationship between the particular and the universal, the 
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individual and the collective, the local and the global.”4 The case study 
presented in the article is an event that influenced one individual but, at the 
same time, is a result of a contemporary and historical construction of 
thought or mindset in Swedish society in general. The data gathered during 
the fieldwork indicates that the student’s experience is not an unusual 
occurrence and that antisemitic actions occur on a regular basis in 
Stockholm. 
I have conducted ethnographic interviews within the community of 
people who define themselves as Third Generation Survivors. The 
interviews have been structured and in-depth and were conducted on a 
regular basis during 2013. In-depth interviews with representatives from 
the Jewish Assembly also took place. I have attended different kinds of 
religious services in the largest of the synagogues in Stockholm in 2013. 
The focus has been on ethnographic participation together with structured 
interviews as the method of choice5 During the research process I have 
collected data about antisemitic attitudes in schools even though the main 
interest during the research has been in other areas6  There are different 
experiences of antisemitism among those individuals who have participated 
in the study. Some of them have experienced it while attending public 
schools in the Stockholm area and they have then chosen to leave the 
public schools in order to attend the Jewish alternative. None of the 
participants report experiencing antisemitism in public places or in any 
kind of professional, working situation but this could be explained by them 
not making their minority status publicly known7 
In order to initially approach an understanding of the concept of the 
Third Generation Survivor, I attended the Official Remembrance day of the 
Victims of the Holocaust in the Great Synagogue of Stockholm in January 
2013. During the ceremony a young woman gave a speech about her 
experiences in today’s Stockholm. In her speech she told the story about 
how her grandfather fled from Nazi Germany and came to a safe haven in 
Sweden just before Hitler invaded Poland. She also described how her 
grandmother came to Skåne, in the southern part of Sweden. Her 
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grandmother came on her own since the vast majority of her relatives had 
been killed. 
In her speech the young woman also told the congregation about the 
episode in her school when she one day came to her locker, during the 
spring of 2012, and found the Nazi swastika scratched onto on the door. I 
will come back to this episode later. Her speech concluded with the idea 
that the ideology which had persecuted her grandparents 70 years earlier 
was still present in Stockholm, in a school in the city center. The young 
woman decided to devote herself to work for remembering the Holocaust 
and, as she said, to put a stop to evil8 
After the Remembrance Day I contacted the Jewish community and 
was able to get in touch with the young woman, here called Ester, which is 
the name she chose for this article, and we conducted structured interviews 
on a regular basic throughout 2013. I have made the purpose of the 
interviews explicit as well as explaining the recordings and the project9 
ANTISEMITISM IN THE SWEDISH SOCIETY 
Swedish-Jewish history has been intertwined for a relatively short 
period. There are no historical references to violations, violence or 
pogroms towards the Jews since the group was prohibited from living in 
Sweden before 177410 The prohibition of immigration by Jews was in itself 
a result of an ongoing prejudice towards the group11 and must be seen as a 
sign of antisemitism. 
There are many researchers who have studied antisemitism from both 
a contemporary and historical perspective12  One of them, the historian 
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Heléne Lööw, has thoroughly studied antisemitism in Sweden and more 
specifically the Nationalist Socialist movement in Sweden, between the 
years 1924 – 1979, 1980 – 1989 and 2000 - 201413 The research shows the 
impact the ideology has had on Swedish society over a period of decades. 
Smaller political clusters with an antisemitic agenda have existed 
since the end of the 19th Century and beginning of the 20th Century in 
Sweden. There have been a large number of political formations and 
organizations of varying sizes which have a focus on anti-democratic ideas, 
antisemitism and fascism in different geographical areas of the country. 
One of the first publicly known antisemites was Mauritz Rydgren and his 
successor Barthold Lundén, who initiated Svenska Antisemitiska 
Föreningen, (Swedish Antisemitic Association, author´s translation) in 
1923, which existed until 193114 During the first decades of the 20th 
Century the different parties had difficulties organizing themselves but in 
1924 three brothers founded the first known nationalist socialist party, 
Svenska Nationalsocialistiska Frihetsförbundet, (Swedish National 
Socialist Labour Congregation, author´s translation) and two years later 
another party was founded by Elof Eriksson, Sveriges Fascistiska 
Kamporganisation (The Swedish Fascist Combat Organisation, author´s 
translation), which later changed its name to Sveriges Nationalsocialistiska 
Folkparti (Sweden´s National Socialist Peoples Party, author´s translation). 
This party became a school for future national socialist and fascist leaders. 
But parallel to this larger, nationwide party, there existed several other, 
smaller clusters of organisations, associations and parties who in 1930 
gathered in one larger party called the Nysvenska Nationalsocialistiska 
Partiet (The New Swedish Nationalist Socialist Party, author´s translation) 
which later took the name The Swedish Nationalist Socialist Party. Two of 
the members, Furugård and Lindholm had an impact on the political arena 
for many decades and formed different parties and associations. During the 
1930’s The Swedish Nationalist Socialist Party also tried to make its mark 
at a parliamentary level but never managed to gather enough supporters. 
The historian Koblik points out that none of the Swedish national socialist 
parties had an impact on the parliament or domestic or international 
politics15 But according to, for example, Åmark and Rudberg, the Swedish 
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government had a very restrictive refugee policy during the 1930’s and the 
beginning of the 1940’s, specifically directed to Jews in Europe16 The 
Swedish government only permitted a small number of Jews to enter 
Sweden at this time17 This only changed with the persecution of Norwegian 
Jews in 1942 and Danish Jews in 194318 
Antisemitism and National Socialism were no longer ideologically 
viable after World War II, but the ideology and the mindset never 
disappeared, neither in the different clusters of political associations or 
organisations, nor among the Swedish population. According to Lööw, 
antisemitism must be understood as consistently present in the Swedish 
society, whether visible, obvious, present, hidden, or disguised19 Certain 
groups such as Sveriges Nationella Förbund (The Swedish National 
Association, author´s translation), had after 1945 and during the 1950’s a 
phase of reorganization where they paved the way for formation of the 
National Socialist and antisemitic parties which were founded during the 
1980’s, for example Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish, 
author´s translation). 
Lööw has studied the shifting agenda during the 1970’s and 1980’s 
from a classical nationalist socialist approach to a militant and radical 
ideology with violent tendencies20 One of the groups who received public 
attention was the mentioned Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden 
Swedish, author´s translation). They launched their first xenophobic 
activities and public appearances in the 1970’s and became well known to 
the public during the 1980’s. They focused more on issues related to 
immigration and xenophobia. According to Lööw, they were the first ones 
to openly discuss the existence of refugees in, and immigration to, Sweden 
which later became a national political question when 
Sverigedemokraterna (The Democratic Party of Sweden, author´s 
translation) received enough votes to enter the Swedish parliament in 2010. 
The Bevara Sverige Svenskt activists during this period were also the first 
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ones to identify Swedish society as their prime enemy and their prime 
target, together with other groups whom they believed controlled and 
governed the world, such as Jews, homosexuals and communists. 
Bachner, who has studied antisemitism in Sweden in particular, claims 
that the 1980s was a decade where antisemitic attitudes became apparent 
publicly during and after the Lebanon War in 1982. Swedish newspapers 
published a large number of articles where they discussed the war and the 
actions initiated by Israel with an obviously antisemitic voice. This 
occurred for the first time in the post-war period and Bachner claims it 
transformed the existing tone.21 
In the 1990’s, the scenario shifted. The old national socialists from the 
1930’s connected with a group of youths and formed an organisation called 
Vitt Ariskt Motstånd, (White Aryan Resistance, author´s translation) which 
became publicly known due to their criminal activities. This group focused 
on a more hard-core approach, with a militant xenophobic agenda. When 
the newspapers wrote about their criminal actions and racist ideas, it 
attracted others and thereby organized and positioned the antisemitic and 
xenophobic questions on the public agenda22 
In the aftermath of Vitt Ariskt Motstånd more groups were formed in 
the 1990’s and continue to be part of the Swedish political scene through to 
the present day. The Swedish foundation Expo has published yearly reports 
focusing on the activities of national socialist groups and the xenophobic, 
intolerant environment in Sweden since 2008. What Expo saw in 2013 is 
how the activities reached a new high, with 2334 actions and events.23 This 
was an increase of 28% compared to 2012. The different types of activities 
include the spread of propaganda, public meetings, handing out pamphlets, 
and demonstrations. The geographical areas where Expo has seen a growth 
are the Stockholm area (Expo refers to Stockholm county and not the 
municipality), the Gothenburg area (Västra Götaland) and Värmland, 
together with Skåne. Two of the largest organizations, Svenska 
motståndsrörelsen (Swedish Resistance movement, authors translation) and 
Svenskarnas parti (Swedes party, author´s translation) started their election 
run-up during the autumn of 2013 and aimed to attract a larger number of 
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members, often working in the area around the Swedish upper secondary 
schools24 
A strong wave of antisemitism dominated the summer of 2014 in 
Europe, among them several cities in Sweden, due to the military conflict 
between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Violent outbreaks of antisemitism have 
been directed towards the Jews, and both synagogues and individuals have 
been attacked verbally and physically right across Europe. In January and 
February in 2015, we have seen an even more violent wave of antisemitism 
with lethal attacks on Jews in both Paris and Copenhagen. 
Over time the political parties have used different forms of 
propaganda to spread their message. In the beginning of the 20th Century 
some of the parties and/or individuals tried to produce and distribute 
smaller newspapers. Others have produced pamphlets, posted stickers, 
organized public meetings, and arranged concerts. The Internet has 
obviously constituted a possibility for different types of networks to keep in 
touch, interact, and cooperate25 Lööw claims that one of the main traits of 
post-World War II propaganda among the National Socialist parties began 
immediately after the war, focussing on the denial of the Holocaust. This 
has been an idea and a statement that has lasted ever since26 and been 
studied and discussed by other scholars as well, for example Bruchfeld, 
Englund, Guttenplan27 
This review shows the prevalence of historical and contemporary 
antisemitism in Sweden. Today Nazi organizations, such as the Svenska 
motståndsrörelsen, focus their activities in and around upper secondary 
schools. In the following section of this article an account of an antisemitic 
attack on an individual will be given. There is no knowledge about who 
committed the assault or the reason why it took place and Lööw states there 
has not been enough research conducted about the individuals who commit 
these illegal attacks28 There is no knowledge whether it was an action 
committed by an individual or by a group. There is no knowledge whether 
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it was an organized act directed to several individuals in Stockholm or if it 
was a deed committed spontaneously, but we do know it was directed 
towards and had a deep effect on an individual. 
A THIRD GENERATION SURVIVOR 
Ester was born into a Jewish family. Her mother converted and her 
father´s mother survived the Holocaust and is the main survivor from a 
large Jewish-Polish family. Ester’s grandmother´s parents and brothers 
were all killed in Auschwitz. Her grandfather escaped from Germany just 
before the war and was the only surviving member of that side of the 
family. Her grandfather´s family and relatives were all killed during the 
Nazi regime. 
Ester was brought up in a Jewish environment and celebrates all 
annual Jewish holidays such as Pesach, Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur and 
Chanukah, together with the weekly Shabbes dinners with both her closest 
and extended family. Her family is not orthodox and they do not follow any 
of the stricter kosher regulations which she would like to do later on when 
she has her own household. Ester follows the Jewish week with Shabbes 
and attends services in one of the orthodox synagogues of Stockholm. 
When she was younger, she attended different Jewish schools in Stockholm 
and spent her summers in the Jewish summer camp outside Stockholm. She 
also sings in one of the Yiddish choirs and takes part in the different Jewish 
youth organizations. But Ester is also strongly involved in the Student 
Corps of the upper secondary school which she attends, which is not a 
Jewish school, and she has a lot of non-Jewish friends. There are no Jewish 
upper secondary schools in Stockholm in 2013. Ester identifies herself by 
her gender, her relationship to her family (daughter, sister) and friends, and 
as the vice chairman in the Student Corps, as well as her Jewishness. When 
she drew her identity chart she did not mention citizenship or belonging to 
any kind of geographical area, continent, nation or city. 
She could be regarded as an ordinary girl who lives an ordinary 
teenage life. But something exceptional happened one day in her school, 
which she describes in the following way during a recorded interview. Just 
ahead of this passage we had talked about when she participated in a 
journey, with the Jewish community, March of the Living. The journey 
takes place in order to commemorate the Holocaust and to visit Majdanec, 
Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka and places where a Jewish vibrant life used 
to exist in Poland: 
 
110 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [VOL. 7:101 
Ester: It was when I started to give lectures with Emelie (a friend). 
Me: But it was in a combination with something else? 
Ester: It was in combination with somebody who carved the swastika on my 
locker. 
Me: Have you notified the police about the event? 
Ester: Yes. 
Me: Yes, you have [. . .] 
Ester: Yes, with a key or something. And it was really this big. Like this. On 
my locker. And this was two weeks before the trip [March of the Living]. And 
then I felt even more, like this. I felt that like this, what is happening, this 
cannot happen but if it happens, I will make sure that it never happens again. I 
just felt that I want to do something. I knew that I wanted to do something. I 
felt that I wanted to go on the journey and see where it takes me. 
Me: What did the school do? 
Ester: It was a teacher who came very quickly and helped me. It was just after 
there had been a shooting in a Jewish school in Toulouse as well. Just two 
weeks ahead of it. And he was a Frenchman and was really upset about it. And 
he helped me a lot so it was great. And then. It happened on a Friday and then 
the Monday after I had a meeting with the principal and my mentors. 
Everything happened very quickly. They painted the locker so the swastika 
would not be visible, the same day. But, but. . . The principal said that there 
were surveillance cameras in the corridor where I had my locker. But they 
were not turned on. And then they asked me if I could imagine or think about 
somebody that could have done it and I kind of, I don´t know. And then we 
reported it to the police but nothing happened. The police did not know where 
to look or investigate the matter. But it is reported to the police. 
Me: How did your parents react? 
Ester: My father was very upset. I did not call him at once because I was so 
very confused and upset, stunned. I did not really know what to do with myself 
when it happened. It was so confusing. It was so chaotic. There were so many 
students there, ahead of me. It was like, my entire class was there before I 
came to the locker, and they were gathered beside my locker. And then I came. 
It was so chaotic when it all happened. 
Me: What was chaotic? Was it their reaction? The swastika? Your feelings? 
Ester: Everything together. One part was the number of people there. They 
were there before I came, before I had seen anything. Everybody was talking. 
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But I could not really perceive anything. And then I saw that the teacher came. 
But I could not reach the locker. And then, the others, they were so upset. It 
was so strange. The entire thing. But then when I called my dad, he was so 
angry. But really. He asked me a lot about my teachers. He could not really do 
anything. The school really dealt with it. They were so good. He could not do 
much.[. . .] 
Ester: This with the swastika. It has a totally different meaning to me 
compared to somebody who doesn´t have the same background as I do, with a 
grandma like mine. It is such a burdensome symbol to me who has a personal 
relation to the Holocaust. [. . .] After the journey (to Poland, authors remark). 
After the swastika. I wanted to do something but I did not really know what. 
But after the journey I felt that I had a responsibility and I felt even more that I 
had to do something. It was a combination. And now we do it. 
During another interview we talked about memory and why Ester 
thinks it is important to remember the Holocaust and why she feels she has 
to do it. 
Me: What was it that you wanted to tell, with your stories and lectures? 
Ester: From the beginning. It was very spontaneous. It was nothing we 
planned. It just happened: we have to do something. That was it. 
Me: Why did you feel that “we have to do something”? 
Ester: Well, it was after that I had the swastika carved on my locker at the 
school. And I felt that: this can´t happen. I mean. Why does it happen? Now? 
In Sweden 2013? My school is really, really good. I do not want to brag. But it 
is a very respectable school. And I felt that I had never believed that people 
had such opinions. Especially not in such a respectable school. But no matter 
what, it should not exist. If I can do something to prevent it from happening 
again, then I want to do it. And then I went on that journey for two weeks, just 
after, and I started thinking about my grandmother as well and then I realized, 
kind of, she is 85 and she will not live forever, so okay, what do we do when 
she is not around. Somebody has to know about what happened to her. It can´t 
die when she dies. It can´t be that way. So, oh well, that was how it started. I 
guess. 
In the interviews Ester discusses and describes her experience. She 
gives a picture of the event, her confusion and her feelings but also the 
reactions from both the school and her parents. Just after the incident in the 
school she went on a journey which influenced her as well. Those two 
events had an impact on her and she made a decision: to talk to others of 
her own age about the Holocaust. In this way, she hopes and believes that 
she can have an impact on society, and especially the younger population. 
She also hopes the memory of her beloved grandmother and what she 
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experienced will last and make a change for the future. When she decides 
to memorize and talk about her grandmother’s experiences and the 
Holocaust she also takes part of a larger tradition of commemoration. It 
must also be seen as a reaction to the antisemitic attack. 
In the sequence of the interviews it is not stated whether the police or 
the school continued to work on the matter in any kind of investigation, 
precaution, or discussion. It is important to clarify how Ester claimed that 
none of the two institutions dealt with the incident after the mentioned 
meeting with the principal.  The upper secondary school and the police 
both seemed to take a passive position. The school did not act or react apart 
from painting the locker and covering the Nazi symbol. The police 
conclude that they did not have any leads or evidence and could therefore 
not continue their investigation. None of the institutions elaborated about 
the existing swastika, why it was there, who had painted it, or what it meant 
for the school that the action took place there. In the aftermath of the 
incident the school never brought it up again with Ester or initiated any 
kind of preventive work addressing the general student population. 
According to Lööw, institutions in society have difficulties addressing 
outbursts like the one mentioned. It is sometimes seen as a puerile, childish 
joke or prank without any kind of ideological conviction to those who go 
on to commit more serious crimes. Society in general struggles to openly 
discuss the ever-present antisemitism and the rather new political situation 
with established, xenophobic and antisemitic political parties such as the 
aforementioned Sverigedemokraterna. One argument is that society and the 
media should treat the political parties and ideological actions with silence 
in order to decrease attention to the matter while others argue that it has to 
be discussed openly. 
Associations, organisations, political parties but also single individuals 
see society as the prime enemy and thereby the school and its students as a 
prime target29 The last part of this article will contain a discussion about 
research related to the legislative aspects of intolerance and discrimination 
in the educational sector. 
ANTISEMITISM AND THE SCHOOL SYSTEM 
According to Bachner, antisemitism in Sweden cannot be seen as 
something that Swedish society has imported, but must be understood as 
part of a larger European historical process, which has existed and 
developed over centuries30 During the last 15 years, discussion and 
research about antisemitism has continued in Sweden. Bachner and Ring 
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have completed a larger survey about antisemitic attitudes and ideas in 
Sweden31 The survey was sent to 5,000 individuals within the age span of 
16 to 75 years, and 2,956 people answered the survey. The result showed 
that 5% had a strong and consistently antisemitic approach, 36% had an 
ambivalent attitude towards Jews and 59% had no antisemitic reflections. 
In the analysis of the results it was noted that the answers were consistent 
in the different age groups. Bachner and Ring support the idea that the 
antisemitic attitude in Sweden is a heritage from the past which also exists 
in a contemporary form with an increased, generalized xenophobic 
approach and atmosphere. It is a question of a historical heritage and a 
social mindset in Sweden which also influences and is a part of the 
Swedish school system and its pupils. This will be discussed in the section 
focusing on legislative and curricular aspects. 
The school is an arena of great interest for the nation. Schools are 
strongly governed by the national parliament and strictly regulated by a 
large amount of legislation and curricula on both general and specific 
levels. One of the most important aspects of Swedish school curricula is 
that of human rights. Everybody must be respected for who he/she is no 
matter his/her age, sexual orientation, ethnic or religious belonging, 
handicap, or gender,32 and schools are obliged to take action in order to 
follow this. 
Through her research, Arneback has seen how schools are dealing and 
working with the multifaceted field related to bullying, racism, xenophobia 
and antisemitism33 Since 1994, when the legislation relating to xenophobia 
was first introduced, the Swedish school system has addressed the 
mentioned areas. However, it has differed over time due to the shifting 
legislative focus of the government, and the legislation has shifted in 
relation to the activities of the intolerant, xenophobic, and antisemitic 
political movements. During the beginning of the 1990’s, it was an issue 
for schools to prevent xenophobia by educating their students. Later on it 
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was necessary to counteract and to respond to intolerant actions. This work 
was supposed to take place without any specific plan, agenda or instruction 
to the schools of how this should be conducted. A new set of laws was 
enacted in 2006, focusing on equal and human rights of students and on 
counteracting any kind of discrimination in relation to sexuality, gender, 
ethnicity, or religion. The new legislation demanded that schools had to 
take precautions and that they were legally responsible for the prevention 
of any violation of the students’ human rights. Schools all over Sweden 
wrote action plans for equal rights where they clearly stated what would 
and could happen if the action plans were violated. Arneback has also seen 
how schools have decided in their action plans to talk to students who have 
displayed intolerant behaviour or language, as well as to educate teachers 
on how to deal with it. 
Arneback concludes that the Swedish school system has, as opposed 
to society in general, a firm legislative set-up for how to deal with racism, 
xenophobia and antisemitism. In a school in Sweden in 2015, freedom of 
speech is strongly regulated. A student cannot say whatever he or she feels 
like to other students without the threat of repercussions if their language is 
viewed as inappropriate. According to Arneback it is rare that schools and 
their action plans address the real issue behind oppressive behaviour and 
what structures linger behind such a phenomenon, such as antisemitism. 
The Living History Forum in Stockholm conducted a survey among 
teenagers about their attitudes regarding tolerance.34 Where students have 
had a thorough and in-depth education concerning the Holocaust, human 
rights, and world religions, they have a larger degree of tolerance towards 
Jews and other minority groups in Sweden. The report also concludes that 
schools bear the responsibility to teach students about human rights, 
national minorities, world religions, and the consequences of the Second 
World War. The Swedish School Inspectorates, a commission whose 
objective is to engender good education in a safe environment, have 
inspected schools in Sweden and the results show that schools either fail to 
teach about the mentioned areas or that the quality of the teaching varies. 
The report states that it is a question of the teacher’s own solid and in-depth 
knowledge about the identified areas which impacts teaching and education 
and thereby teenagers’ tolerance. 
 
 34. Forum för levande historia, Den mångtydiga toleransen. En studie av 
gymnasieungdomars attityder läsåret 2009/2010, Stockholm: Forum för levande historia, 
2010, accessed 2014-07-01, www.levandehistoria.se. 
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UNDERSTANDING THE PHENOMENON 
Ester is a young girl who lived an ordinary teenage life in Stockholm 
in 2012. She went to one of the most popular schools in the city centre, a 
school that only really accepts students with a strong educational history, as 
there is a long list of students applying to it. Only high performing students 
can study there. Ester believed she was safe from undemocratic outbursts 
and that her human rights would be respected. During one of the 
interviews, she said that she never thought an outbreak of antisemitism 
would take place there, due to its status of being a respectable school as she 
herself defines it. As the article has shown, this is exactly what happened 
on that day when she found the Nazi Swastika on her locker door. A couple 
of weeks later she participated in the educational program, March of the 
Living, in Poland to learn more about the Holocaust. Following the 
journey, she and her friend decided to give lectures about their experiences 
in Poland, what they had learned about the Holocaust and to talk about 
what had happened to Ester. They wanted to tell students of the same age 
how she had experienced antisemitism herself, in Stockholm in 2012, just 
as her grandparents did during the Nazi regime under the 1930s and 1940s. 
As research has shown Swedish society has a long tradition of firmly 
grounded antisemitism. It is part of the Swedish mindset. One of the 
institutions which is affected by antisemitic outbursts is the Swedish 
school. Political parties with an antisemitic agenda organize activities 
around school buildings, and this article has shown how outbursts also take 
place within schools. School legislation and the curricula govern the work 
in Swedish schools and focus specifically on human rights. It is stated that 
schools carry the responsibility to protect their students from any kind of 
discrimination. The upper secondary school mentioned in the article has 
failed to follow this legislation, has failed to address the problem and has, 
together with the police, failed to take sufficient action when it happened. 
Knowledge and education are two of the most important tools for 
fighting prejudice and misconceptions. The Swedish curricula for different 
subjects, for example history, social science and religion, have a limited 
focus on Israel, Judaism and the Holocaust35 The word “genocide” is 
mentioned in the history syllabus but without the precise distinction of 
which episode to work with. I suggest that the work in the upper secondary 
schools has to have a stronger focus on the education about the mentioned 
areas; the establishment of Israel, the Jewish living conditions and 
traditions, and aspects of the Holocaust that go beyond the regular, 
summarized stories. In addition, I suggest that students who are studying 
those aspects also connect their work to that of Facing history and 
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Ourselves, an educational organization that wants to “shape a humane, 
well-educated citizenry that practices civility and preserves human 
rights.”36 Results from Sweden show the necessity of working within these 
areas in order to create tolerance. There is a general Holocaust fatigue in 
Swedish schools that has to be addressed, and the pedagogy and didactics 
have to be revitalized. However, the solution is not to create new laws 
regulating the work of the schools and teachers but rather to initiate a 
general discussion focusing on the phenomenon. The discussion has to take 
place within schools, among teachers and principals, as well as publicly in 
the media, among politicians and researchers, in order to formulate a new 
agenda on how to approach antisemitism in Swedish society and 
specifically within schools. 
In relation to this, as Lööw claims37, research about the individuals or 
groups who commit antisemitic attacks and carry this ideology or mindset 
has not yet been conducted. This is an area of research that has to be 
covered in order to interpret and understand why the Swedish school 
system and its students are targets. 
Some individuals from the group who define themselves as Third 
Generation Survivors are organized in a group called Zikaron. This word 
means “to remember” in Hebrew. The goal for Zikaron is to reach out with 
stories from the Holocaust to teenagers in Swedish schools. Ester is one of 
the initiators of Zikaron and this is a way for her to make a change and 
have an impact on the future of Sweden using her and her family´s 
experiences and memories from one of the largest crimes in history. Ester 
defines herself as a Third Generation Survivor and says she commemorates 
in order to put a stop to evil. 
 
 
* Anna Sarri Krantz is a graduate student at Department of Sociology, Lund 
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Denying the Holocaust in Poland 
Alina Cała* 
The Nazis carried out their mass extermination of the Jewish people mainly on 
Polish soil. Poles witnessed all the stages of this crime. For this reason, one 
might expect that “Holocaust denial” should not take root in Poland. But a kind 
of rivalry with the narration of Polish martyrdom was already under way quite 
early after the war. The pre-war tradition of antisemitism, and the focus on 
dealing with their own trauma, were not conducive to an empathic 
contemplation of the Jews’ tragedy during the Holocaust. Of course, such 
emotions among Polish society were an object of political manipulation by 
different factions of the communist regime. Due to these tensions, a specific 
form of Holocaust denying developed, especially in 1968. A kind of struggle 
continues regarding contemporary antisemitism in Poland, in which 
remembrance is still being divided between “Jewish” and “Polish” themes. 
This paper examines the development of Holocaust Denial’s propaganda 
motives and absorption of elements of the Auschwitz lie in Poland after 1989. 
The Nazis carried out their mass extermination of the Jewish people 
mainly on Polish soil. Here, the Germans established mass extermination 
camps near Chelmno, in Auschwitz-Birkenau, Majdanek, Sobibor, and 
Treblinka. German chemists and companies developed the technology in 
those places for committing mass murder via gas chambers. Germans 
transported Jews who had been deported from many countries of Europe1 
to the extermination camps. Poles witnessed all the stages of this crime. For 
this reason, one might expect that “Holocaust denial” should not take root 
in Poland. However, this assumption is only partially correct. 
It was difficult for Polish antisemitic propaganda to deny the fact of 
the Holocaust as such, or in particular the use of gas for killing in gas 
chambers. However, discussions on the numbers of victims and their “not 
quite so” tragic fate were already under way quite early after the war. In 
saying it, we must make clear a few facts. 
It must be stressed that the Second World War was a great trauma for 
all Poland’s citizens. In waging total war, the armies of the Third Reich, 
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which invaded Poland in September 1939, acted brutally from the very 
outset. They did not limit their hostilities to the Polish army, but also struck 
at the civilian population. Towns were bombed and streams of refugees 
strafed by German warplanes. The German attack on Poland (as well as the 
Soviet Union’s seizure of Poland’s eastern provinces) caused huge losses to 
the population. Six years of occupation followed, which were marked by 
terror, persecution and the merciless implementation of racist laws. Each 
day brought arrests, torture, and executions of political elites, intellectuals, 
members of the resistance, and even random hostages taken from street 
round-ups. Each Polish family lost someone either in combat, or through 
Nazi repression and persecution. 
The trauma of war affected the entire Polish nation. Shortly after the 
liberation, it showed itself in deep indignation and led to demands for 
collaborators and national traitors to be held to account. Court cases that 
were launched against collaborators enjoyed great popular support. 
Nevertheless, following the occupation, many Poles harboured guilty 
consciences or moral uncertainties about what they had done. Those 
ambivalent feelings manifested themselves, among others, through the 
projection of restless consciences onto Jews who had survived the 
Holocaust. The traditions of pre-war antisemitism, reinforced by the 
invasive anti-Jewish racist propaganda pursued by the German occupiers 
for six long years, led people to seek an imaginary enemy and “traitor of 
the nation” in the Jews - especially as the Jews were demanding the return 
of sequestrated workshops, homes or belongings2 A notion in circulation 
already before the war, and used by antisemites, accused all Jews of having 
a “birthright of their race”, namely a tendency to subversion manifested by 
supporting the left. After 17 September 1939, when the Soviet Union took 
advantage of German aggression against Poland and occupied the eastern 
reaches of the Polish Republic, Polish antisemites began accusing Jews of 
favouring the annexation and even greeting it with enthusiasm. The 
German authorities reinforced this message, identifying Jews with the 
Soviet apparatus of coercion and accusing them of crimes against Poles, 
such as the mass arrests of elites, the deportation of around one million 
Poles to Soviet labour camps in Siberia, and Soviet involvement in 
numerous atrocities. Soviet crimes were attributed to Jews: in society, it 
was a readily propagated element of anti-Jewish Nazi propaganda in the 
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occupied territories of Poland, especially from 1941, when the Germans 
invaded the Soviet Union3 
The idea of the Jew as a national traitor, founded on the delusions 
caused by post-war trauma, who was “once again trying to corner all 
business”, calling for the return of “all that belonged to the Jews – though, 
not necessarily to him personally” and conspiring with communists to 
“enslave the Polish nation” or constituting, indeed, the very essence of 
communism: this was the most common image of Holocaust survivors in 
the eyes of antisemites. Moreover, antisemites were quite numerous. In 
addition, anti-Jewish sentiments rose after the war, not only in Poland, but 
also in many other European countries4 In Poland, they led to numerous 
clandestine killings and three pogroms. As a result of anti-Jewish violence 
in 1945-1947, nearly a thousand Jews were murdered, mainly by anti-
communist partisans, but also by their former neighbours. They were also 
the frequent targets of robberies because, contrary to reality but in line with 
traditional views, Jews were associated with wealth. Also, collective anti-
Jewish actions led to blood libel rumors and post-war spilling of blood in 
Kazimierz and Krakow (1-2 deaths) including the torching of the Kupa 
synagogue. Tension continued the following year as rumors of Jews 
kidnapping children triggered riots at Kielce (43 deaths) on July 4, 1946.5 
Hostile attitudes to the Jews and the focus on dealing with their own 
trauma were not conducive to an empathic contemplation of the Jews’ 
tragedy during the Holocaust. While in 1944-1946 there was public support 
for penalising those who had betrayed Jews or had somehow facilitated 
their murder by the Germans, by 1947 such proceedings increasingly met 
with a wall of silence from Polish witnesses and obstruction from judges. 
In parallel, a myth started to arise about the martyrdom of the Polish nation 
and its heroic struggle against the Nazi invaders. The fate of the Jews 
began to be seen as equivalent to Polish martyrdom – or even as a less 
important “spin-off” of the Poles’ suffering. Collaborators could not fit this 
martyrly-heroic vision, so attempts were made to forget inconvenient facts. 
Communist state policy stoked these attitudes. Official memorials and 
celebrations of anniversaries embellished the martyrly-heroic myth. 
Concentration camps such as Majdanek and Auschwitz were turned into 
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museums. Nevertheless, the extermination camps that the Nazis had built 
specifically to murder Jews, such as in Chelmno or Auschwitz-Birkenau, 
were not commemorated. An exposition presenting the extermination of 
Jews was opened in one of the barracks at Auschwitz, but it was dismantled 
as early as in 1949. The information presented in the Auschwitz Camp 
Museum was manipulated. One could learn that the Poles were murdered at 
Auschwitz as well as people of many other European nations. The 
nationalities were listed alphabetically, so “Jews” (in Polish “Żydzi”) were 
placed last. There was no clarification that the overwhelming majority of 
those nationalities, apart from Poles, Gypsies and Soviet prisoners of war, 
were Jews who were transported to the gas chambers in Auschwitz-
Birkenau from countries occupied or dominated by the Third Reich, such 
as Austria, Hungary, Romania, Greece, and France. Around this time, 
historians somewhat mechanically determined the numbers of victims of 
the Second World War as three million Poles and three million Polish Jews, 
thus making equal the weight of the losses of these two nations. 
The outcome of state policy was that the genocide of the Jews started 
slipping from memory. School textbooks barely mentioned the Holocaust: 
the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was also noted, but on only one page. The 
leftist narrative ignored the nationality of Nazism’s victims, giving due 
attention to the ideas of “humanitarianism” and “internationalism” but 
thereby obscuring the differences between Jewish and Polish fates during 
the war. In society the belief grew that Polish suffering was the same, or 
even greater, than that of the Jews6 
The communist state’s strong censorship expunged antisemitic 
propaganda from printed texts. This did not mean, however, that it did not 
exist in the spoken word. A subsequent generation of communist activists 
recognised its potential for social engineering. At the beginning of the 
1960’s, the bosom of the ruling single party gave rise to a faction of 
activists that adopted antisemitic discourse in the struggle for a more 
authoritarian model of communism that was coupled with nationalism. 
Mieczyslaw Moczar stood at the head of this faction, named the 
“Moczarites”. They enjoyed the tacit support of the leadership of the Soviet 
Union, which at that time had decided to side more actively with the Arabs 
during the conflict with Israel. As a result of this conflict, strong anti-Israel 
and anti-Zionist propaganda developed from 1969 on in the Soviet Union7 
 
 6. A. Cała. “La malédiction de la mémoire traumatique,” in Juifs et Polonais 1939-
2008, ed. Jean-Charles Szurek and Annette Wieviorka (Paris, 2009). 
 7. S. T. Possony, Antisemitism in the Russian Orbit (Leiden-Boston, 1976); E. 
Goldhagen, Communism and Antisemitism (Berlin, 1987); D. Libionka, “Brakujące ogniwo. 
Sowiecka Literatura Antysyjonistyczna w Polsce przed i po Marcu 1968 [The Lacking Link. 
Anti-Zionist Soviet Prints before and after March 1968],” in Komunizm: Ideologia, System, 
Ludzie, ed. T. Szarota (Warszawa: Wydawn. NERITON, Instytut Historii PAN, 2001). 
 
2015] DENYING THE HOLOCAUST IN POLAND 125 
But Poland was pioneering in anti-Zionist propaganda, starting already in 
1967. In 1968, the Moczarites took advantage of nationwide student 
protests that were being organised against censorship and restriction of 
freedom of thought, as a pretext in the struggle for power in the communist 
party. Another faction of communists tried to beat the Moczarites with their 
own weapon, namely antisemitism hidden in anti-Zionist rhetoric. Thus, in 
1968-1969 an antisemitic campaign was unleashed in all contemporary 
media. Many intellectuals of Jewish origin experienced various types of 
harassment, as a result of which more than 13,000 of them were forced to 
emigrate from Poland8 
On the initiative of the Moczarites, in 1968 the key words devoted to 
the Second World War were changed in the new edition of an 
encyclopaedia that had been published since 1965. This was accompanied 
by a press campaign against the editor and the head of the publishing house 
that had issued it, which emphasised his Jewish origin. The publisher lost 
his position and was forced into exile. He moved to Sweden, where he 
lived until his death. He was accused of being “unfavourably disposed 
towards Poland and Polish people”, that he had overstated the number of 
Jewish victims, exaggerated the description of their suffering during the 
Holocaust, and detracted from the extent of assistance they had received 
from Poles. The slogans enforced by the Moczarites contained the seeds of 
the “Auschwitz lie” because they underestimated the number of Jewish 
victims, while inflating the number of Nazism’s Polish victims. 
Antisemites who were supportive of the Moczarites published books 
and articles, which, quite remarkably, transposed the Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust with their persecutors. Jews were accused of having supported 
the Nazis, all cases of Jewish collaboration in the ghettos were widely 
publicised, and emphasis was placed on the role of Jewish police in 
carrying out deportations from ghettos to death camps. In one book, which 
played on conspiracy theory, Zionists were accused of having initiated the 
destruction of European Jewry by secretly influencing the policies of the 
Nazis9 The Moczarites stressed the roles of many Poles who had helped the 
Jews, overstating their numbers and accused those saved of showing 
ingratitude. At that time, another frequently adopted antisemitic journalistic 
theme was to accuse Israel of conspiring with its “former oppressors” in 
West Germany against Poland. The alleged aim was to decrease Poland’s 
international standing through “false” accusations of antisemitism. It is 
worth noting that this last propaganda theme of the Moczarites carried 
 
 8. D. Stola, Kampania Antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967-1968 (Warsaw: Inst. Studiów 
Politycznych, 2000). 
 9. T. Bednarczyk, Obowiązek Silniejszy od Śmierci (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja 
Wydawnicza, 1982). 
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particularly well in Polish society, which, though brimming with anti-
German resentment, was quite well disposed towards Israel, where it was 
believed, the most widely spoken language was Polish and Polish Jews 
were vanquishing the pro-Soviet Arabs (anti-Soviet resentment was as 
strong as anti-German). 
The Moczarites’ propaganda was finally suppressed after one year, 
when the faction was broken up. The authorities amended the rules on 
censorship, which resulted in a general ban on Jewish subjects –which 
contributed to further forgetting of the Holocaust and the multi-ethnicity of 
Poland’s past. Nevertheless, the seed of a specifically Polish version of the 
Auschwitz lie still managed to take root among antisemites. 
The lack of any attempt at all to combat antisemitism and also the lack 
of counter-polemic to the Moczarites’ propaganda offensive (due to lack of 
freedom of speech under communism) had long-lasting effects. First, 
antisemitic authors, though they could no longer publish any anti-Jewish 
texts, failed to change their views, thus contributing to the sustainability of 
certain strands of Moczarist propaganda. Collective memory was distorted. 
There was a fairly common belief that the fate of the Jews was an offshoot 
of the Nazi plan to murder all Poles, that the sufferings of both parts of 
society were identical or very similar, and that the Poles did everything 
they could to help and save the persecuted Jews. This view still lingers 
today and is even strengthening along with the passing of a generation of 
witnesses who remember and can provide a somewhat different portrayal 
of the past. 
Views like those described above started a kind of struggle over 
memory that is still continuing. Previously, it had been manifested by the 
removal of traces of Jewish martyrdom (as in 1949 on information boards 
in the museum at Auschwitz), and currently in the specific conflict “over 
memorials”10 In the 1980’s, a monument was erected for the deportees of 
the Warsaw ghetto. Its abstract form resembles a wagon, into which 
Warsaw’s Jews were packed and sent to the Treblinka extermination camp. 
In the 1990s, a monument was built nearby for Poles who were transported 
by the Soviet authorities in 1939-1941 to Siberia. The symbolic form was 
very similar: a realistic wagon in which deportees were displaced. The 
wagon was filled with crosses to underline the Catholic faith and Christ-
like martyrdom. For balance, one matzevah was included among the 
crosses – to commemorate the Jewish victims of the deportations. The 
proportions of religious symbols indicate, however, that despite the facts, 
the Jews suffered much less than Catholic Poles11 Given the entrenched 
 
 10. E. Janicka, Festung Warschau (Warsaw, 2011). 
 11. Deportees in 1940-41 included 52% Poles, 30% Jews, 18% Ukrainians and 
Belarusians. D. Boćkowski, “Losy żydowskich uchodźców z centralnej i zachodniej Polski 
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belief among antisemites that Jews in the Soviet apparatus of coercion were 
responsible for the deportations, this monument’s location near the first is 
contentious. Some people are not so concerned about the equation of Polish 
martyrdom with that of the Jews, but about the transformation of Jewish 
victims into oppressors. When the Jewish History Museum was established, 
antisemitic groups initiated a monument for Poles who had saved Jews. 
Remembrance is being divided between “Jewish” and “Polish” themes. 
The numbers of Polish and Jewish victims of Auschwitz, as well as of 
the whole Second World War were revised by historians only after the fall 
of communism, i.e., in the 1990’s. Those new findings, although carefully 
grounded in historic sources, aroused, and continue to arouse, the 
opposition of parts of Polish society. In particular, the fall of communism 
and the building of the foundations of a democratic system gave an 
opportunity for antisemites to reveal their views in print and to create legal 
political bodies, in which antisemitism could be the most important or a 
key trait of political identity. A significant number of politically active 
antisemites were originally supporters of Moczarism, with the difference 
that they had rejected communism and bound themselves with the extreme 
right, including ultraconservative Catholic circles. A group of such 
activists, who were prior Moczarites, determined the political content of 
Radio Maria, the strongest antisemitic Catholic media in Poland and 
possibly Europe, which, at the height of its popularity in the late 1990’s, 
had an audience of just less than 8% of Polish society12 
In Poland, modern antisemitism is a mix of old pre-war anti-
communist propaganda motives, combined with Moczarist argumentation, 
whose totalitarian communist roots are barely masked. Antisemitic 
narrative threads arriving from Western Europe are adopted with some 
delay. One of those threads is historical revisionism. We can fairly 
accurately trace the process by which this theme was adopted. 
The maturing of the generation that drew its knowledge about the Nazi 
genocide only from school paved the way for a group of historians 
questioning the numbers of victims of the Holocaust and trying to minimise 
or deny the Nazis’ guilt. It is no coincidence that they started their work in 
England and the United States, countries that had not experienced the 
trauma of extermination within their borders, and where the different stages 
 
przebywających na Kresach Północno-Wschodnich w 1939 [Fates of Jewish refugees from 
central and western Poland in the north-east borderlands in 1939],” in Świat Nie Pożegnany, 
ed. K. Jasiewicz (Warsaw London, 2004). 
 12. A. Cała, Żyd—wróg odwieczny?: Antysemityzm w Polsce i Jego źródła [“The Jew 
as Eternal Enemy?” Antisemitism in Poland and its Roots] (Warsaw: Wydawn. Nisza, 
2012); Y. Bauer, The Danger of Antisemitism in Central and Eastern Europe in the Wake of 
1989-1990 (Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, 1991). 
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of the debate on the greatest crime of the twentieth century did not impinge 
upon the sense of national identity, as, for example, was the case in 
Germany and Poland. They were able to achieve popularity because it was 
easier for them to hide the ideological entanglements of their assessments. 
The greatest exposure was achieved by David Irving, an English historian, 
who in the late 1970’s began to undermine the very fact of the mass murder 
of Jews in death camps, arguing that the crematoria were actually bathing 
houses and that gas was used for disinfection13 These statements were 
taken up by antisemitic publicists in the US, Germany and Scandinavian 
countries. Historical revisionism has become one of the most important 
components of a new wave of antisemitism and neo-Nazism in Western 
Europe and the United States. The authors of revisionist books were taken 
to court several times, during which time their lies and factual errors were 
proven false and they were ordered to make large compensation payments, 
which circumscribed the circulation of their conclusions in popular and 
academic spheres. Germany introduced the category of “Auschwitz lie” to 
the Penal Code, with its dissemination penalised by courts. 
In Poland, strands of Western European historical revisionism began 
to be accommodated in the 1990’s. The stages can be traced in detail. First, 
the National Rebirth of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski)14 group 
issued a selection of translations of works by Western revisionist historians, 
titled The Holocaust Myth (Mit Holokaustu), as the first volume of a 
“Szczerbiec” Library series (1993). Nonetheless, this publication went 
unnoticed. Three years later, the subject was picked up by Tomasz Gabis. 
In a two-part article The Holocaust Religion (“Stanczyk”, No. 2/1996, Part 
 
 13. D.J.C. Irving, Hitler’s War (New York: Viking Press, 1977); The first person to 
question the genocide of the Jews was a French socialist Paul Rassinier, a former prisoner of 
Buchenwald, author of the book Le drame des Juifs européens (1964). D. L. Hoggan in The 
Myth of the Six Million (1969) accused Jews of inflating the number of victims to extort 
compensation. The 1970s saw a flowering of similar anonymous publications in the US, for 
example, The Six Million Swindle: Blackmailing the German People for Hard Marks with 
Fabricated Corpses (1973), Why Do They Lie to Us? Perhaps Hitler was Right? (1974), Did 
Six Million Really Die? (1974) etc. The term “revisionism” appeared for the first time in the 
title of a book by H. E. Barnes (1967) The Public Stake in Revisionism. The year 1979 saw 
the establishment in the US of the Institute for Historical Review that propagated 
revisionism. A similar organisation was set up in 1982 in the Federal Republic of Germany 
– both were shut down by court order in the mid-1980s. D.E. Lipstadt, Denying the 
Holocaust (New York: Turtleback Books, 1994); H. Schulman, The Revisionist (London, 
1999). 
 14. (NOP) National Rebirth of Poland emerged from the skinhead movement in 1989. 
The name refers to a similar pre-war fascist grouping. Registered in court in 1992, it has 
cooperated with the English International Third Position and the German 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands. It is active to this day, although with marginal 
support.  
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II in No. 1/1997) he accused the West of succumbing to “the Holocaust 
myth”, which he said is an omnipresent, constantly updated and 
instrumentalised component of ideology and politics. He believes that it has 
taken the form of a religion, with its temples (the Holocaust Museum in 
Washington, D.C., the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles or Yad 
Vashem in Jerusalem) and “holy books” (e.g. The Diary of Anne Frank). 
Christianity is being not only dethroned, but also indicted for joint 
responsibility for the Holocaust. He claims that the “metaphysical guilt” for 
crimes committed on Polish soil leads to a state of “theological 
humiliation” of Poles and a charge of “deicide” against the Polish nation. 
According to the author, “only” 300,000 people of Jewish origin died in the 
death camps, and the Jews overstated the number of victims to justify the 
creation of Israel and to force favour for the country on the international 
arena. He used quotation marks for each mention of the word “Holocaust”. 
Gabis’s article resonated in certain right-wing circles, though it did not yet 
lead to much debate. Igor Figa discussed this article in details in the ultra-
Catholic “Fronda” publication titled On the Holocaust Religion (O Religii 
Holocaustu, “Fronda”, 1997, No. 9-10), writing in conclusion: 
The Jews themselves and the Germans have already noticed the phenomenon 
which Gabis has termed the “Holocaust religion” and are devoting increasing 
numbers of studies and analyses to it and putting it to earnest debate. 
Meanwhile, in Poland, discussions have not yet begun. [. . .] Dialogue cannot 
avoid sensitive and controversial issues, if we want Polish-Jewish 
reconciliation to be not fictional, but a reality. 
Gabis was praised for combating the “Holocaust myth”, on the pages 
of Nasz Dziennik, a newspaper associated with the Catholic Radio Maria. 
According to the paper’s editors (23 February 1999, “Stańczyk as a 
Conservative”), the author presented the conclusions of “very serious 
historians that negated the generally accepted stereotypes about numbers of 
casualties during the Second World War, the internal policies of the Third 
Reich, concentration camps, etc”. The Radio Maria fraternity was not the 
only one that picked up on the conclusions of Auschwitz liars. In 1999, the 
Kwartalnik Narodowy (No. 2), published by Leszek Bubel (antisemitic 
activist and leader of the Polish National Party15), printed a translation of a 
 
 15. The Polish National Party acted legally from 2004. It specialised in mass printing 
of antisemitic publications. It achieved 8,000 votes in the elections of 2005. It ceased its 
activity around 2009, after several sentences handed down to its leader for inciting ethnic 
hatred.  
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piece by the French denier Robert Faurisson16, “There Were no Gas 
Chambers”. One Nowe Pokolenie editors (1999, No. 1), claimed: 
I do not intend to question the Holocaust, but to make it clear that a Christian 
cannot afford to believe in the Holocaust Religion, which is being stubbornly 
promoted and recognised by governments and media around the world. 
Currently, the Holocaust has taken on all the features of a new religion, which 
is slowly displacing others. There is no room for religious tolerance, each 
challenge of Holocaust dogma is punishable by imprisonment [. . .] it is just 
another instrument being used by the “chosen people” to fight Christianity and 
the Truth. 
Gabis’s conclusions were then repeated by Grzegorz Gorny on the 
pages of Rzeczpospolita, one of the most widely read newspapers, which 
was taken over in 2006 by right-wing activists, in an article entitled 
“Auschwitz instead of Sinai” (18 July 2009)17Gabis’s text inspired Dariusz 
Ratajczak, a lecturer of history at the University of Opole and an activist in 
one of the National Parties18 He wrote a book called Dangerous Subjects 
(Tematy niebezpieczne, 1999) which sparked a nationwide debate that 
concluded in court. In his chapter on Holocaust Revisionism (pp. 21-25), 
Ratajczak supported Irving’s hypotheses. He described the researchers of 
the Nazis’ genocide of Jews as “followers of the Holocaust religion and 
therefore supporting censorship and imposing a false, propaganda-based 
image of the past onto world opinion”. He repeated the English historian’s 
assertions: “In summing up this theme, we can say without much error that 
Zyklon B was used in the camps as a disinfectant and not to kill people”. 
The book came out in April 1999. In May, the author was suspended 
from his duties as lecturer and investigated. This led to court proceedings in 
November and an acquittal in December “due to the low harm to society”. 
In the verdict’s justification, the judges wrote that the publication was 
 
 16. R. Faurisson was a lecturer of literature at the University of Lyon. In 1983, he was 
suspended for promulgating the Auschwitz lie and fined in 1990 and 1991. Like Irving, he 
referred to the “Leuchter Report”, the author of which, claiming to be an engineer, argued 
that the operation of the gas chambers, as described by witnesses, was not feasible for 
technical reasons. In 1991, it was revealed that Fred Leuchter did not possess a technical 
education and was obliged by a court to withdraw the false allegations contained in the 
report. Irving also publicly withdrew certain of his claims, on grounds that he had been 
misled by Leuchter.  
 17. http://www.rp.pl/artykul/336127.html>http://www.rp.pl/artykul/336127.html 
(Internet version of the article by G. Gorny in “Rzeczpospolita”).  
 18. The National Party was founded in 1928. It was the strongest nationalist group in 
interwar Poland, preaching antisemitism. It was headed by Roman Dmowski (1864-1939), 
the father of Polish nationalism. After the fall of communism in Poland, six parties with the 
same name were active in 1989-2001. Each of them claimed to be advancing Dmowski’s 
legacy. 
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issued in a negligible print run of 300 copies. However, it was re-issued by 
Leszek Bubel’s publishing house and fragments of it began to circulate on 
the internet. Despite the acquittal, in April 2000, the Senate of the 
University of Opole decided to remove Ratajczak from his position, with a 
three-year ban on teaching. 
This was not the end of the matter. Following an appeal in November 
2001, Ratajczak was, nonetheless, found guilty of an Auschwitz lie and 
received a suspended sentence and a small fine19 The book and the court 
cases were widely discussed and reported in the press. They also triggered 
a fierce debate on the limits of free of speech. Radio Maria’s on-air 
defenders of ideas propounded by Ratajczak were Andrzej L. Szczesniak, 
Ryszard Bender and Thomas Wituch. Bender has stated, 
Oswiecim was not an extermination camp, but a labour camp. Jews, Gypsies 
and others were destroyed there through hard work, although it was not always 
that hard and they were not always destroyed, because first-hand reports exist 
that the camp provided meals three times a day and sick inmates were given 
delicate soup, milk and white bread, and Jews often held important camp 
positions, such as kapo.20 
The scandal of Ratajczak’s book contributed to revisionism becoming 
one of the most common themes of antisemitic discourse in 1999-2005. In 
2000, Jewish organisations’ protests prevented the publication of Irving’s 
book by the state publishing house, Bellona, associated with communist 
military circles. Since then, private publishing houses have printed 
translations of all of his works and the author has visited Poland several 
times, invited by various antisemitic organisations. 
From 2007 onwards, antisemitism began to decline in Poland. Several 
political and sociological factors have been responsible for this. The most 
turbulent phase of the transition from communism to market capitalism had 
ended. Society had adapted to often painful reforms. The older generation 
of antisemitic activists, guided by pre-war and Moczarite traditions, were 
no longer active. Among young people, the skinhead subculture lost its 
fashionable appeal. Meanwhile, the West radiated new examples of 
 
 19. D. Ratajczak wrote for antisemitic periodicals, like Myśl Polska, the weekly 
Najwyższy Czas and the Wroclaw-based Opcja na Prawo. He took odd jobs and for a long 
time was unemployed. Having fallen out with his family, he lived in a car. He was found 
dead on 12 June 2010. An autopsy showed the cause of death as alcohol poisoning. This has 
become fertile ground for internet conspiracy theories about his assassination through an 
injection of alcohol.  
 20. “Night Talking”, Radio Maria, 26 XI 1999. This statement led to the protest of the 
Catholic University of Lublin’s Senate and the start of proceedings for a disciplinary 
dismissal, but were interrupted after a court in Torun dismissed the complaint against 
Bender’s assertion. 
 
132 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [VOL. 7:121 
xenophobic ideologies that exploited hostility towards immigrants and 
Islamophobia, and to a lesser extent, antisemitism. Political correctness 
prevailed over aggressive antisemitic hate speech. This does not mean that 
one cannot discern patterns of antisemitism rooted beneath polite wording, 
including accusations of moral responsibility for crimes of communism and 
the alleged anti-Polish stance of Jews. Nevertheless, Holocaust denial has 
not taken permanent root in Polish antisemitic discourse. 
 
 
*Alina Cala is a research historian and ethnologist, former board member of 
Warsaw’s Jewish Historical Institute as well as author of several books 
documenting Jewish folklore and life in Poland including The Image of the Jew in 
Polish Folk Culture, Assimilation of Jews in the Kingdom of Poland and The Jew 
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Ruptured Memory on the Streets of Vienna 
Karen Frostig* 
The Vienna Project is a new multi-media, social action memorial project 
situated on the streets of Vienna. Using participatory methodologies to engage 
public audiences, the memorial was developed as an inclusive memorial, 
naming seven different Austrian victim groups murdered between 1938-1945, 
under National Socialism. The project recognized the different circumstances 
of persecution maintained by the different groups, while creating the basis for 
a shared history that, in turn, led to an enhanced appreciation of difference and 
equality. “Ruptured Memory on the Streets of Vienna” captures the discourse 
surrounding the project’s design and its reception in Vienna. The project 
opened on 23rd October 2013 and closed one year later, on 18. October 2014 at 
Austria’s National Library at the Hofburg Palace. 
The Vienna Project is a new multi-media, social action memorial that 
grew out of my experience as a returning Jewish artist, looking for my 
family in a city consumed with history, but where memory remained 
hidden.  The three national memorials dedicated to remembering the 
victims of National Socialism left me feeling estranged from a city that 
bore the burden to remember the past. 
I had claimed Austrian citizenship in 2007,1 and Austria was now 
“my” country. Walking the streets searching for the evidence of thousands 
upon thousands of murdered citizens, I gradually felt compelled to tell a 
story about National Socialism in Austria that had not yet been told. 
Relying on the project axiom “What Happens When We Forget to 
Remember,” The Vienna Project would be developed as a memorial project 
marking the 75th anniversary of the Anschluss,2 representing seven 
 
 1. In 2007, I learned from the department of immigration that I had always been an 
Austrian citizen, based on my father’s record of citizenship before 1936. This meant that I 
was not “acquiring” Austrian citizenship, but, rather, “claiming” my Austrian citizenship. 
 2. The Anschluss occurred on March 12, 1938 when Austria was annexed into greater 
Germany. The Anschluss marks the turning point when racial persecution officially began in 
Austria. The Nuremburg laws went into immediate effect. 130,000 Jews fled Austria—the 
majority of Jews were expelled—starting in 1938 until the borders were closed. My father 
was among those arrested and sent into exile. From Grimm, Laura. “Adolf Hitler: 
Biography,” 2015, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.biography.com/people/adolf-hitler-
9340144 
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persecuted Austrian victim groups, murdered under National Socialism 
between 1938-1945. Perceived as an outsider without family, friends, or 
connections in Vienna, I developed the project at a distance of 4,000 miles, 
without speaking German, and with no advanced funding. For many years I 
was the only Jewish member of the project team, and I remained the only 
descendant of murdered Austrian victims. 
“Ruptured Memory on the Streets of Vienna” reviews the project’s 
inception in Vienna in conjunction with my gradual movement from 
outsider to insider status. The essay also compares The Vienna Project’s 
Naming Memorial with the Deserter Memorial, two memorials with 
contrasting agendas and methodologies, presented the same week, 400 
meters apart.  Consideration of outsider and insider status shed light on 
how these two memorials were received at a time when political issues 
concerning immigration policies were gaining widespread media attention. 
Designing, directing and implementing The Vienna Project reflected 
my scholarship as an artist, writer, and activist, interested in the artistry of 
public art and public memory. Opening on 23rd October, 2013 at the Odeon 
Theater in the second district, The Vienna Project closed on 18th October, 
2014 at the Austrian National Library at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna’s 
first district. 
TODAY’S AUSTRIA 
In 1923, the city of Vienna was home to the largest German-Jewish 
population in all of Europe, numbering 201,513 inhabitants and 
constituting 10% of the population.3  Following the devastating effects of 
the Shoah on Austria’s Jewish community, an estimated 10,000-15,000 
Jews live in Austria today.4 
A small and wealthy country, Austria has one of the highest standards 
of living in all of Europe. Voted year after year as the world’s most livable 
city,5 Vienna is referred to as a “city of the future,” a smart city with a top-
 
 3. Weinzierl, Erika. The Jewish Middle Class in Vienna in the Late Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Centuries (Minneapolis, MN: Center for Austrian Studies, University of 
Minnesota, 2003). 
 4. Prodhan, Georgina. “Austria’s Jews Wary of Quiet Rise in Anti-Semitism,” World 
News, accessed March 9, 2015, 
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/11/17265291-austrias-jews-wary-of-quiet-
rise-in-anti-semitism?lite. 
 5. “2014 Quality of Living Word-wide City Rankings,” Newsroom, 2014, accessed 
February 19, 2014, http://www.mercer.com/content/mercer/global/all/en/newsroom/2014-
quality-of-living-survey.html. 
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notch infrastructure.6 Vienna has also been named Europe’s new capital for 
the arts, a city boasting of its expenditures in the arts, reflected in an 
enormous network of opera houses, theaters, museums, and world-renown 
orchestras.7 Vienna was recently nominated a “Human Rights City” based 
on its democratic policies and its commitment to “respect, protect, 
implement, and promote human rights.”8 
Following worrisome trends of anti-Semitism growing in many major 
cities across Europe, combined with increased presence of Austria’s right-
wing Freedom Party (FPÖ) under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache 
now holding 27% of the electoral vote,9 the Austrian government now 
faces new challenges regarding minority representation. These challenges 
are further exacerbated by the growing presence of asylum-seekers arriving 
in Austria. Taxed by the rising tide of nationalism, a tight economy, and 
new demands for protection of minority rights, political leaders in Austria, 
as well as in other parts of Europe, are caught navigating an increasingly 
complex terrain. 
Political tensions are also measured by recent protests concerning the 
annual “Wiener Korporationsring” (WKR) Ball sponsored by far-right 
extremists groups.10 The ball takes place at the Hofburg palace at the end of 
January (near or on Holocaust Remembrance Day). A second event, 
organized by the same group and dedicated to “commemorating the dead,” 
occurs on May 8th at the crypt at Heldenplatz.11 Far-right extremist groups 
congregate there each year to publicly mourn murdered Wehrmacht 
soldiers. Starting in 2012, the Austrian government instituted a 
“Celebration of Joy” concert with the Vienna Symphony Orchestra to 
commemorate Victory Day in Europe, when the allies defeated Germany, 
 
 6. Jahr, H. Sustainable Urban Infrastructure, 2009, accessed November 22, 2014, 
https://www.mobility.siemens.com/mobility/global/SiteCollectionDocuments/en/integrated-
mobility/mobility-consulting/sustainable-urban-infrastructure-vienna.pdf. 
 7. Murphy, Tim. “Vienna: The World’s Secret Capital of Contemporary Art,” 
Traveler, 2014, March 1, 2015, http://www.cntraveler.com/stories/2014-12-03/vienna-fair-
austria-contemporary-art-mak. 
 8. Nowak, Manfred. “Vienna-City of Human Rights,” Human Rights, 2015, February 
22, 2015, http://bim.lbg.ac.at/en/vienna-city-human-rights-0. 
 9. Salzmann, M. Austrian State Elections: Far-Right Freedom Party makes 
Significant Gains, 2015, accessed July 13, 2015, 
https://ww.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/06/04/farr-j04.html. 
 10. Tejas, Aditya. “38 Arrests in Vienna at Protest Against Far Right ‘Academics’ 
Ball’,” Politics, 2015, March 1, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/38-arrests-vienna-protest-
against-far-right-academics-ball-1801284. 
 11. Heldenplatz, which means “Heroes Square,” is situated in front of the Hofburg 
Palace and is historically the site for a great deal of political activity. On March 15, 1938, 
Hitler spoke from the balcony of the Hofburg Palace, facing throngs of jubilant Austrians 
gathering there to celebrate the Anschluss, that had taken place three days earlier. 
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in an effort to displace far right extremist groups who were claiming 
historic allegiance to Heldenplatz. The momentum for this kind of 
remembrance initially came from far left political groups. The Social 
Democrats and liberal NGOs then stepped on the train. 
In these limited examples, one can quickly grasp how Austria’s past is 
gaining ground on present-day politics. While Social Democrats and other 
liberal groups actively support memory work regarding the racist treatment 
of minority groups under National Socialism, right-wing extremists remain 
fervently tied to neo-Nazi nationalist ideologies. 
Historic tensions polarizing mainstream Austrian “insider” groups 
from minority “outsider” groups also impacted my ability, perceived as 
both an insider and an outsider, to secure The Vienna Project as a major 
national memorial project. I soon discovered that funding The Vienna 
Project was significantly compromised by the City of Vienna’s parallel 
efforts to fund a new public memory project dedicated to memorializing the 
Austrian deserters of the Wehrmacht army. The Vienna Project, with its 
independent focus on the murder of minority groups under National 
Socialism, was initially regarded as an untimely distraction from the all-
encompassing mission to drive right-wing extremist groups from the 
Hofburg. 
PUBLIC MEMORY IN VIENNA 
When I first met with Austrian officials to discuss The Vienna Project, 
everyone was friendly. I was assured that Vienna had adequately 
memorialized the history of National Socialism with three national 
monuments and multiple plaques posted around the city. Additionally, 
Austrian officials and institutional directors reported that Austrians did not 
like naming memorials. Unflustered, I maintained course, believing in my 
ideas and my capacity to make a valuable contribution to Austria’s memory 
culture. I was also motivated to create a memorial that would include the 
names of 16 members of my family. 
I was told that the only possibility for funding a project on such a 
short timeline to meet the 75th anniversary date of the Anschluss was 
through KOER, a temporary public art foundation. Sometimes KOER 
funds memory projects, but if the project is too tightly tied to history, they 
exclude it from funding: research-based history projects are eligible for 
support through a different municipal fund.  Creating a project that would 
qualify for funding by KOER partially explains the temporary nature of the 
design. In 2011, 2012, and 2013, I submitted three different applications 
representing different aspects of project development to KOER. All three 
applications were rejected without further explanation. City officials 
communicated their disappointment, expecting me to abandon my plans. 
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Funding a public art project is always a challenge. I could not decipher 
if the funding stalemate was about money or about my status as an outsider. 
I assumed both. 
As director, it was my job to find funding and keep the project solvent. 
In Vienna, project development must take into account that everyone 
expects to be paid: artists, students, as well as interns. Artists funded by 
government programs are typically established German-speaking Austrian 
artists, who enjoy some degree of public recognition. As an outsider 
without a prior history of Austrian funding, I needed to build my own 
network for support. 
Becoming acclimated to Austria’s cultural industry, I quickly learned 
that Austria does not have a strong record of philanthropy. There are no tax 
incentives. The economic crisis hitting Europe in 2012 made it plausible 
for federal ministries, private foundations, corporations, and small 
companies to decline making a financial contribution to the project, despite 
Austria’s robust economy. 
Partnerships were also difficult to establish. Most institutions managed 
a tight operational budget. Partnerships providing in-kind support signaled 
to funding agencies that they were enjoying some degree of budgetary 
surplus. Contributing any form of support to The Vienna Project would 
jeopardize future funding for their programs. Therefore partnership 
development, like philanthropy, was generally not forthcoming. 
In addition, laws granting permission to install art in the public sphere 
are highly regulated. Without government permission, which is generally 
quite liberal, art activism becomes an outlawed practice. Thus, in regard to 
gaining permission and funding, Austrian artists are obliged to work with 
the government. Under such circumstances, securing government approval, 
while pursuing politically charged art that likely critiques government 
policies, undercuts the very definition of art activism. Despite various 
cultural blind spots, these facts were fairly easy to assimilate. Other 
negotiations, dealing with more nuanced expressions of resistance, were 
harder to decipher. 
While I did not have funds to hire Austrian artists and historians, I 
could do the preliminary work of organizing the project independent of 
Austrian funding. Since I wanted the project to represent a collaboration 
between Austrian artists and historians with my own work as an Austrian-
American artist and scholar of Jewish ancestry,12 I would eventually need 
to secure Austrian funding. However, this could happen closer to project 
 
 12. I use the term of “Jewish ancestry” in lieu of being identified as a “Jewish artist.” 
The latter term does not conform to public policy that prevents identifying someone by his 
or her religion. For practical purposes, I was referred to as an American artist, on occasion 
as an Austrian artist, but never as an Austrian-American artist or a Jewish artist.  
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implementation, when permissions and working partnerships to support 
project production were in place. 
Over the course of many months, I learned about three memorial 
projects sited for Vienna that were currently under consideration. One 
proposal was for a permanent naming memorial, to be developed by the 
City of Vienna, for Jewish victims who were deported from the Aspanghof 
train station in the third district. Another was for a permanent naming 
memorial for Jewish victims of the Holocaust, developed by a Canadian 
survivor and supported by the Jewish community of Vienna, to be situated 
in a public park. The third, mentioned earlier as a memorial dedicated to 
Austrian Wehrmacht deserters, is the only new memorial that has been 
completed to date. 
METHODOLOGIES OF REMEMBRANCE 
The Vienna Project was initiated under my direction and developed as 
a new methodology for memorialization that featured a number of 
conceptually fresh ideas. The Vienna Project would present multiple 
persecuted Austrian victims of National Socialism, murdered between 
1938-1945. As an inclusive and differentiated memorial project, multiple 
victim groups with different histories would be presented at the same time. 
This methodology was integrated into ten aspects of project development, 
including: Opening Events, the “Sidewalk Installation” project 
encompassing 38 memory sites, performance art, oral history video 
interviews, guided tours, the Reading Marathon, Holocaust education 
curricula, social media activity, the Closing Ceremony, and the Naming 
Memorial. 
The interactive and participatory approach of The Vienna Project was 
primed to invite contemporary public discourse in the form of video art 
installations, performance art, guided tours, and social media output.13 The 
goal was to find a means of combining archival research with participatory 
practice without compromising the approach or integrity of either 
discipline. This methodology was particularly effective in developing the 
“Sidewalk Installation” project, comprised of 38 memory sites, referencing 
1938, when racial persecution officially began. 
The 38 memory sites reflected rigorous scientific research, conducted 
by historian Jerome Segal, at the University of Vienna. Extensive research 
represented multiple victim groups and different examples of aggression 
and exclusion, as well as instances of resistance and rescue occurring in 16 
 
 13. O’Neill and Doherty describe participation as a “form of civic practice” O’Neill, P. 
and C. Docherty. eds. Locating the Producers: Durational Approaches to Public Art (New 
York: Valiz/Antennae Series, 2011), 9. 
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districts around Vienna. Waltraud Jungwirth from the University of 
Applied Arts worked with graphic design students to create hand-cut 
stencils containing the project axiom in ten languages “What Happens 
When We Forget To Remember?” The sidewalk stencil sprays marked the 
location of the 38 sites.14 Rather than install static sprays that would 
become “invisible” over time, I wanted to activate the sites with 
contemporary commentary from Austrian artists and performers. I hired 
Ildiko Meny to curate the performance art program, who worked closely 
with Johanna Taufner, our social media coordinator. 
The smartphone app was initially developed by Kabren Levinson as a 
navigational tool to find the 38 sites. The app was also capable of 
seamlessly integrating historic research about the sites, produced in 
German and English, with video clips from contemporary artists, plus oral 
history video interviews from survivors and historians commenting on the 
history of specific sites, further enhanced by a guided tour program. Georg 
Traska and Jerome Segal conducted these interviews, and Kate Melchior 
created the guided tours. The result was a rich interplay of information 
about each site that could be accessed through one’s smartphone while 
standing at the site. 
Subsequently, a new generation of smartphone apps has appeared in 
Europe to mark historic sites for a variety of purposes. However, I have not 
heard of any apps of this type, equally as ambitious. The actual design of 
The Vienna Project’s smartphone app, developed by software engineers in 
our partnering organizations (Kapsch AG and CSS GmbH), featured the 
project’s many programs. The programs, unfolding in public spaces over 
twelve months time, required the support of a large, interdisciplinary team, 
consisting of two historians, a fleet of graphic designers, a cartographer, a 
performance art recruiter and curator, a social media coordinator, a tour 
guide and curriculum specialist, technologists, and documentation artists. 
The Reading Marathon became an additional site-based project developed 
in conjunction with the Closing Ceremony, requiring additional staffing of 
students, teachers, volunteers, translators, as well as transcribers, readers, 
documentation artists, and navigators. Taking place for one hour, archival 
letters collected from 16 countries were read by Austrian high school 
students and adult children of Austrian émigrés and refugees, at 26 memory 
sites located in 16 districts. 
The Sidewalk Installation project was distinguished from other 
European memorial projects in additional ways. Not only did the 38 sites 
 
 14. The phrase reoccurs in different configurations around the city in ten languages, 
representing victim groups, present-day minority groups, and tourist groups: Deutsch, 
Yiddish, Romani, Slovenian, Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian/Bosnian, Turkish, Hebrew 
and English. 
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mark places where different groups were murdered, deported, and on 
occasion, rescued, the sites also identified state-sponsored, racist 
institutions depriving citizens of their civil rights. Permission to spray 
stencils in front of the Parliament, national museums, universities, the 
courts, prisons, and cultural institutions represented a new level of 
criticality that was endorsed by the Austrian government. While these 
historic sites warranted fresh attention, such a candid look at the past is 
indeed remarkable by any government, given the degree of savagery this 
history represented. 
While outreach to performing artists in Vienna was extensive, only 
one performing artist, historian and actor, Philipp Reichel, came forward to 
do a reading from letters and documents in his possession that substantiated 
his grandfather’s allegiance to the Nazi party.  At first, the project team was 
concerned that representing such a presentation could somehow be 
construed as promoting a pro-Nazi agenda. In fact, the opposite was the 
case. The Vienna Project was designed to juxtapose historical data with 
contemporary commentary. In retrospect, it was striking how rarely 
conversations about family members took place. With that said, it is my 
impression that many Austrian historians and sociologists, as well as 
Austrian students of history and art, are eager to explore this history. It is 
largely a matter of government funding, as to which and how many of these 
projects move forward. 
The Naming Memorial constituted another example of original 
methodologies regarding activities of remembrance. A number of key 
components, circumscribed in the Naming Memorial, set this memorial 
apart from other memorials in Europe.  These components include: a non-
hierarchical presentation of multiple groups of victims’ names displayed at 
the same moment, multiple victim groups differentiated by group 
affiliations, multiple victim groups defined by genocide or murder, 
individual names presented in relation to group representations, groups in 
relation to other groups, and names and percentages of victims pertaining 
to each group displayed alongside the multiple groupings. This information 
was depicted through graphic means, across an unimaginable panoramic 
view of 91,780 victims’ names, projected onto the walls of buildings 
surrounding Josefsplatz. The Naming Memorial represented a single 
narrative of a nation’s history of genocide and murder. 
Early on, people joined the project on the basis of creating an 
inclusive memorial whereby all names would be treated equally; same font, 
same size letters, and same duration for projection. When it became clear 
that I would include group affiliations as part of victims’ identity and 
history, some team members expressed a concern that Jewish victims not 
dominate an “inclusive” memorial project. I was advised more than once, 
that “the memorial should not be too Jewish.” I was quick to take the 
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position that an inclusive memorial must also represent the history 
accurately. This included noting victims’ names in conjunction with 
archival categorizations. Nonetheless, team members perceived the issue of 
numbers as problematic, arguing that depicting group affiliations in any 
form to reveal numbers would create hierarchy. 
Erasure of archival information was unacceptable to me, especially in 
representing a history of genocide and murder that was all about erasure. 
The number of Jews murdered reflected factual information, not the urge to 
dominate or control the narrative. A division of opinion regarding inclusion 
and difference continued to polarize members of the project team. The 
debate strengthened my conviction that difference could be represented 
graphically without imposing a new hierarchical order. As the original 
artist, the founding director, and producer of the Memorial Project, I was in 
a position to determine the conceptual design of the Naming Memorial. I 
worked closely with video artist Elisabeth Wildling to implement the 
complexity of this plan. 
The Naming Memorial became the pinnacle of my scholarship 
concerning a respectful depiction of this horrific history. No one was left 
out, nor was history rewritten to satisfy a sanitized or politically revised 
presentation of memory.15 The projections were fleeting, lasting about three 
hours. It was a miraculous moment: a naked confrontation with a dark past, 
paid for by the Austrian government. 
TWO MEMORIAL PROJECTS UNDER PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT 
I first introduced The Vienna Project to members of the Austrian 
government in 2009. At the time, the Austrian government politely 
expressed disinterest in the project. I did not know that the government was 
preparing to launch a “call for artists” to submit a proposal for a new 
memorial project for Austrian Deserters. In fact, five years later, these two 
memorials had an uncanny convergence. 
The Vienna Project opened on 23rd October, 2013 and closed on 18th 
October, 2014. The unveiling for the Deserter Memorial occurred on 24th 
October, 2014, just 400 meters away. Curiously, the same rationale 
invoked at our opening was used at the unveiling of the Deserter Memorial: 
“national identity must include national memory” (Austria’s National Day 
 
 15. Names of persecuted victims of National Socialism came from six databases. 
Acknowledgement of the “unnamed” victims, noted in the archives as “N.N., männlich 
N.N., weiblich N.N.” was included as the final slide of the naming memorial. Therefore, 
“all” recorded names found in the databases, that also encompassed the “unnamed,” were 
noted in the project’s “Naming Memorial.” 
 
144 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [VOL. 7:135 
was celebrated a few days later on both occasions). Additional parallels are 
equally striking. 
The two projects had the same timeline for development, from 2010-
2014, and addressed the same history from different vantage points, using 
different methodologies of remembrance. German artist Olaf Nicolai’s 
permanent memorial reflected the ideas of an individual artist, using 
traditional motifs and materials (a pedestal, an inscription, and concrete). 
The memorial is centrally located across from the Federal Chancellery, 
dedicated to memorializing deserters.16 Wehrmacht deserters were 
Austrian. Unlike the persecuted Austrian minority groups represented in 
The Vienna Project’s Naming Memorial, these Austrians were not 
perceived as “other,” actively persecuted as a result of a racist ideology. 
The plight of deserters and their post-war history was compelling on 
different grounds. A striking three tier monument, constructed in the shape 
of an “X,” the structure symbolized anonymity and heteronomy. Plans for 
the Deserter Memorial followed the “Recognition Act” passed in 2009 to 
overturn prior sentences, as well as grant compensation to deserters and 
their families. The two memorials cost roughly the same amount of money: 
220,000 € for the Deserter Memorial and 300,000 € for The Vienna Project. 
Closing and unveiling events attracted approximately the same size 
audiences, roughly 250-300 attendees.17 Additional distinctions are worth 
noting. 
Initially, The Vienna Project was poorly received. I was discouraged 
from pursuing my ideas by government offices, as well as numerous 
institutions presumably sympathetic to my goals. I was an unknown entity, 
without a track record for project development in Vienna. Over time, 
however, an attitude of disinterestedness gave way to an expression of 
support. By the project’s closing, government officials in both Federal and 
City offices, as well as every major cultural and historic institution in 
Vienna celebrated the project. Ninety percent of funding came from the 
Austrian government, Austrian corporations, and in-kind institutional 
support. The inclusive design of the memorial project with the caveat that 
groups be presented in a differentiated format, received high accolades. 
Despite this enormous outpouring of support, not one news reporter 
attended the Closing Ceremony or the Naming Memorial. The size of The 
Vienna Project, the complexity of its design, plus our lack of PR funding 
may have contributed to these circumstances. 
 
 16. Weiharter, Elke . Olaf Nicolai: Memorial for the Victims of Nazi Military Justice, 
2014, accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.koer.or.at/cgi-bin/page.pl?id=493&lang=en. 
 17. “Austria Inaugurates Memorial to Wehrmacht Deserters Killed by the Nazis,” 
2014, November 21, 2014, http://www.dw.de/austria-inaugurates-memorial-to-wehrmacht-
deserters-killed-by-the-nazis/a-18019168. 
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By contrast, the Deserter Memorial’s unveiling received widespread 
attention from international news media. While the impetus to create the 
memorial came from the government, its public reception was fraught with 
political backlash. Deserters continue to hold a controversial place within 
Austria’s history of National Socialism. Many Austrians feel that deserters 
do not deserve public recognition, continuing to be perceived as traitors of 
the regime. By funding this project as a government-based initiative, public 
memory in Vienna took a new turn. 
The Deserter Memorial accomplished the dissemination of three 
significant messages regarding National Socialism. First, in the aftermath 
of an unjust war, conducted under an evil and repressive regime defined by 
hateful racist ideologies, resistance against one’s government can be 
condoned as a moral and courageous act. Second, the strategic location of 
the memorial, placed in Ballhausplatz across from the Chancellor’s office, 
highlighted the historic murder of Chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss during an 
unsuccessful Austrian Nazi coup attempt in 1934. Austrofascist history 
between 1933-1938 was distinctly different from its German counterpart,18 
despite an endless supply of photos documenting Austria’s triumphant 
response regarding its unification with Germany. Third, the monument 
becomes a concrete symbol of how today’s government distances itself 
from the history of National Socialism by recognizing Austrian deserters as 
courageous opponents to this unlawful regime. 
The Vienna Project’s Naming Memorial also contained significant 
elements of controversy, breaking through years of silence. The first 
Naming Memorial of its kind in Europe and the first naming memorial in 
Vienna to actually name Jews, Roma and Sinti, homosexuals, the mentally 
ill and physically and mentally disabled, Jehovah Witnesses, Carinthian 
Slovenians, and dissident victims, The Vienna Project achieved an 
unprecedented level of openness that lives on as a memory of a memory. 
The multi-faceted memorial provided the Austrian government with the 
opportunity to endorse multiple victims groups. While the history itself 
could not be rehabilitated, ideas about memory advanced, embracing new 
measures of inclusion, participation, and historic accuracy. 
CONCLUSION 
The Vienna Project officially began in 2010 to mark the 75th 
anniversary of the Anschluss. The history of this project and its favorable 
reception within Austria supports a new chapter in Austria’s history and 
 
 18. Botz, G. “The Coming of the Dollfuss–Schuschnigg Regime and the Stages of its 
Development.” in Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe, eds. C. P. António and 
A. Kallis (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014), 121-141. 
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memory of National Socialism. “Ruptured Memory on the Streets of 
Vienna” sheds light on how today’s Austrian government supports 
Holocaust memory while seeking to distance itself from the fascist and 
racist ideologies of the past. 
One of the project’s most salient accomplishments was to bring 
members of different political parties together in support of The Vienna 
Project. Curiously, this was an unintended by-product of a massive 
fundraising campaign. 
In bringing the project to a close, I was told that my American spirit of 
invincible optimism and entrepreneurial-ship surprised many Austrians, 
who were moved to help. While the city was slow to endorse the project, 
once a few leaders pledged support, others joined in. Of equal significance 
was the fact that no one “blocked” the project. The inclusive design of the 
memorial appealed to most groups. No single group dared oppose the 
project on those grounds. In the end, small amounts of support came from 
twenty-one Austrian organizations, six private foundations, nine municipal 
and four federal offices, five corporations, ten small businesses, and eight 
individuals. US contributions were incidental. This meant that Austrian 
support was diversified and could not be construed in political terms.  As 
the project moved from the margins to the center, so did my status as an 
outsider. By the project’s end, government offices and organizations were 
eager to be named in the program booklet as a sponsor or contributor to the 
project. People of different political persuasions shared a collective sense 
of pride in helping to make this project a reality. 
While the story of funding pales in comparison to the innovative 
design of the memorial project, it is the context of Austria’s daunting 
history of genocide, paired with a history of denial that makes these facts 
so significant. How a country moves from denial to bearing responsibility 
for crimes committed is of great interest to scholars working with histories 
of genocide. 
The obligation to remember the past, the victim groups, criminal acts 
perpetrated by regime members, as well as courageous actions of 
resistance, must be renewed again and again as each generation comes of 
age. Protecting and promoting human rights in the present is best 
understood when the darkest chapters of a nation’s history are also 
remembered. 
 
* Karen Frostig is Founding Director of The Vienna Project; Associate Professor, 
Lesley University; and Resident Scholar in the Scholars Program of the Women’s 
Studies Research Center, Brandeis University. 
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Western Societies, Cultural Relativism, Anti-
Zionism and the Politics of History 
Andreas Benl* 
Since 9/11 there has been a broad debate about immigration, Islamism, 
discrimination and antisemitism in the West. The article refutes the dichotomy 
between immigrants of Muslim descent on the one hand and indigenous 
inhabitants seen as a homogenous bloc on the other. Cultural relativism 
transcends this dualism – it is a political game between different parties. 
Antisemitism and anti-Zionism are at its center but often a blind spot at the 
same time. While secular Western laws and politics in general are painted as 
discriminatory against Muslims by Islamists and cultural relativists alike, the 
state of Israel is often condemned as the peak of neo-colonial repression 
against the oriental ‘Other’. The article shall show instead, how the different 
brands of cultural relativism and anti-Zionism in Western countries relate to 
the history of Islamism on the one hand, the repressed in the history of 
Western societies between colonial past on one hand, and the Holocaust and its 
remembrance on the other. 
I. ANTISEMITISM AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM TOWARDS ISLAM 
During the mass marches in Europe on the occasion of the war of the 
Israeli Army against Hamas in the summer of 2014, there was a short 
dispute in the German press about a possible new wave of antisemitism in 
Germany and Europe, its actors and its relevance. When asked by die taz, 
the leading newspaper of the German alternative left, about protesters who 
shouted antisemitic slogans on demonstrations against Israel, Wolfgang 
Benz, former head of the Berlin Center for Research on Antisemitism 
answered: 
“It is a small minority of fanatics and not the majority of the German 
population. This minority now gets an attention they do not deserve from their 
political and numerical weight. . . . For years, some people would have us 
believe that Islam is inextricably linked with hatred of Jews. But this is 
wrong.”1 
 
 1. Wolfgang Benz, “Hitler steht nicht wieder vor der Tür,” die tageszeitung, July 24, 
2014, accessed February 8, 2015,  
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This description was challenged two days later by the journalist 
Christian Geyer in the influential liberal-conservative Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung daily, who claimed: 
“This antisemitism stems from . . . the minds of migrants from Turkey and 
Arab-Islamic countries of origin . . . One is neither racist nor islamophobic, if 
one also takes into account these religious roots of the new Jew-baiting instead 
of dismissing the antisemitic bullying in a deliberately blurred vision as the 
outcome of a lack of integration. Antisemitism cannot be integrated.”2 
Benz sees no reason to be alarmed at all and emphasizes that it is a 
completely wrong concept to depict Islam as inherently antisemitic. On the 
other hand, Geyer from the Frankfurter Allgemeine sees current violent 
antisemitism as a phenomenon brought to Western societies by Muslim 
immigrants. The role of the majorities of these societies remains unclear in 
debates of this kind; the only question is whether there is a relevant 
problem with antisemitism among Muslim immigrants or not. But if 
antisemitism and Islamism are seen as virtual ontological features of people 
with a Muslim background, the question arises, why normally only Turks 
and Arabs are mentioned in those debates, while the Iranian immigrants are 
left out. Shouldn’t they be at the center of the stage, given the fact that the 
creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran was the most important event for 
the spread of global Jihadism and Islamist anti-Zionism since the creation 
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A controversy of the late seventies may serve as starting point for a 
more nuanced perspective on the interconnections between Westerners and 
people with a Muslim family background regarding regressive ideologies: 
In 1978, a polemic erupted between Michel Foucault and an Iranian woman 
living in Paris, one of the first of many controversies to follow, where 
oriental freethinkers are criticized by western liberals or leftists for a 
supposed hatred of Islam. Foucault had just written a series of articles 
about the unfolding revolution in Iran where he was very clearly favoring 
the Islamist current of the revolutionaries. The woman from Iran with the 
alias Atoussa H. wrote in reply about Foucault’s fascination with the 
perspective of a future ‘Islamic Government’ in Iran and about life under 
Sharia law: 
“It seems that for the Western Left, which lacks humanism, Islam is 
desirable. . .for other people.” 
She concluded: 
“Many Iranians are, like me, distressed and desperate about the thought of an 
‘Islamic’ government. . . . The Western liberal Left needs to know that Islamic 
law can become a dead weight on societies hungering for change. The Left 
should not let itself be seduced by a cure that is perhaps worse than the 
disease.”4 
Foucault, in a short rejoinder published the following week in the 
magazine Nouvel Observateur, wrote that what was “intolerable” about 
Atoussa H.’s letter was that it “merges together all the aspects, all the 
forms, and all the potentialities of Islam within a single expression of 
contempt.” He concluded by lecturing Atoussa H. that „in order to 
approach it [Islam] with a minimum of intelligence, the first condition is 
not to begin by bringing in hatred.”5 
Foucault’s arguments might sound familiar from current debates about 
so-called Islamophobia, and would hardly produce a public outcry today. In 
1979, however, the ensuing terror campaign by Khomeini against women, 
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Simone de Beauvoir6 against the new regime in Iran and brought Foucault 
harsh criticism by other leftist intellectuals. The renowned Marxist 
Orientalist Maxime Rodinson warned of Islamism as a sort of “archaic 
fascism” and compared Khomeini’s concept of an Islamic Government 
with the Spanish Inquisition. Without naming Foucault, he talked about 
“Europeans convinced of the vices of Europe and hoping to find elsewhere 
(why not in Islam?) the means of assuring a more or less radiant future.”7 
The former Maoists Jacques and Claudie Broyelle accused Foucault of 
window-dressing a murderous regime.8 
During the remaining years of the cold war and even in the 90s, the 
attitude of many Western intellectuals towards Islamist terror and the 
Iranian regime remained critical.9 In 1989, the so-called Rushdie affair - the 
death fatwa by Khomeini against the novelist - sent shock waves through 
European capitals, and solidarity with Salman Rushdie was an issue for 
liberals and leftists. British scholar Kenan Malik has written a history of the 
events, citing his own experiences.10 
One key point of Malik’s book is the transformation of the anti-racist 
movements against xenophobia and neo-fascism of the 70’s and 80’s into 
so-called multi-cultural community politics, after the Rushdie affair. This 
development was supported by government agencies that were weary of 
political activists with a civil rights agenda. They preferred self-appointed 
community leaders speaking on behalf of Islamic or other ethno-religious 
defined entities instead.11 
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The Rushdie affair marks a turning point. Initially, many liberal and 
leftist intellectuals expressed solidarity with Rushdie, while mainstream 
media and institutions were often hesitant and put state reason and 
Realpolitik above freedom of speech. Malik exposes his own experience as 
a radical advocate of free speech for Rushdie’s Satanic Verses with the 
voluntary self-censorship of British media.12 But Khomeini’s Fatwa also 
challenged the leftist self-image. During the cold war, the Western New 
Left had sided even with the most retrograde national liberation movements 
– but always in the name of universal values, stating that the particular 
should only be the form of the universalist content. Now an assault on free 
speech was declared in the name of Islamic particularism: the form became 
content. In light of the crisis and imminent collapse of the so-called ‘Real 
socialism’ in Eastern Europe, Islamism could start its ideological expansion 
in the West, by fusing a particularist ideology with the remnants of anti-
imperialism after the end of the Soviet Union: anti-Americanism and anti-
Zionism. 
II. ISLAMISM IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERNITY 
In order to understand the connection between cultural relativism and 
historical and current antisemitism, it is necessary to view them in the 
context of the history of Islamism in societies minted by the Islamic 
religion, many of which have seen attempts to separate religion and state in 
the first decades of the 20th century. Especially in Turkey and Iran, this 
concept, secularism, had been put in place for decades as a state mission 
from above. In Iran there had been even a liberal-bourgeois revolution in 
1905 demanding the separation of religion and the state. At that time, 
clerics who opposed secularization were clearly in retreat. The Islamic 
clergy took varying positions to safeguard its influence. The prominent 
Shia cleric Ayatollah Abol Ghasem Kashani first allied himself with the 
modernist monarch Reza Shah Pahlavi, was arrested by the British 
occupation forces in World War II as an enemy of the Anti-Hitler-
Coalition, briefly supported the reformist anti-imperialist Mohammad 
Mossadegh in the early 50’s, and then forged an alliance with Reza 
Pahlavi’s son Mohammed Reza to topple Mossadegh.13 His political foster-
son, Khomeini, only broke with Mohammed Reza Pahlevi in the early 60’s, 
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when Pahlavi introduced authoritarian changes from above like a land 
reform and women’s suffrage. 
Khomeini never shared the modernist goals of the liberal and leftist 
adversaries of the Shah of Persia, but he could ultimately gain reputation 
among secular anti-imperialists who were frustrated about the failure of 
Mossadegh14, had hardly made a thorough critical analysis of the role of 
religion in Iranian history and thus were susceptible to having their agenda 
reformulated in Islamic terms. Khomeini introduced anti-Zionism as a 
religious-political propaganda tool. He speculated whether the Shah was a 
Jew because of the good relations between imperial Iran and the Jewish 
state. In the 60’s and 70’s, Khomeini did not endorse the propagandistic 
distinction later made by many Islamists, between Jews and Zionists.15 In 
the introduction to his main opus Islamic Government, he presents the Jews 
as conspirators against Islam: „From the very beginning, the historical 
movement of Islam had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first 
established anti-Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems, and 
as you can see, this activity continues down to the present.”16 While 
Khomeini ultimately became the charismatic leader of Islamism, two 
Iranian intellectuals who died before the revolution of 1979 stood for the 
transformation from secular to religious anti-imperialism and cultural 
relativism in the 60’s and 70’s. 
The first was the former communist party member Jalal Al-e Ahmad 
with his essay “Gharbzadeghi” from 1962, which has been translated as 
“Plague from the West”, “Westoxification” or “Occidentosis”. In this 
essay, Jalal Al-e Ahmad denounces a cultural colonization of the Iranian 
society by western capitalism, which he sees as a soulless culture of the 
machine. Islam is identified as a possible means of resistance, among 
others, against this development, but less on a theological or spiritual level, 
and more as part of a cultural empowerment for a modernization of the 
East, in coordination with ascending Eastern countries, as a counter-empire 
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to Western capitalism.17 In the preface of the book, he refers to the German 
national conservative writer Ernst Juenger, and states that Juenger and Jalal 
Al-e Ahmad himself were “both exploring more or less the same subject, 
but from two viewpoints”18, a possible reference to Juenger’s anti-liberal, 
anti-Western literature and essays. 
Sociologist Ali Shariati added an anti-imperialist dynamic to Jalal Al-
e Ahmad’s cultural critique. Shariati criticized the conservative, quietistic 
tradition of Islam and offered a social revolutionary re-interpretation of 
Islamic history. From his studies in Paris he knew Sartre’s existentialism 
and the anti-colonial writings of Frantz Fanon. At the same time he was a 
fierce critic of Marxism, which he saw as the peak of humanist “Western 
fallacies”.19 While Jalal Al-e Ahmad took Islam as a tool for the return to 
the oriental cultural heritage, Shariati saw a perceived desire for “authentic 
cultural values” as a bridge towards Islam, which he saw as the only 
possible savior of those values. His work “Hajj” substantiates sacrifice and 
martyrdom as the core values of a revolutionary Islam opposed to the 
“alienation of mankind” by consumerism and worldly rationalist thinking.20 
In his essay “Fatima is Fatima” from 1971, he criticizes the confinement of 
traditional women to the household on the one hand and feminist, 
individual, so-called ‘westernized’ emancipation at the other. Instead, 
Shariati demands that women should be given the opportunity to be active 
members of society - but only if they are willing to become (spiritual or 
literally) soldiers of Islam and join the fight against a perceived western 
cultural invasion.21 
As the practitioner of the Islamic revolution, Khomeini had more 
concrete problems, but he carried on Shariati’s shift of emphasis from the 
dichotomy of believer/unbeliever to oppressor/oppressed, which could 
relate to secular-universalist anti-imperialism, in spite of the religious-
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particularist content of political Islam. Islamism at first sight seems to 
represent complete stagnation and the rejection of historical development 
subsequent to the era of Muhammad. But Khomeini was determined to 
prove that an Islamic state, built on the religious laws of the Quran was a 
possibility in the 20th century. He ridiculed the secular Iranian notion that 
the Islamists were opposed to the technological achievements of modernity. 
He demanded, on the contrary, that these should be used for the 
establishment of the Islamic theocracy. With the concept of Velayat-e 
faqih, the guardianship of the Islamic jurists, Khomeini introduced a 
significant innovation: centrality shifts from the holy texts to the religious 
leader as a mediator between god and the masses. In a Machiavellian turn, 
Khomeini stated that the religious leader may even change the religious 
tradition and sharia laws in case of a state of emergency: “The government 
has the right to prevent anything, whether related to religious rituals or not, 
as long as it is against the interests of Islam.”22 
Islam here is less a term of religious and more of political theology, 
reminiscent of the Third Reich law theorist Carl Schmitt, who defined the 
political as the distinction between friend and enemy23 and the sovereign as 
the one who decides on the state of exception.24 In the Islamic Republic, 
this is the Guardian Jurist, mandated by God. Even more important than the 
religious laws or the definition of the contents of a certain religious 
orthodoxy is the identification of metaphysical enemies – on top of which 
list are the Jews, Zionism and the state of Israel. In the summer of 1979, 
only months after his takeover, Khomeini introduced Quds [Jerusalem] 
Day as a global Muslim duty to rally against Israel and the West, fusing 
anti-imperialist oppressor/oppressed rhetoric with Islamist anti-Zionism, 
and denouncing all non-participants in the Muslim world as unbelievers 
and traitors: 
“Quds Day is an international day, it is not a day devoted to Quds alone. It is 
the day for the weak and oppressed to confront the arrogant powers, the day 
for those nations suffering under the pressure of American oppression and 
oppression by other powers to confront the superpowers; it is the day when the 
oppressed should arm themselves against the oppressors and rub their noses in 
the dirt; it is the day when the hypocrites will be distinguished from the true 
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believers. For the true believers acknowledge this day as Quds Day and do 
what they must do. The hypocrites, however, those who are secretly affiliated 
with the superpowers and are friends of Israel, are either indifferent on this day 
or do not allow the people to hold demonstrations.”25 
One of Ayatollah Khamenei numerous speeches illustrates the 
continuity of decisionistic anti-Zionist politics in the Islamic Republic: a 
unity which is solely forged by the enemy: 
“We have passed through the barrier of denominational discord. We helped 
Hizbullah of Lebanon –which is a Shia group – in the same way that we helped 
[Sunni groups] Hamas and Islamic Jihad [PIJ] and we will continue to do that. 
We did not become a prisoner of denominational limits. We did not 
differentiate between Shia, Sunni, Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi’i and Zaidi 
denominations. All Palestinian areas have to become armed.”26 
III. ANTI-ZIONISM AS THE COMMON DENOMINATOR OF CULTURAL 
RELATIVISM AND ISLAMISM 
Cultural relativism is the counter-term to ethical and sociological 
universalism, meaning that cultures can only be understood from within 
their own values and history. After the Second World War, this kind of 
relativist approach was defined as opposition to German and European 
ethnocentrism and racism. In 1952, Claude Levi-Strauss wrote the booklet 
“Race and History” for the UNESCO, wherein he refuted the notion of 
substantial differing races, while at the same time denouncing the self-
image of European enlightenment looking down upon other cultures: 
“. . .[M]odern man has launched out on countless lines of philosophical and 
sociological speculation in a vain attempt . . . to account for the diversity of 
cultures while seeking, at the same time, to eradicate what still shocks and 
offends him in that diversity.”27 
Anti-colonial thinkers like Frantz Fanon took up the critique in the 
60’s and tried to identify a revolutionary culture of the oppressed against 
the colonial oppressor.28 In his essay “The defeat of the Mind” from 1987, 
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French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut criticized Fanon, claiming that his 
attempt to escape European philosophy had failed and only led him to side 
with German national romanticism as represented by Johann Gottfried 
Herder, who thought in closed, unchangeable national cultural entities, as 
opposed to the universalism of the French Revolution.29 It is important to 
note that, within the framework of the Cold War, these discussions 
remained ambivalent. When Edward Said started the ‘linguistic turn’ in 
anti-imperialism, and denounced Marx’s writings about the Orient as part 
of western imperialist ‘Orientalism’30, he was for example severely 
criticized by the leftist Syrian thinker Sadik al-Azm for creating an 
“Orientalism in reverse” by transforming negative western stereotypes 
about the East into an affirmed essence of ‘the other’.31 
Since the attacks of 9/11, the panorama has changed: we are hardly 
anymore talking about a plurality of cultures seen as static entities but 
about a dichotomy - the West against Islamism. While it was possible to try 
to mix ethnology and Marxism in the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 
movements during the cold war, this was no longer conceivable after 1989 
and even less so after 9/11. The competition is no longer between two 
secular, universalist alliances disagreeing over the worldly terms of the 
French Revolution: freedom on the one hand, equality on the other. There 
is no alternative economic system like the former Eastern bloc but only 
remaining oil rent states like Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, and the plunder 
economy of the “Islamic State” challenging Europe and the United States. 
In the past, it was the Soviet Union that supported nationalist or religious 
anti-western movements in the Third World on a tactical basis. Venezuela’s 
‘Socialism of the 21st century’, on the contrary, is maintained with counter-
insurgency assistance by Iranian revolutionary guards, not the other way 
round.32 
Within this political-ideological dynamic, anti-Zionism gets to the 
center of the stage. For the radical left, it is what has remained from the 
former global contention between western capitalism and so-called real 
socialism: Israel is no more seen as an ally of the West against supposedly 
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progressive Third World movements as during the cold war constellation, 
but as the center of all evil by a leftist anti-imperialism which does not 
hesitate to ally itself with Islamism. For liberal multi-culturalists, on the 
other hand, the conflict between Israel and Palestine represents all the 
perceived injustices committed by the West against the oriental ‘other’. 
If we take a closer look, it is possible to detect politics of history going 
back beyond the cold war. The solidarity with the Palestinian struggle in 
western European societies is formulated in terms related to the colonial or 
fascist past of the respective countries. While in France, and especially in 
Great Britain, anti-Zionism is wrapped in anti-imperialist and post-colonial 
concepts, in Germany and Austria it is regularly connected to the Nazi past: 
its cruelties are seen as an obligation - not for solidarity with the Jewish 
state, but with Palestinian anti-Zionism. 
Three examples from the Academy should illustrate this thesis: 
Austrian scholar Claudia Brunner has written a very emotional account of her 
reworking of the genocidal Nazi past of her grand uncle Alois Brunner. In the 
end she tries to explain the shift of her academic interest towards suicide 
bombers in the Middle East as a logical continuation of her interest in the 
history of Nazism and her “close relationship with the family phantom [Alois 
Brunner], but just under different conditions.” “In the course of research on the 
resistance of the Palestinians against the Israeli policy, I finally get back on a 
personal, emotional level to the dimension of the European / German / 
Austrian responsibility for the situation in the Middle East, a responsibility I 
cannot and want not to oversee within a historical perspective.”33 This is a very 
frank and revealing personal account demonstrating the psychological 
connection between guilt feelings about a Nazi family history and the desire to 
see current antisemitic terror as “resistance” against Israeli repression. 
In regard to the Gaza demonstrations of 2014, Hamburg sociologist 
Vassilis Tsianos also cites personal experiences in a newspaper article. In 
this case it is the history of racist discrimination against his Greek family in 
Germany. Tsianos links this experience to so-called post-migrational and 
postcolonial grievances of Muslims in Germany. Without any explanation, 
he then presents the yearly Berlin Al-Quds demonstration staged by the 
Iranian regime as a Muslim protest against a supposed Israeli colonialism. 
He then states that generations of immigrant youth are taught in history 
lessons about the Holocaust in a European manner, and that the history of 
their families is not mentioned . He omits the fact that the starting point of 
his article was his own European family. In his stream of consciousness, 
the European narrator approaches the Muslim ‘other’ in an alleged 
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common history, the victimhood of virtual racist and colonial oppression 
by Israel.34 
My third example is an article written in summer of 2014 by Hamid 
Dabashi on the Al-Jazeera website, called “Gaza: Poetry after Auschwitz”. 
Dabashi is of Iranian descent and professor of Iranian Studies and 
Comparative Literature at the Columbia University in New York. He 
claims that Adorno’s statement from 1949: 
“to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” today applies to a “macabre 
chorus of death”which is the poetry that Israelis are singing upon the graveyard 
of Gaza. “Israel is the puerile poetry after Auschwitz. It is barbarism 
manifest”.35 
Among these three examples, Dabashi’s article is definitely the most 
radical expression of anti-Zionism; he even reproaches the rulers of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Erdogan’s Turkey for a supposed fake 
opposition against Israel. But while Dabashi’s description of Israel as a 
society of genocidal child killers resembles the chants of the mobs 
marching through European streets in summer of 2014, no one of the latter 
would have the idea of citing Adorno, the critic of antisemitism, as an 
imaginary soulmate.36 Nor does Dabashi argue from a Muslim or Islamist 
perspective. Provided with enough unscrupulousness, any European could 
have written the article. 
IV. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ROLE OF ANTISEMITISM BEFORE AND 
AFTER 1945 AND ITS IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND THE 
MIDDLE EAST 
What unites these three examples is the naturalness with which anti-
Zionism is presented as a lesson of the colonial or the Nazi past of Europe 
without any further arguments. It is easy to refute the absurdity of the anti-
colonialist, anti-racist, and anti-fascist attitude of scholars or politicians 
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who try to whitewash Islamism and anti-Zionism. In reality, the godfather 
of Palestinian anti-Zionism, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was neither a 
classical anti-colonialist nor much less anything like an anti-fascist, but was 
first appointed by the British Mandate for Palestine and then resided in 
Nazi Germany, where he supported the genocidal antisemitism of the 
regime.37 Then there was Western collaboration with Islamists in the cold 
war. But these forgotten facts repressed by a post-fascist and post-colonial 
anti-Zionism lead to a new question: What has changed in antisemitic 
expressions since the pre-Nazi-era and why? 
In their essay “Elements of Antisemitism” in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno analyzed antisemitism as a blind 
and murderous ritual of the masses, a psychological compensation for the 
hardships endured in a class society by the underprivileged, and as a tool of 
cynical manipulation to cover up interests of the ruling class.38 But the 
genocide perpetrated by the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft transcended 
traditional political and class boundaries. After Auschwitz, antisemitism 
had lost its ‘good reputation’ in the West, but at the same time the political 
panorama which had evolved in the Dreyfus affair39, and separated right-
wing antisemites from liberal and left-wing enemies of antisemitism, was 
put into question. While the rise of Nazism in Europe marked the failure of 
its liberal and leftist adversaries, modernist political movements in the 
Middle East after the Second World War and Israel’s war of independence 
almost immediately showed a hybrid character mixing leftist anti-
imperialism with an antisemitism that had earlier been associated with the 
extreme right.40 
After 1945, and antisemitism’s transnational destructive force became 
known, a taboo emerged against open declarations at least in Western 
Europe and North America. A complicated politico-ideological division of 
labor arose. Anti-Jewish western intellectuals and politicians voiced 
understanding for genocidal ideologies as an expression of Palestinian or 
Muslim victimhood. Such an approach poses a much smaller political risk 
for its agents than if they had represented these ideologies and inherent 
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antisemitism themselves. On the other hand, anti-Zionism and antisemitism 
have been the common denominator and instrument of power for Middle 
Eastern despotisms of differing ideologies. The destruction of Israel was a 
central benchmark of success for pan-Arabism and other post-colonial 
movements in the Middle East. When this goal was not achieved, the rise 
of the Islamists was logical: They blamed even the weak and ill-organized 
attention of the secular revolutionaries for social progress and well-being as 
a distraction from the war against the Jews and the West with the result has 
been the preservation of backwardness and regional devastation. 
But this constellation has collapsed. For years, the most explicit and 
vocal critics of Islamism had been Middle East intellectuals and Middle 
East immigrants with first-hand experience of Islamism. On the other hand, 
Islamism, with its blending of Islamic history and western technology and 
reactionary modernism, made the passage to Europe. i.e. during the 2014 
Israel and Hamas conflict, several observers remarked on the greater 
potential to incite antisemitism in European capitals, than on the streets of 
the Middle East.41 Antisemitism after Auschwitz can neither be confined to 
a particular social or ethno-religious layer of society. With the rise of the 
Sunni Islamic State and the Shia Islamic Republic’s race towards nuclear 
arms, concern for post-war mutations of antisemitism must be guided by 
practicality begging the following: Is a global coalition against Islamism 
and genocidal anti-Zionism possible? 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given Jihad’s antisemitic and global, genocidal implications an 
examination of historical Islam and modern Islamism is in order. Though 
few would decry the examination of Christian anti-Judaism as a 
generalizing, offending or even ‘racist’ idea, this is not the case for 
adherents of Islam. With its reenactment by totalitarian antisemitic 
movements, history is not identical. There have been multiple exchanges of 
ideological fragments between western and Islamist thinkers and 
ideologues. First, Islamism’s founding fathers Hassan al Banna42 and 
Jerusalem’s Mufti absorbed Nazi styled fascism along with modern 
antisemitism. It was only after the Islamic revolution and decline of the 
Eastern bloc, that Islamism became a fascination for western intellectuals. 
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I have tried to expose that cultural relativism and Islamism are the 
edges of the same problem and what is the role of antisemitism in this 
political-ideological constellation. For decades, all kinds of despots have 
held Middle Eastern societies hostage in the name of the struggle against 
Israel. To overcome this phantasm has now become a central precondition 
to prevent a similar destruction of the Middle East like that of Europe by 
the Nazis. The delegation by Westerners of genocidal antisemitic 
resentments to Palestine and the Middle East in the name of understanding 
for the Islamist ‘other’ has been put in question by the turmoil in Syria and 
Iraq, the ensuing refugee crisis, and the influx of Jihadists coming back 
from the Middle East to Europe. The question is now whether there is 
enough humane self-interest left in the West for forging an alliance with all 
those in the Middle East who oppose Sunni and Shia Jihadism between 
Gaza, Raqqa, and Tehran. 
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Antisemitism of the Ayatollahs: 
Holocaust Denial and Hatred of Israel  
in Khamenei’s and Rouhani’s Iran 
Stephan Grigat* 
This article argues that the constant threats to annihilate Israel and the denial or 
relativization of the Shoah are not rhetorical but essential elements of the 
Iranian regime. Conspiracy theories are analyzed as structural features of the 
specific ideology of Iran’s rulers. Under Hassan Rouhani, the regime’s 
eliminatory anti-Zionism still plays a crucial role in the formulation of its 
foreign policy. 
What distinguishes the Iranian regime from other despotisms 
conditioned by Islam, and makes it especially dangerous, is the 
combination of a revolutionary-activist Islamism centered on belief in the 
Mahdi, the state-driven effort to obtain the technology for weapons of mass 
destruction, and a radical anti-Zionism shared by all currents within the 
regime. The Mahdi is the hidden Twelfth Shi’ite Imam who, it is believed, 
will one day return. Under the Iranian Constitution, it is he, rather than the 
Supreme Leader, who is the head of state in Iran.1 Vilayat-e Faqih, 
“guardianship of the Islamic Jurists” is intended through puritanical terror 
within and the export of the Islamic revolution abroad, to pave the way for 
his return. 
The regime that has ruled Iran since 1979 openly proclaims its 
religious-ideological goal of world rule. Proving the existence of this claim 
does not require sophisticated critical techniques. A brief look at the 
explicit content of the writings of the regime’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, is quite enough2 Moreover, his successor and current holder of 
the office of Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who has described Israel as a 
“cancerous tumor that should be cut and will be cut”3, has also made clear 
statements in this respect.4 
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The regime’s antisemitism – expressed in traditional Jew-hatred, a 
worldview based on conspiracy theories and projection, Holocaust denial 
and relativization, and hatred of the Jewish state – is routinely downplayed 
in scholarly and political discussions.5 Breaking with this practice, it will 
here be argued that the constant threats to annihilate Israel and the denial or 
relativization of the Shoah are essential elements of the regime, that 
Khomeini already espoused traditional Jew-hatred, and that conspiracy 
theories and projection are structural features of the ideology of the Iranian 
rulers. Against this background, we will address the questions of whether 
there have been any substantial changes under the new Iranian president 
Hassan Rouhani and what role the regime’s antisemitic ideology plays in 
the formulation of its foreign policy. Finally, some recent statements by 
leading figures in the regime will be discussed in relation to the 
negotiations over the Iranian nuclear and missile programs that took place 
at Vienna’s Theodor Herzl Square until July 14th 2015. 
TRADITIONAL ANTISEMITISM AND ELIMINATORY ANTI-ZIONISM 
For the Iranian dictatorship, the Middle Eastern conflict is not about 
improving the lot of the Palestinians, a two-state solution, or any kind of 
agreement or compromise, but explicitly about destroying Israel. This 
position is neither new nor confined to particular Presidents or officials. 
The destruction of Israel has been the official policy of the Islamic 
Republic since 1979. It is advocated not only by the fanatical supporters of 
ex-President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, but also by conservatives and those 
Mullahs and Ayatollahs that the West treats as pragmatists, moderates or 
reformists.  In 1997 Ali Khamenei proclaimed in an address to the 
Revolutionary Guards that Israel would be expunged from the pages of 
history. In a meeting with Sheikh Yassin, he assured the then leader of 
Hamas that Iran would “not recognize this cancerous ulcer for a single 
hour”.6 In Iran, the slogan “death to Israel” has since 1979 been a staple of 
Islamist state propaganda and has been daubed at military parades on 
missiles that are already capable of reaching Tel Aviv. Wahied Wahdat-
Hagh has aptly described the program of the Iranian regime as “eliminatory 
anti-Zionism”.7 
In order to deny the antisemitic character of the Iranian regime, much 
is often made of the still existing Jewish community in Iran. Admittedly, 
the Jews in Iran are not currently suffering the kind of systematic 
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persecution meted out to, for example, the Baha’i.8 However, this line of 
argument consciously downplays the fact that the small Iranian Jewish 
community faces systematic discrimination and has no choice but to 
constantly dissociate itself from Israel.9 
Khomeini was not only hostile to the Jewish state, but openly 
proclaimed his enmity towards the Jews. He considered Islam to have been 
at war with them since its inception. In a classic case of projection of his 
own megalomania, Khomeini believed himself engaged in a struggle 
against an unfolding plan for Jewish world domination about which he had 
already fantasized in his central text, Islamic Government, a collection of 
lectures that he gave while in exile in Iraq in the 1970s. “We must protect 
and make the people aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are 
opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish 
domination throughout the world”10 Elsewhere he asserts: 
“And as you see the Jews have grasped the world with both hands and are 
devouring it with an insatiable appetite, they are devouring America and have 
now turned their attention to Iran and still they are not satisfied [. . .]”11 
A major role in the spread of antisemitism in Iran has been played by 
the Persian translation of the antisemitic screed, The Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion. First published in 1978, large print runs of several new 
editions have since been issued by official Iranian bodies, sometimes with 
modified titles such as The Protocols of the Jewish Leaders for the 
Domination of the World.12 This modified title is in itself enough to show 
that the sporadic efforts by the Iranian leadership to draw a sharper 
distinction between Jews and Zionists have had little effect. Moreover, 
when Iranian propaganda talks about “Zionists” it almost always associates 
the term with the conspiracy theories characteristic of traditional 
antisemitism against Jews. In the Iranian regime’s ideology and 
propaganda, Zionism is attacked not as an everyday political opponent, but 
as the root cause of virtually all the world’s problems, whose destruction 
would pave the way to salvation.13 
Virtually all the topoi of modern antisemitism can be demonstrated in 
the Iranian Islamists’ ideology, in particular the glorification of a 
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concretely transfigured, organic, authentic, destiny-fulfilling and 
harmonious community seen as the opposite of a chaotic-abstract, 
alienated, rotten, artificial, immoral, materialist, conflict-ridden and, in the 
last analysis, Jew-associated social model. Ulrike Marz places special stress 
on the resentful anti-capitalism of Islamist ideology which has hitherto 
attracted too little attention: “The belief in the possibility of excluding 
exploitation from the capitalist economy and laying the blame for it on an 
enemy of Islam leads the Iranian religious leaders to a critique of 
capitalism that is not only religious, but also antisemitic.”14 While the 
Nazis drew a distinction between “rapacious” [“raffendes”] and 
“productive” [schaffendes] capital and identified the former with the Jews 
and the latter with the Aryan folk community, the Ayatollahs proclaim, as 
the alternative to “parasitic capitalism”, an “Islamic economy” that is only 
“an ethically and morally overlaid variant of capitalism that no more breaks 
with wage labor, exploitation and surplus value than do other ideologies 
that attempt to manage capitalism”.15 
Marz rejects both explanations of Islamic antisemitism based on the 
exegesis of religious texts that find the root of the Jew-hatred of the 20th 
and 21st centuries in Koranic verses, and the “import thesis” according to 
which antisemitism was simply injected into the Islamic world from 
Europe at the start of the 20th century. Instead, she offers an analysis of the 
modern-regressive tendencies in Islamic society itself: in her view, Iranian 
antisemitism draws firstly on “explicitly Islamic attitudes to and 
accusations against the Jews”, secondly on a “specific Iranian social 
context” and thirdly on features borrowed from modern Western 
antisemitism and Islamically reinterpreted.”16 The Iranian Islamists “try to 
combat the crises of modernity with a religiously-referenced construction 
of a collective identity.”17 Marz shows the extent to which the Iranian 
regime’s ideology is a “regressive-modern phenomenon” and Iranian 
Islamist antisemitism a modern ideology that employs an anti-modern 
content and modern means in pursuit of its realization.18 This ideology is 
one of the main reasons for the Ayatollahs to spend billions on fighting 
Israel, and it repeatedly produces overtly antisemitic actions, such as the 
bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), the Jewish 
community center in Buenos Aires, the Argentine capital in 1994. 
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ALL CHANGE WITH ROUHANI? 
Eighty five people were killed and hundreds seriously wounded in the 
AMIA attack, making it one of the bloodiest antisemitic incidents since 
1945. The Argentinian judiciary continues to accuse the Tehran regime and 
Hezbollah of this outrage, and Interpol has issued arrest warrants against 
senior Iranian officials in relation to it. According to Argentinian special 
prosecutor Alberto Nisman, who died, allegedly murdered, at the beginning 
of 2015 and Abolghasem Mesbahi, a former Iranian secret service officer 
who defected in the late 1990’s, the decision to commit this massacre was 
approved by a special committee closely linked to the Iranian regime’s 
Supreme National Security Council. Hassan Rouhani, the victor in the 
Iranian Presidential elections of June 2013 was, as a member of Ali 
Khamenei’s inner circle, at that time the Secretary of the Council. 
According to Nisman, the Special Committee that decided on the 
attack in Argentina  and allegedly also on the murder of Iranian 
oppositionists in Europe also included then President Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani —deemed “moderate” by the West, Secret Services Minister, 
Ali Fallahian (in the 1990’s an official guest at the German secret service 
HQ in Pullach and of the German Chancellery), Foreign Minister Ali 
Akbar Velayati (still active in Khamenei’s inner circle) and – Hassan 
Rouhani. 
Moreover, above and beyond his role in the murder of 85 people in the 
Argentinian capital and numerous Iranian oppositionists in Europe, 
Rouhani is by no means the “man of compromise and reconciliation”19 
depicted in a number of media reports or the “bearded bringer of hope with 
a heart”, portrayed in the German daily newspaper taz.20 
The election of Rouhani has not changed anything essential vis-à-vis 
the constitutional commitments of the Islamic Republic - in which the 
Supreme Leader has, in any case, the final say in all decisive matters - 
neither as regards the anti-Israeli policy nor as regards the effort to achieve 
a nuclear military capability. The only novelty is the employment of a new 
tactic for the pursuit of these goals: Rouhani favors a more restrained 
rhetoric than his predecessor. 
After Rouhani’s election, the commander of the paramilitary Basij, 
Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, once again proclaimed the 
approaching end of Israel21 and the announcement by Pasdaran leader 
Mohammad Ali Jafari, that the Jewish state would face “imminent 
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destruction” if the USA and France were to intervene militarily in Syria,22 
once again made the antisemitic logic of the Iranian regime crystal clear to 
everyone – and was, like previous such statements, shrugged off. In 2013, 
2014 and 2015 Rouhani, like his predecessors, attended the annual military 
parade in which banners in front of the proudly displayed Shahab-3 
missiles carried the message that Israel must “cease to exist”. In July 2014, 
again like his predecessors, he took part in Tehran in Al-Quds Day, on 
which, at Khomeini’s behest, demonstrations calling for the destruction of 
the Jewish state have been held throughout the world at the end of 
Ramadan since 1979. For Rouhani, as for every other representative of the 
Iranian regime, Israel is “an old wound that has been sitting on the body of 
the Islamic world”23, “a miserable country,”24 and a “festering tumor”.25 
Rouhani stands for a change of tactics, not of strategy. The goals 
remain the same, but the rhetoric has changed from that employed during 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Even were Rouhani prepared to adopt a more 
moderate approach to some issues, the dominant position of the Supreme 
Leader, the influence of figures such as Chief Justice Sadegh Larijani, and 
the power of the Revolutionary Guard — which increased massively under 
Ahmadinejad and exercises wide-ranging control over the nuclear and 
missile programs — would prevent him from getting his way. 
PRAGMATISM AND “STRATEGIC VISION” 
Time and again, the question arises as to what role the antisemitic 
ideology and hatred of Israel play in the Iranian regime’s political decision-
making. The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy has from the outset been 
characterized by equal measures of pragmatism and destructive 
irrationality, and this has enabled Western observers to continually 
downplay the significance of the latter — the destructive fantasies towards 
Israel — by reference to the former. In fact, however, as Menashri puts it, 
“Iran’s attitude to Israel [has been] one of the rare examples of adherence 
to dogma.”26 
On the one hand, the commitment to a “revolutionary foreign policy” 
is inscribed in the Islamic Republic’s Constitution. The Iranian 
Constitution, following the conception of the Iranian Islamists, is meant to 
apply beyond the borders of Iran. If it is to remain true to the letter of its 
own Constitution, the regime is obliged consistently to pursue an activist 
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foreign policy based exclusively on the dictates of revolutionary political 
Islam. 
On the other hand, in order to achieve the best possible balance 
between ideology and pragmatism, the requirement to obey even the 
Supreme Leader has been explicitly lifted precisely as regards discussions 
about foreign policy issues. The results can be seen in the publications of 
Iranian think-tanks such as the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies, 
in which, within the framework of the Islamic Republic’s ideology, sharply 
contrasting positions on international political questions are sometimes 
expressed.27 
Representatives of the Realist school of International Relations, refer 
to the concept of Realpolitik, and conclude from this that it should be 
possible to pragmatically integrate the Iranian regime into an international 
or at least regional security architecture. Such conclusions overlook the fact 
that the Ayatollahs have seized every opportunity to expand their sphere of 
influence, and they also ignore the fact that, as regards the threat to Israel, 
pragmatism can have no meaning for Tehran other than waiting for the 
right moment to go on the offensive. 
When Khomeini took power in 1979 in Iran, he took a purist view of 
foreign policy, the thrust of which was documented by one of his first 
prominent visitors, Yasser Arafat, who, in a festive ceremony, was given 
the keys to the former Israeli Embassy in Tehran after many future 
Pasdaran officers had received their initial military training in PLO camps 
in southern Lebanon. If Khomeini had had his wish, his credo that his 
Islamic revolution was neither “western nor eastern”, e.g. neither capitalist 
nor socialist but some kind of an Islamic “third way”, would have been 
applied to the foreign policy of the newly established Islamic Republic. 
However, even a fanatic like Khomeini had to yield to the facts of the 
situation facing the regime in the first decade of its existence. While he still 
lived, the regime established good economic ties with several West 
European states, notably West Germany28 and Austria,29 and close relations 
with one of the most important “eastern” countries, the People’s Republic 
of China. A decisive role in developing the pragmatic response to the 
existential threats to the regime – which involved no change in the hostility 
to Israel and the USA - was played by two politicians who still today play a 
crucial part in determining Iran’s destiny: the then President Khamenei and 
his successor Rafsanjani.30 
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In the current situation, many observers are once again pondering the 
question of how far political pragmatism might affect the revolutionary 
goal and whether maslahat – expediency over and above any ideological 
principles or goals – a principle that the Iranian Islamists have always 
recognized, will ever entail a renunciation of eliminatory anti-Zionism as 
part of the basic core of the regime’s ideology. 
Even a mainstream German-Austrian Iran expert such as Walter Posch 
accepts that there is no chance of this. When it comes to Israel self-interest, 
maslahat only means that the Islamic republic is currently not looking for 
an all-out war with the Jewish state but prefers to support its proxies, like 
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West-Bank, with 
weapons and billions of Dollars. Maslahat means “not defeating ideology, 
but at most restricting its scope.”31 Moreover, Posch clearly explains what 
the core of this ideology is: a “strategic vision” based on the “paradigm of 
the illegitimacy of the state of Israel.”32 In another article Posch points out 
that the recent noises about Iran having the same right as other countries to 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy cannot hide the original aim of the 
nuclear program. In the early 1990s the argument was quite openly 
advanced that, “nuclear weapons are necessary in order to wipe Israel off 
the map. Such arguments were even put forward by political figures now 
advocating a moderate approach.”33 
However, this understanding has not prevented Posch from proposing 
that the West work with the very same figures who have presented the “end 
of Israel” as a strategic goal. In particular, he advocates the establishment 
of relations with that very “Iranian think-tank scene” in which such 
strategic visions of destruction are expressed in the sober language of 
international relations analysis. So, the acceptance by the West of the 
“moderate, constructive foreign policy”34 that Posch thinks the Iranian 
regime could adopt would also mean the acceptance of the “strategic 
vision” of the destruction of Israel and “paradigm of the illegitimacy of the 
Jewish state” as legitimate positions in international politics. 
RESTABILIZATION OF THE REGIME - REFORMED HOLOCAUST DENIAL 
Internally, the Islamic Republic is marked by the existence of parallel 
state and “revolutionary” institutions, organized in the form of competing, 
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gang-like factions. However, the antisemitic and conspiracy-theorizing 
worldview and the threats of destruction against Israel, shared by all 
factions of the regime, play a decisive and indeed necessary role in 
integrating the hostile gangs and the factional fight is not only over who is 
to get the biggest share of the pie, but also over who can best advance the 
program of eliminatory anti-Zionism. 
In the original and for a long time operational conception of the 
Islamic Republic, the Supreme Leader ruled over the factions and mediated 
between them. The “Prince of the Believers” — as one of the many titles 
held by the Leader describes him — embodies the awareness that, as 
Khomeini once put it, the regime needs two wings in order to achieve its 
goals and would be in danger of falling if one of them were simply to be 
cut off. 
This conception was called into question by Khamenei’s clear and 
early support for Ahmadinejad during the 2009 electoral farce. Since 
Rouhani’s election, it has once again become operational. One expression 
of this restoration has been the composition of Rouhani’s government. In 
choosing his ministers, Rouhani took into account the wishes of almost all 
the factions to create a kind of grand coalition in order to broaden the base 
of the regime and so strengthen it for the prospective annihilation effort. 
Admittedly, supporters of Ahmadinejad and his longstanding spiritual 
mentor and political promoter Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who has declared 
that “the Jews are the most corrupt in the world,. . . the most seditious 
group among all human beings and they will not leave Muslims alone until 
they destroy Islam”35, are not represented in Rouhani’s cabinet. However, 
the fact that Khamenei has appointed Ahmadinejad a member of the 
influential Expediency Council shows that even this faction, which stands 
for an especially radical interpretation of the Mahdi doctrine, will continue 
to play a role. 
The struggle for official positions and influence between the spiritual, 
political, and military leaderships, the Revolutionary Guards, Secret 
Services and economic elites, and the Larijani brothers, the Khamenei 
circle and the Rafsanjani clan has calmed down a bit under Rouhani. The 
various factions must now pay somewhat more heed to the overall interests 
of the regime. However, the interest groups have not disappeared and 
further such conflicts are inevitable, particularly in relation to efforts to 
contain the power of the Revolutionary Guards. 
Immediately after the election of Rouhani, the Guards, the very name 
of whose “Quds Unit” expresses the goal of all their efforts, made it clear 
that they would not let their efforts be impeded. A Pasdaran general, 
Massoud Jazayeri, not only informed the USA and the “Zionist forces in 
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the region” that they were within the action radius of the Iranian regime, 
but also that “the major policies of the Islamic Republic would not be 
affected by nuclear talks or negotiations about other issues”.36 
Nonetheless, Khamenei himself is now clearly determined to rein in 
the Pasdaran’s power somewhat, following speculation during 
Ahmadinejad’s term of office about whether the Guards, who had been 
extending their control over ever widening spheres of economic and 
political life, really needed the clergy any more and whether the theocracy 
might turn into an open military dictatorship. As a result, there are only 
three Pasdaran ministers in Rouhani’s government whereas over half of the 
members of Ahmadinejad’s first cabinet were recruited from the 
Revolutionary Guards or Basiji. However, this shift has nothing to do with 
some kind of wind of moderation. It represents merely a shift between 
power centers, in this case towards the traditional security apparatus, which 
is in competition with the Pasdaran, and in particular in favor of the 
VEVAK security service, which is more strongly represented in Rouhani’s 
government than in any since 1979.37 
The clear, if surprise, winner of the battles over the composition of 
Rouhani’s government is Rafsanjani. Despite unexpectedly being excluded 
from running in the recent presidential election by Khamenei – among 
other things as a punishment for his maneuverings during the protests 
following the 2009 election – the composition of Rouhani’s cabinet, which 
includes numerous Rafsanjani supporters, is a kind of comeback for the 
“Richelieu of Iranian politics”. 
Against all the evidence, Rafsanjani, identified in the 1997 Mykonos 
judgment in Germany as one of the prime movers behind Iranian state 
terrorism in Europe38, was dubbed a “moderate” during his Presidency by 
both the Western media and governments in just the same way as Rouhani, 
who in a sense stepped into Rafsanjani’s shoes after the latter’s exclusion, 
is being now. Rafsanjani’s statement that only a single nuclear bomb would 
be needed to destroy Israel while the Islamic world would only be harmed 
by the anticipated counter-strikes is notorious.39 Less well known is his 
Holocaust denial. 
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According to the Anti-Defamation League, he stated on Iranian radio 
that his personal researches had led him to the conclusion that Hitler had 
murdered only 20,000 Jews.40 
His successor, Mohammed Khatami, a vehement supporter of the 
death penalty for homosexuals41 is still regarded as a shining example of a 
“reformist Islamist” maintained the tradition when he positioned himself as 
one of the most passionate defenders of the French Holocaust denier Roger 
Garaudy.42 The current President wants to tone things down in this respect 
and has developed a kind of “moderate Holocaust denial”: when asked in 
an interview whether he believed the Shoah was a “myth”, Rouhani 
reaffirmed his position as a politician and unable to comment on the 
“dimensions of historic events.”43 
Rafsanjani, who, sidelined during Ahmadinejad’s Presidency, will 
now once again play a role in Iranian politics, has for the past 35 years 
been promoting what even before the 1979 revolution he declared to be the 
sacred duty of all Muslims in his book Israel’il va Qods-e Aziz44: the 
struggle against Israel, for which he was all too keen to gain allies in 
Germany. Not only Ahmadinejad, but also his perennial opponent 
Rafsanjani saw German reunification, which took place at the same time as 
the consolidation of the rule of the Mullahs in Iran following the end of the 
war with Iraq, as the beginning of a new era. According to him, not only 
Germany, but also Iran had suffered decades of Allied domination. The 
breaking of the “strategic alliance between the two countries during the 
Second World War” had enabled the Allies to divide Germany into West 
and East, wrote the pistachio magnate in a preface to a study by the former 
Iranian Ambassador to Germany.45 In Rafsanjani’s view the most important 
development at the end of the Cold War was the restoration of a sovereign 
Germany independent of the victors in the Second World War, which had 
enabled the two countries to restore their “historical ties”. This restoration 
would go further, with a clear end in view: in Posch’s summary, Rafsanjani 
advocates the “strategic goal of Iran, through its nuclear activities, 
achieving nuclear parity with Israel, as a result of which the Muslim world, 
based on its demographic advantage and strategic depth, would finally gain 
the upper hand46 The recent successes of Rouhani’s charm offensive in the 
USA and Europe, which must surely have exceeded even the high hopes of 
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Khamenei and his tacticians, bring the Iranian regime a big step closer to 
the achievement of this “strategic goal”.47 
Under Rouhani, this goal is now being pursued using somewhat more 
moderate rhetoric. However, the position of the key figure in the regime on 
the Holocaust is crystal clear: long before Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial 
caught the world’s attention, Ali Khamenei had described the existence of 
gas chambers in the Second World War as “fairy tales”.48 On Khamenei’s 
official English language webpage one could for years and can to this day 
read about “the myth of the massacre of Jews known as the holocaust”.49 At 
the start of 2014, Khamenei once again questioned the historical reality of 
the Shoah.50 
The 2006 Holocaust denial conference in Tehran was officially 
opened by Manouchehr Mottaki, the pre-predecessor of Rouhani’s current 
Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif. Despite this, Mottaki shortly 
afterwards got a friendly reception from his German and Austrian 
counterparts. Zarif strives for “moderation” in this area too. Nevertheless, 
during his initial charm offensive in the USA he could not bring himself 
simply to reply “yes” to the question of whether he believed the Nazis had 
murdered six million Jews, but resorted repeatedly to the rhetoric of 
“moderate” Holocaust relativization that talks about the Nazis’ “major 
atrocities” to which many Jews also fell victim.51 The essence of this prattle 
was clearly exposed when in September 2013 Zarif announced that “we 
condemn the massacre committed by the Nazis against the Jews and we 
condemn the massacre committed by the Zionists against the 
Palestinians.”52 Absurdly, this was interpreted throughout the world as a 
clear break with Ahmadinejad’s ideas and a generous recognition of Jewish 
suffering, although the statement boils down to nothing more than the 
antisemitic smear that the Israelis are the new Nazis. 
The fact that this “change”, from the pro-active courting of Western 
Holocaust deniers to the equation of the Shoah – reduced to a “massacre” – 
with the state of its survivors and their descendants, was greeted in the 
West as an “important signal”, “major progress”, a “hopeful sign”, etc., 
showed how easy it was going to be for the new-style Iranian regime to 
dazzle Western public opinion while work on decisive components of the 
nuclear and missile programs proceeded almost uninterrupted. The same 
goes for the eager reception of the report, swiftly categorically denied by 
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Fars News, that Rouhani had congratulated the world’s Jews on Rosh 
Hashana in 2013. It is not in fact of much importance whether the greeting 
did or did not in fact come from Rouhani, since, despite the various openly 
anti-Jewish statements by senior regime figures, it was in no way out of 
line with the Islamic Republic’s ideology to send a few friendly words to 
the Jews and such things happened from time to time even under President 
Ahmadinejad. The insistence on the difference between religious Jews who 
are granted the right to live as a discriminated minority in the Umma so 
long as they make clear their hostility to Israel, on the one hand and, on the 
other, Zionists, who are talked about in exactly the same terms employed to 
describe the Jews in traditional antisemitic discourse, is part of the regime’s 
basic ideological equipment – and creates points of contact with sections of 
the anti-Zionist left in Europe and the USA. The extent of the susceptibility 
of parts of this milieu for the friendly face of the Iranian terrorist regime 
became evident when 70% of respondents in a Guardian online poll agreed 
that Rouhani deserved the Nobel Peace Prize for 2013.53 
NEGOTIATING TOWARDS THE BOMB AND REGIME IMMUNITY 
The systematic whitewashing of Rouhani is the precondition for the 
nuclear talks with the Iranian regime that have been ongoing since 2013 
and resulted in 2015, not in a halt to the Iranian nuclear program, but in its 
institutionalization, since its infrastructure would remain more or less 
intact. Immediately after Rouhani’s election, both Brussels and Washington 
indicated a readiness to reach wide-ranging compromises with Khamenei, 
who, a few days before the Geneva talks opened in October 2013, called 
again for the “liberation of Palestine” and identified the “criminal Zionist 
network” as, alongside the USA, the “main enemy”54 and even when the 
talks were under way assailed Israel as an “illegitimate and bastard” 
regime55 — none of which was even mentioned, let alone criticized, by any 
of the participating governments. 
Here we are already up against one of the basic problems of such 
negotiations: almost no one is talking any more about the regime’s 
antisemitic character, a situation about whose implications the historian 
Jeffrey Herf has emphatically warned.56 The negotiations and  the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), announced in July 2015 in 
Vienna, not only lend the Ayatollahs a legitimacy that they lost a long time 
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ago in the eyes of significant layers of the Iranian population, but also 
immunize them against criticism. 
Just one day after the Geneva agreement, in a meeting with the 
Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri, Rouhani inveighed 
against the “artificial regime of Israel”, whose existence was due to 
colonialism and had led to a “redoubling of the problems” in the Middle 
East. “Over the past 65 years, the tracks of the Zionists have been traceable 
in every trouble and problem in the region.”57 Shortly thereafter, the 
Speaker of the Iranian pseudo-Parliament, Ali Larijani, declared Israel to 
be the “modern face of fascist racism.”58 Only days before the 
announcement of the JCPOA Rafsanjani declared, according to the Islamic 
Republic News Agency, that Israel “will be wiped off the map.”59 
Once the Iranian regime had learned that it could strengthen its 
position vis-à-vis the West and in the region with little likelihood of 
criticism from the EU or USA, the momentary cautiousness regarding 
Holocaust denial vanished. Between 29 September and 1 October 2014, the 
Ayatollahs once again gave a platform to the Conspiracy Theorists and 
Antisemites International at the 2nd New Horizon Conference in Tehran. 
Billed as an international meeting of “independent thinkers and 
filmmakers,60 alongside the old school Holocaust deniers, a large 
proportion of the “independently thinking” speakers were 9/11 Truthers. 
Among the participants were the longstanding head of Radio Islam, 
the Swedish-Moroccan Ahmed Rami, who has been found guilty of hate 
speech, and the Italian history professor, Claudio Moffa, openly presented 
on the Conference website like this: “He achieved international fame 
through revisionist statements, in particular by the public denial of the 
Holocaust”61 In 2006, former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke had been a 
guest in Tehran. Now the regime could celebrate the appearance of Medea 
Benjamin, co-founder of Code Pink and a key activist in the American 
“peace” and BDS movement. From France came former Front National 
member, Olivier Lemoine, who has lately been active in smaller far-right 
organizations. Before the conference, according to the Anti-Defamation 
League (ADL), the participation of the antisemitic comedian and activist 
Dieudonné M’bala M’bala was announced. However, on the website, only 
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the names of cartoonist Joe le Corbeau, presented as “closely related” to 
Dieudonné62, and Holocaust denier Maria Poumier, who took part in the 
film L’antisémite produced by Dieudonné with the support of the Iranian 
Institute of Cinema, were to be found. 
One of the topics raised at the conference was the supposed Zionist 
subjection of Germany. Manuel Ochsenreiter, active over the past two 
decades as a writer, editor and interviewer for a variety of German far-right 
publications, was there to explain about the “Israeli lobby in Germany”. 
Ochsenreiter has for many years been identified as an intermediary 
between the German-language far-right scene and the Iranian regime and in 
particular the Lebanese Hezbollah. 
Senior government officials attended the conference. Saeed Jalili, an 
unsuccessful candidate in the 2013 Presidential election as well as a former 
chief negotiator for the nuclear program and Secretary of the Supreme 
National Security Council, took part as did Alaeddin Borojerdi, the current 
President of the Iranian pseudo-Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee 
and Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the regime’s longstanding representative at the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. 
The difference from the 2006 Holocaust denial conference is striking. 
While the earlier event drew condemnation from almost the entire world 
and attracted a great deal of media attention, the only noteworthy protest in 
the age of Rouhani came from ADL Director, Abraham Foxman. In 
October 2013, Rouhani had taken care to prevent such a conference 
happening shortly after his assumption of office. Back then it would have 
hindered the charm offensive against the West. Now, however, the Iranian 
regime has clearly ceased to feel the need for such caution. 
CONCLUSION 
As regards the conspiracy-theorizing and projective worldview, 
Holocaust denial and relativization, and the Iranian regime’s threats to 
destroy Israel, nothing substantial has changed under Rouhani, nor have 
things improved in other relevant areas. The regime still spends billions to 
support and arm the sworn enemies of Israel like Hezbollah, and it will be 
able to spend much more money for the fight against Israel if the sanctions 
are lifted according to the JPCOA. The key figure in the regime, Ali 
Khamenei, has repeatedly threatened Israel’s destruction e.g., on 9 
November 2014, the anniversary of “Kristallnacht”,63 and most recently in 
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his book Palestine, published in 2015. This book again clearly highlights 
the centrality of the desire for the destruction of Israel for the Iranian 
regime. The annihilation of the Jewish state, which Khamenei again calls 
“a cancerous tumor”64, is not mere rhetoric from the early times of the 
revolution, but a non-negotiable doctrine. There are still voices in the West 
like British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond who see in Iran a “more 
nuanced approach” to Israel after the JPCOA.65 He got his answer directly 
from Hussein Sheikholeslam, foreign affairs adviser to Ali Larijani, who 
declared: “Our positions against the usurper Zionist regime have not 
changed at all. Israel should be annihilated and this is our ultimate 
slogan.”66 Also Seyed Mahmoud Nabavi, a representative of Ali Khamenei, 
and Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham openly contradicted 
Hammond’s  assertion.67 
In other relevant areas the situation in Iran has not only not improved 
under Rouhani but to the contrary further deteriorated compared to 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency: The number of executions has dramatically 
increased since Rouhani’s inauguration.68 The death penalty for 
homosexuality continues to be implemented. Oppositionists and religious 
minorities such as the Baha’i are being persecuted just as mercilessly as in 
previous years. The alliance with the Lebanese terrorist militia, Hezbollah, 
remains intact, that with the radical Islamists of Hamas has been restored69 
and the rulers in Tehran can now proudly announce that they dominate the 
politics of four Arab capitals: Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Sanaa. 
For Khamenei’s nuclear drive, Hassan Rouhani is the right man in the 
right place at the right time. For the West he is a comforting excuse for not 
taking any serious action against the Iranian regime. In Israel, the response 
to Rouhani’s election and the course of the nuclear negotiations with the 
JCPOA as its result has stimulated discussion about how the Jewish state 
should now prepare itself to act independently, if necessary, to stop Iran 
getting nuclear weapons. The JCPOA was not only strongly criticized by 
the current Netanyahu government, but by all important political 
mainstream parties in Israel, e.g. by Yair Lapid from the liberal Yesh Atid 
party and by Eitan Cabel and Jitzhak Herzog of the center left Zionist 
Union. It is widely discussed in Israel what would be the best way of 
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dealing with the Iranian threat now and in the future, but the warnings 
against any appeasement towards the Iranian regime are almost unanimous. 
Also, former high-ranking security officials who criticized Netanyahu for 
the way he handled the Iran issue do not preclude a military option for the 
future. Notwithstanding the controversial discussion in Israel about how to 
react to the Iranian threat, almost all mainstream politicians in Israel act on 
the assumption that nuclear weapons would not only help the Ayatollahs to 
stay in power but would be an existential threat to Israel even if Teheran 
might not have the intention to immediately use them against the Jewish 
state.70 
 
*Stephan Grigat is visiting professor for Israel Studies at the Moses Mendelssohn 
Center for European-Jewish Studies, University of Potsdam/Center for Jewish 
Studies Berlin-Brandenburg, lecturer for Political Science at University of Vienna 
and co-founder of Stop the Bomb campaign. 
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Islamic Jihadism and the Legacy of Nazi 
Antisemitism 
David Patterson* 
This article argues that the central tenets of National Socialist antisemitism are 
reflected in antisemitism that defines Jihadist ideology. Like Nazis, Jihadists 
ideologues embrace a totalitarian worldview dividing humanity into good and 
evil, with the Jew as the primary, unredeemable evil. Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid 
Qutb, and Haj Amin al-Husseini are examined. Drawing largely on Mein 
Kampf the article outlines the Jihadist strategy of using propaganda in order to 
incite Jew hatred and to promote fanaticism demonstrating that the Jihadist 
hatred of the “Zionist entity” has nothing to do with the occupation; rather, it is 
a religious hatred of evil itself, which takes “Zion” to be a base of operations 
for the Jewish domination of the world: the Jews must be destroyed for the 
sake of all humanity. 
The last words to come from the hand of Adolf Hitler as he prepared 
for his suicide were a plea to humanity to continue to “resist mercilessly the 
poisoner of all nations, international Jewry.”1 Numerous groups have 
heeded the Führer’s dying words, from the North America’s Aryan Nations 
to the British Nationalist Front, from Russia’s Pamyat Nazi Party to the 
International Stormfront; Wikipedia, in fact, lists eighty-seven such 
organizations.2 The most systematic, most pervasive, most violent response 
to the call of the Führer, however, has come from the Islamic Jihadists. No 
other groups bent on the extermination of the Jews are so heavily armed or 
so generously funded, often receiving support from Islamic governments. 
Where and how did this bond between Nazi antisemitism and Islamic 
Jihadism arise? And what does it tell us about the extent to which Jihadist 
antisemitism represents a further development of Nazi antisemitism? 
 
 1. Quoted in David Welch, Hitler (London: UCL Press, 1998), 97. 
 2. List of Neo-Nazi Organizations, Wikipedia.org, accessed September 6, 2015, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_neo-Nazi_organizations. 
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EARLY INFLUENCES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPAGANDA 
From the time he founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, Hasan al-
Banna, author of “On Jihad,”3 professed his admiration of Adolf Hitler.4 
During the 1930’s he sent delegations to the Nuremberg rallies,5 and in 
October 1938 the Brotherhood organized the Parliamentary Conference for 
Arab and Muslim Countries in Cairo, where they distributed Arabic 
translations of Mein Kampf and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Al-
Banna indicated that he had learned a great deal from the Führer about the 
importance and methods of propaganda.6 Both for the Nazis and for the 
Islamic Jihadists, the aim of propaganda was neither to inform nor to 
persuade but, in the words of Hitler, to “reimplant the spirit of proud self-
reliance, manly defiance, and wrathful hatred.”7 In keeping with the aim of 
implanting wrathful hatred, Hitler understood deception to be an important 
part of any propaganda campaign, insisting that “something of the most 
insolent lie will always remain and stick.”8 The Nazis were masters of “the 
most insolent lie,” accusing the Jews of everything from the age-old Blood 
Libel to secretly plotting to take over the world. And the Jihadists repeat 
the Nazi lies. 
Learning well his lessons from the Nazis, al-Banna “gave careful 
thought to all the details of a far-flung propaganda campaign,”9 and in 1935 
he organized the Muslim Brotherhood’s first propaganda committee.10 
Slogans extolling the Nazis were part of the propaganda that the 
Brotherhood spread during the Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936 – 1939, an 
uprising not only incited by the Mufti of Jerusalem and future Nazi activist 
Haj Amin al-Husseini,11 but also supported by arms and money from the 
 
 3. See Hasan al-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna: A Selection from the 
Majmuat Rasail al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna, trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), 133-61. 
 4. See, for example, ibid., 97. 
 5. Matthias Küntzel, Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11, 
trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 30. 
 6. Ibid., 45-46. 
 7. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1971), 632. 
 8. Ibid., 232. 
 9. Christina Phelps Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), 152. 
 10. Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 55. 
 11. Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim 
Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1. 
 
2015] ISLAMIC JIHADISM AND ANTISEMITISM 191 
Nazis.12 The Brotherhood’s insolent lies about the Jews found a receptive 
audience among the Arab Muslims, many of whom applauded the Nazi 
agenda. During those years, for example, there was a musical refrain that 
floated about the Middle East: “Bala Misou, bala Mister, bissama Allah, 
oria alard Hitler (No more monsieur, No more Mister, in heaven Allah, on 
earth Hitler).”13 The Arab Revolt as promoted by Haj Amin al-Husseini, 
notes Matthias Küntzel, 
took place against the background of the swastika: Arab leaflets and signs on 
walls were prominently marked with this Nazi symbol; youth 
organizations. . .paraded as ‘Nazi-scouts,’ and Arab children greeted each 
other with the Nazi salute.14 
A JIHADIST TIE TO THE NAZIS: HAJ AMIN AL-HUSSEINI 
In March 1933 al-Husseini had his first meeting with Nazi General 
Consul Heinrich Wolff in Jerusalem. While cultivating his contacts with 
the Germans, he established connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
when he met with Abdul Rahman al-Banna, brother of Hasan al-Banna, 
who went to Jerusalem to set up an alliance with the Mufti in 1935. On 2 
October 1937 al-Husseini met with Adolf Eichmann and Herbert Hagen; 
Eichmann “reported that ‘Nazi flags fly in Palestine, and they adorn their 
houses with Swastikas and portraits of Hitler.’”15 Days later, wanted for 
inciting insurrection against the British Mandate, the Mufti fled to 
Lebanon. Two years later he set up his base of operations in Baghdad and 
was on the payroll of the Nazis until the end of the war. Once the war was 
underway, he joined with Rashid Ali al-Gaylani to lead a Nazi-backed 
takeover of the Iraqi government on 1 April 1941. By 31 May the British 
had suppressed the coup, but not before al-Husseini issued a fatwa 
announcing a jihad against Britain and the Jews.16 On 28 November 1941 
the Mufti met with Adolf Hitler, who assured him that the Nazis and the 
Arabs were engaged in the same struggle to exterminate the Jews.17 By 
January 1942 al-Husseini was recruiting Muslims to serve in SS killing 
 
 12. Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (New Haven, CT: Yale 
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 13. Raoul Aglion, The Fighting French (New York: Holt, 1943), 217.  
 14. Matthias Küntzel, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World,” 
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 15. Chuck Morse, The Nazi Connection to Islamic Terrorism (New York: iUniverse, 
2003), 46.  
 16. Joseph B. Schechtman, The Mufti and the Fuehrer: The Rise and Fall of Haj Amin 
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units, the most infamous of which was the Handschar Division of 21,065 
men.18 
Although Gilbert Achcar claims that “the number of books” about al-
Husseini “is altogether disproportionate to his historical importance,”19 he 
nevertheless notes the Mufti’s ideological affinity with the Nazis as 
evidenced in a speech that the Mufti delivered on 2 November 1943. There 
al-Husseini declared that the Jews’ inherent traits “make them incapable of 
keeping faith with anyone or of mixing with any other nation: they live, 
rather, as parasites among peoples, suck their blood, steal their property, 
pervert their moralsFalse Germany is also struggling against the common 
foe who oppressed Arabs and Muhammadans in their different countries. It 
has clearly recognized the Jews for what they are and resolved to find a 
definitive solution for the Jewish danger that will eliminate the scourge that 
the Jews represent in the world.”20 On 21 January 1944 al-Husseini began 
his radio broadcasts for that year by declaring, “National Socialist Germany 
is fighting world Jewry. The Koran says, ‘You will find that the Jews are 
the worst enemies of the Moslems.’ There are also considerable similarities 
between Islamic principles and those of National Socialism.”21 Klaus 
Gensicke lists seven principles that the Mufti identified as ideological 
affinities between the Nazis and the Jihadists: (1) the oneness of leadership 
embodied in the Führerprinzip, (2) the rule of power and the insistence 
upon obedience, (3) the primacy of battle and waging war, (4) the 
unification of the Volk or the umma, (5) the importance of family and the 
proper indoctrination of children, (6) hatred of the Jews, and (7) the virtues 
of hard work and creativity.22 
On 1 March 1944, in one of his Nazi propaganda broadcasts to the 
Arab world, al-Husseini enjoined Muslims to “kill the Jews wherever you 
find them. This pleases God.”23 After the war ended, now a wanted Nazi 
war criminal, he turned up in Egypt on 20 June 1946, where he received a 
hero’s welcome. Ten days later the Muslim Brotherhood publicly extolled 
al-Husseini, declaring, “The Arab hero and symbol of Al Jihad and 
patience and struggle is here in Egypt.”24 Soon he had his first official 
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meeting with al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, the man who would become the 
most influential of the Jihadist ideologues; now allied with Hitler’s 
Grossmufti, the Brotherhood would continue “the same struggle that Hitler 
and Germany—and Husseini himself—had been waging during the war.”25 
SYSTEMATIZING JIHADIST IDEOLOGY: SAYYID QUTB 
The writings of Sayyid Qutb reflect both parallels and likely 
influences of Nazi thinking. Central to both Nazi and Jihadist Jew hatred is 
the principle that the Jew is an invisible enemy of humanity, an “invisible 
wirepuller,”26 Hitler puts it, as invisible—as metaphysical—as Satan. Here 
we have two essential ties between the antisemitism of the Nazis and the 
antisemitism of Islamic Jihadists such as Qutb: (1) the promulgation of the 
lie that the Jews are secretly, invisibly plotting to take over the world 
through their invisible control over the banks, media, and power centers, 
and (2) the Jews embody the invisible, insidious essence of evil itself. The 
point is not that the Jews’ actions are evil but that they are themselves the 
source of all evil actions. Qutb even accused Jews of secretly installing 
Zionists operatives in the highest echelons of Muslim regimes that he did 
not deem Muslim enough.27 Reiterating numerous declarations from Hitler, 
Qutb averred that the aim of international world Jewry is to “eliminate all 
limitations, especially the limitations imposed by faith and religion, so that 
the Jews may penetrate into the body politic of the whole world and then 
may be free to perpetuate their evil designs.”28 The final solution to such a 
threat? The Islamic domination of the world—hence the absolute need for 
worldwide jihad. 
The second point that the Jihadists such as Qutb draw from the 
Nazis—namely that that the Jew not only commits evil but embodies the 
essence of evil and is therefore beyond remission—is equally crucial to an 
understanding of Islamic Jihadism and the legacy of Nazi antisemitism. 
Here one must consider the category of race in Nazi thinking. More than a 
biological or anthropological category, the notion of “race” in Nazi 
ideology is rooted not just in color or physiognomy, but in a concept of 
essence: it is a metaphysical category that fuses body and soul, biology and 
being, into one. The concept has a name: it is Rassenseele or “race-soul.” 
Explaining the meaning of Rassenseele, Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg 
 
 25. Ibid., 244. 
 26. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 493. 
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writes, “Soul means race viewed from within.”29 If race may be viewed 
from within, then it is not reducible to any outward manifestation such as 
skin tones or hair texture; rather it is conceptual. This concept, says 
Rosenberg, “departs from the single but completely decisive avowal. . . that 
blood and character, race and soul are merely different designations for the 
same entity.”30 If character and soul are in the blood, then so is a way of 
thinking; the German Geist is “poisoned by Judaism,” says Rosenberg, and 
not just by Jewish blood, as the –ism is in the blood.31 Hence the Jewish 
threat to humanity “would not be altered,” Rosenberg explains, “if the Jew 
denied the Talmud, because the national character, which remains the 
same, would continue to represent an equally inflexible, dogmatic 
viewpoint.”32 
Cultivating their alliance with the Arabs, the Nazis were careful to 
insist that their antisemitism was specifically Jew hatred, and did not 
include Arabs. In November 1942, for example, the New York Times 
reported that a Berlin foreign ministry spokesman took “great pains” to 
assure the Arabs, “We have never said the Arabs were an inferior race. On 
the contrary, we have always pointed out the glorious historic past of the 
Arab people.”33 What made the Arabs’ past glorious, in the eyes of Nazi 
thinkers such as Professor Dr. Sturmbannführer Johannes von Leers, was 
the Jew hatred that manifested itself in the Arabs’ present, as we see from 
his essay “Judaism and Islam as Opposites,” in which he cites al-Husseini 
with great admiration.34 There he underscores the fact that “the Quran is 
full of warnings about the Jews, who are bluntly called ‘Satans’ [see 4:55, 
4:60, 58:14-19, and 98:6]” and affirms that the present age owes “a great 
debt” to the Muslims for battling and exposing the Jews for what they are.35 
Here both a distinction and a parallel between the Nazis and the 
Jihadists must be noted. While the Nazis were indeed racists, their 
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ideological stance toward the Jews was not reducible to a racist position. 
Falling outside the array of human races, the Jews were the source of 
contamination and corruption of all races; they do not constitute a race any 
more than Satan may be said to belong to a race. Hence, Emil Fackenheim 
argues, the Nazis were not antisemites because they were racists; rather, 
they were racists because they were antisemites.36 As for the Jihadists, 
Qutb insists that Islam rejects all distinctions based on race or class, 
asserting that “only Islam has the distinction of basing the fundamental 
binding relationship in its society on belief” alone.37 Indeed, he blames the 
Jews and Judaism for bringing “racial arrogance” into the world.38 What 
the Jihadists inherit from the Nazis, then, is not race theory but an 
essentialist antisemitism, which leads to an exterminationist antisemitism. 
Developing the Nazi theme that the Jews embody the essence of evil, 
Qutb maintained that “Jews as Jews were by nature determined to fight 
Allah’s Truth and sow corruption and confusion,”39 that the Jews’ “passion 
to control others” was a “driving force in their national character,”40 and 
that “the deeper cause of the Jewish hatred of Islam was the malevolent 
Jewish nature.”41 This malevolence applies to the Jewish state. Like the 
Nazis, who understood the Jewish evil to lie in the Jewish essence, Qutb’s 
Jihadist followers set out “not simply to morally delegitimize Israel as a 
Jewish State and a national entity in the Middle East, but to dehumanize 
Judaism and the Jewish people as such.”42 Once demonized, the Jew is 
dehumanized and cannot be accorded the same possibility of conversion 
that is open to the rest of humanity, any more than one can convert the 
Devil. 
THE ATTENDANT FANATICISM 
Thus we glimpse the roots of fanatic antisemitism, both Nazi and 
Jihadist. “The greatness of every mighty organization,” writes Hitler, “lies 
in the religious fanaticism and intolerance with which, fanatically 
convinced of its own right, it intolerantly imposes its will against all 
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others.”43 This fanatic imposition of one’s own will upon all others is the 
mark both of Nazi and of Jihadist totalitarianism. Just as Hitler declared 
that he was “acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator,”44 
so al-Husseini cried out, “Slaughter Jews wherever you find them! Their 
spilled blood pleases Allah,”45 and the Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini 
insisted, “Islam says: Kill in the service of Allah.”46 Kill whom? Kill the 
Jews. Following the diatribes of Qutb (whose writings he translated into 
Farsi), the Ayatollah writes, “From the very beginning, the historical 
movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who 
first established anti-Islamic propaganda.”47 Thus Islam must “make people 
aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very 
foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout 
the world.”48 The war against the Jews, whether Nazi or Jihadist, then, is a 
holy war that can end only in victory or death. It is not for nothing that in 
his introduction to the Arabic edition of Mein Kampf, the translator Luis al-
Haj describes Hitler’s “struggle” as a jihad,49 which is holy. There is no 
surrender, no negotiation, no compromise in a holy war. 
The holy war against the Jews is waged against an enemy who is evil 
incarnate, who is therefore other than human, and who requires 
extermination. The Jew is “an ape,” says Hitler,50 echoing the teaching 
from the Quran (5:60). “The whole existence of [the Jews],” he adds, “is 
based on a continuous lie,”51 also calling to mind verses in the Quran 
claiming that the Jews falsified Scripture and history to suit their own ends 
(2:59; 3:78). Therefore to wage a holy war against the Jews is to wage war 
for the sake of the truth. Indeed, Qutb deemed the Jews the “falsifiers of 
Divine Truth,”52 so that for anyone who loves the truth and hates the lie, 
Jew hatred is a mark of righteousness: killing Jews—killing evil and lies—
is a holy act pleasing to Allah. As the champions of divine truth, Islamic 
Jihadists must wage war against the Jews, who by definition are committed 
 
 43. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 351; emphasis added. 
 44. Ibid., 65. 
 45. Tom Knowlton, “Nazi Roots of Modern Radical Islam,” accessed September 6, 
2015, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/816232/posts.  
 46. Quoted in Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism 
(Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), 242. 
 47. Ruhullah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam 
Khomeini (1941 – 1980), trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 27. 
 48. Ibid., 127. 
 49. Luis al-Haj, introduction to Kafaahi, by Adolf Hitler, trans. Luis Al-Haj (Beirut: 
Dar Baysan, 1963), 6. 
 50. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 302. 
 51. Ibid., 307. 
 52. Quoted in Nettler, Past Trials and Present Tribulations, 7; emphasis added. 
 
2015] ISLAMIC JIHADISM AND ANTISEMITISM 197 
to lies. As in the case of the Nazis, the Jihadists’ holy war against the Jews 
has nothing to do with politics or territory, a point made by Salafist Sheikh 
Muhammad Hussein Yaqoub in an Egyptian television broadcast on 17 
January 2009: 
If the Jews left Palestine to us, would we start loving them? 
Absolutely not. The Jews are infidels—not because I say so. . . but 
because. . . Allah who said that they are infidelsFalse They are enemies not 
because they occupied Palestine. They would have been enemies even if 
they did not occupy a thingFalse Our fighting with the Jews is eternal. . ., 
until not a single Jew remains on the face of the earth. As for you Jews, the 
Curse of Allah upon you, you pigs of the earth!”53 
Here we discover that the Jihadists are not antisemites because they 
are anti-Zionists; rather, they are anti-Zionists because they are 
antisemites—another trait that they share with the Nazis. 
NAZI AND JIHADIST ANTI-ZIONISM 
In 1921 Alfred Rosenberg published his diatribe Der staatsfeindliche 
Zionismus (Zionism: Enemy of the State), in which he argued that Zionism 
is a Jewish strategy for world domination. Francis Nicosia describes 
Rosenberg’s Der staatsfeindliche Zionismus as “a major contribution to the 
National Socialist position on Zionism” that would continue to shape 
Hitler’s views of the movement.54 Rosenberg’s theories, says Nicosia, 
“demonstrate a fundamental ideological hostility and incompatibility 
between National Socialism and a Zionist movement that was considered to 
be merely an instrument of a monolithic Jewish world conspiracyFalse 
Nevertheless, it appears that Rosenberg did recognize from the beginning 
the utility of encouraging the Zionist movement in Germany as a means of 
facilitating the removal of Germany’s Jewish population.”55 The policy 
here, it must be noted, was strictly utilitarian, as Nicosia indicates; 
ideologically, the Zionist movement posed an existential threat to the 
Nazis, as it did to the Jihadists. Therefore neither the Nazis nor the Jihadists 
could accept that Zionists’ stated aim of seeking not just a homeland but 
also a haven for the Jewish people in a world that itself posed and 
existential threat to them. Given the antisemites’ premise that the Jew is not 
threatened but rather poses the threat, the ultimate outcome can only be the 
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extermination of the Jews, even if their removal to Zion might be 
acceptable as a stopgap measure. While perhaps temporarily acceptable to 
the Nazis, such a measure was from the very beginning quite unacceptable 
to the Jihadists. 
As though writing the script for Islamic Jihadists, in Mein Kampf 
Hitler asserts, “While the Zionists try to make the rest of the world believe 
that the national consciousness of the Jew finds its satisfaction in the 
creation of a Palestinian state, the Jews again slyly dupe the dumb Goyim. 
It doesn’t even enter their heads to build up a Jewish state in Palestine for 
the purpose of living there; all they want is a central organization for their 
international world swindle.”56 Therefore, “the Jewish state is completely 
unlimited as to territory.”57 The measures taken to oppose the Jewish state 
must be equally unlimited. Nazi and Jihadist anti-Zionist antisemitism 
represents a radical perversion of the most ancient, most fundamental 
evil—murder—into the highest good that, at least among the Jihadists, 
brings with it the highest reward. In the Jihadist appropriation of God, not 
only is the prohibition against murder eliminated—it is twisted into a 
commandment to murder, for the sake of an entry into paradise. Jewish 
blood is the Jihadist’s ticket to Paradise, as preached by Islamic Jihadist 
ideologue Abdullah Azzam,58 something that one does not find among the 
Nazis. 
Repeating the Nazis’ representation of the Zionist movement, Sayyid 
Qutb viewed the Jewish state as just a small part of a “universal Zionist 
conspiracy; indeed, like Hitler, he took Marxism and Zionism to be part of 
a single conspiracy.”59 A familiar image employed by Nazi propagandists 
to illustrate the Zionist threat shows an octopus with its deadly tentacles 
wrapped around the entire globe and a Star of David inscribed on its head. 
The same image can be found among many of the Jihadist illustrations of 
“world Zionism.”60 This image of world Jewry as something monstrous 
finds its way into many Jihadist texts and documents. When in December 
1948 the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in Egypt, for example, al-Banna 
blamed International Zionism.61 In 1950 Islamic scholar Abd al-Rahman 
Sami Ismat wrote, “The Jews and Zionism are like an evil tree. Its root is in 
New York, its branches all over the world, its leaves the Jews—all of them, 
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old and young, male and female, without exception, are its thorny leaves 
and poisoned thorns, and the poison is swift and deadly.”62 Years later 
Hezbollah’s Al-Manar broadcast system would repeatedly depict “the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a key part of a larger effort to halt the 
‘cancer’ of Zionism.”63 Similarly, Article Thirty-Two of the Hamas Charter 
of Allah states, “After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile 
to the Euphrates.” And: “Their plan is embodied in the ‘Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion.’” And: “The Islamic Resistance Movement considers itself 
to be the spearhead of the struggle with world Zionism.”64 Article Twenty-
Two, in fact, states that the Jews are behind every calamity that has 
befallen humanity.65 The Jihadist struggle, therefore, is for the sake of 
humanity and is carried out in the name of Allah. 
THE ASCENT TO THE THRONE OF DIVINE JUDGMENT 
The Nazis’ claims about the Jews’ desire to plunge the world into war, 
their plotting to take over the world, and so on are all too familiar. In the 
Jihadist discourse, one finds a parallel in the allegations that the Jews have 
an exterminationist agenda toward the Arabs, that they are behind the 9/11 
attacks, that they seek to conquer the world, and that they are consumers of 
blood. How does this last accusation constitute a projection of Jihadist aims 
onto the Jews? On 28 November 1971, Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfi al-
Tal was assassinated by the Palestinian group Black September in front of 
Cairo’s Sheraton Hotel. One of the assassins went over, bent down, and 
licked his victim’s blood.66 And in February 2006 Hamas produced a video 
of a homicide bomber’s final testimony to the world, in which he declared, 
“My message to the loathed Jews is that there is no god but Allah [and] we 
will chase you everywhere! We are a nation that drinks blood, and we 
know that there is no blood better than the blood of Jews. We will not leave 
you alone until we have quenched our thirst with your blood, and our 
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children’s thirst with your blood.”67 This most radical appropriation of the 
soul of the other person—the soul that is in the blood—is characteristic of 
the Jihadists’ radical appropriation of God, as they assume the throne of 
divine judgment. 
Jihadism not only legitimizes spilling Jewish blood—it sanctifies it. 
This undermining of the divine, absolute prohibition against murder is very 
often a defining feature of antisemitism, inasmuch as the antisemite’s 
project, whether Nazi or Jihadist, is often to be as God, not only knowing 
but determining good and evil. According to the Jewish teaching that both 
the Nazi and the Jihadist antisemite would obliterate, we are to read the 
Ten Commandments not from top to bottom but from right to left (in 
Hebrew): “I am God” means “Thou shalt not murder” (see, for example, 
the Midrash Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Bachodesh 8). Because the Jews 
have been singled out for the task of unmasking false gods, the desire to be 
as God is a desire to kill the Jews, which is the deepest desire of the 
antisemite. The dynamic of Jew hatred, moreover, works in two directions, 
with each fueling the other: in order to ascend to the divine throne of 
judgment, one must eliminate the divine prohibition against murder, and in 
order to eliminate the divine prohibition, one must eclipse, appropriate, or 
otherwise eliminate God. The elimination of God amounts to the 
elimination of any absolute limiting principle that might curb one’s actions. 
The crimes of the Nazis, therefore, were not unimaginable but everything 
imaginable, for their actions were limited only by their imagination and 
their will. There was no measure too extreme: it was impossible to go too 
far, to be too brutal, or to murder too many Jews. Just the opposite: the 
principle that guided them in their actions was “Thou shalt murder every 
Jew.” For this reason, as Fackenheim has maintained, murder was not a 
byproduct of National Socialism—it was its very essence.68 Why? Because 
antisemitism was its very essence, as it is the essence of Islamic Jihadism. 
Thus “Jihad and Jew-hatred belong together,” Matthias Küntzel 
observes.69 Elsewhere Küntzel notes another important parallel between 
National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism: “Just like National Socialism was 
propelled by a utopia which advocated salvation through destruction, 
Islamism is propelled forward by a similar utopia. In both cases, it is the 
distorted image of a perceived enemy which provides the perpetrator with 
his own identity. In both cases, the annihilation of evil is considered to be 
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the precondition for the realization of an idealized dream of homogeneity. 
In both cases this evil is projected onto ‘the Jew.’”70 As we have seen, the 
Jihadist resemblance to National Socialism that Küntzel notes is not 
accidental. 
In both instances it is clear that each shares with the other, Nazis and 
Jihadists, an essentially exterminationist Jew hatred. Robert Wistrich sums 
up very well a crucial point to be made about Islamic Jihadism and the 
legacy of Nazi antisemitism: 
The Muslim fundamentalists—like the Nazis before and during the Shoah—
rant against the ‘anonymous powers’ of globalization and the plutocratic 
WestFalse They (falsely) claim to speak for frustrated, underprivileged, and 
impoverished masses betrayed by more traditional Arab and Muslim ruling 
elitesFalse Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories lie at the very heart of the Muslim 
fundamentalist and Arab nationalist world view today—linking together 
plutocratic finance, international freemasonry, secularism, Zionism, and 
communism as dark occult forces led by the giant octopus of international 
JewryFalse This mythical structure of thought is in many ways virtually 
identical with Nazi anti-SemitismFalse Fundamentalist Islam has the same 
totalitarian, pseudo-messianic aspiration to world hegemony as German 
Nazism.71 
And so the pattern of modern—or perhaps anti-modern—antisemitism 
repeats itself. Eclipsing God, the Nazis eclipsed the absolute obligation 
imposed from beyond, so that the will from within posed the only limits to 
their actions. Appropriating God, the Jihadists appropriate the authority to 
impose from beyond what they have determined to be the will of Allah, 
which is not a matter of human will but an absolute obligation. What makes 
the Jihadist embrace of the Nazi legacy an embrace of antisemitism—and 
not just an affirmation of fascism or totalitarianism—is this appropriation 
of God, as when Hamas, for example, deems its charter to be the Charter of 
Allah or when Hezbollah declares itself to be a “‘clearinghouse for 
mankind,’ where those who will be admitted into paradise are separated 
from those destined for hell.”72 For the elimination of God through such an 
appropriation is in the end a defining feature of antisemitism itself, at least 
in its religious, political, and ideological manifestations. Because the Jews 
are the most ancient, most enduring witnesses of the first utterance at 
Mount Sinai—”I am God” (Exodus 20:2)—the Jihadist who would ascend 
to the throne of God must eliminate the Jews. There lies the key to the 
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Old and New in the  
Palestinian Holocaust Public Discourse 
Esther Webman* 
On the eve of Holocaust Memorial Day (April 2014) Palestinian President 
Mahmoud ʻAbbas called the Holocaust “the most heinous crime” in modern 
history. This paper examines attitudes toward the Holocaust in Palestinian 
public discourse.  ʻAbbas’ reflects a new approach in Palestinian and Arab 
public discourse in response to international and regional developments and 
has yet to receive attention by Israeli and Jewish leaders. Mainstream 
Palestinian public discourse acknowledges the Holocaust but continues to 
challenge its uniqueness and scope, and to de-legitimize Israel and Zionism. 
On the eve of Israel’s Holocaust Memorial Day in April 2014, 
Palestinian President Mahmoud ʻAbbas (Abu Mazin) released an 
unprecedented statement calling the Holocaust “the most heinous crime” in 
modern history. He “expressed his sympathy with the families of the 
victims and many other innocent people who were killed by the Nazis.” 
The Holocaust, he went on, “is a reflection of the concept of ethnic 
discrimination and racism which the Palestinians strongly reject and act 
against,” urging the Israeli government to use “the incredibly sad 
commemoration of Holocaust day” to take the chance to find a “just and 
comprehensive” peace with his people, based on a two-state solution.1 
This was the first public official reference to the Holocaust by a 
Palestinian or Arab leader, which acknowledged the Holocaust for what it 
is, but tied it to other deeds of the Nazi regime. The statement was met by a 
sour official Israeli reaction that interpreted Abu Mazin’s move as an 
instrumentalist attempt to soothe criticism against the unity deal he had 
reached with his Islamist rival Hamas a few days earlier.2 ʻAbbas’ 
statement is not new and reflects a trend — a new approach — in 
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Palestinian and Arab public discourse on the Holocaust, that has emerged 
since the mid-1990s in response to international and regional 
developments, but has not received due attention, especially by Israeli and 
Jewish leaders. Despite the setbacks it suffered due to the lingering peace 
process, the Palestinian intifada in the early years of the 21st century, and 
the upheavals of the “Arab Spring” since 2011, this new approach seems to 
be gaining - momentum. 
This paper seeks to highlight divergent attitudes to the Holocaust in 
Palestinian public discourse, which has “indigenized” the Holocaust and its 
terminology, either for the reconstruction of Palestinian national identity or 
for the demonization and de-legitimization of Israel. Expanding 
consciousness of the Holocaust and studies worldwide have proved to 
create a double-edged result. On the one hand, the Holocaust has been 
turned into a yardstick of all evil, and its memory and lessons are revered 
by the international community; and, on the other hand, its symbols and 
terminology are increasingly inverted and used against the state of Israel. 
TRADITIONAL ARAB APPROACH TO THE HOLOCAUST 
The traditional Arab approach toward the Holocaust stems from the 
viewpoint that it did not concern the Arabs. It claims that the scene of the 
disaster was Europe, and that the perpetrators of the extermination acts 
were European, but that “the Jewish problem” and its solution were 
exported to the Middle East. Europe relieved its feelings of guilt through 
the establishment of the state of Israel, and the Palestinians were those who 
paid the price. The “price” meant the loss of Palestine and Palestinians 
becoming refugees in their own land or in Arab countries. If it were not for 
the Holocaust, this viewpoint asserts, Israel would not have come to exist. 
The proximity of these two events led to their convergence and the creation 
of a causality relationship between them.3 As a result of this conviction, the 
Palestinians and the Arabs could not separate their attitude toward the 
Holocaust from their attitude and animosity toward Israel and Zionism. 
Resistance to the establishment of Israel as the solution to the “Jewish 
problem” overshadowed their ability and willingness to acknowledge and 
sympathize with the Jewish tragedy. It was an instinctive reaction gradually 
buttressed by ideological, political, and even cultural claims. 
Initial responses to the Holocaust in the immediate years after WWII 
were not monolithic: they underwent a swift change in the course of three 
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years, however, from the end of World War II up to the establishment of 
the state of Israel in 1948, moving from a more empathic and humanitarian 
approach toward the suffering of the Jews and the Holocaust victims, to 
their representation as the major cause of the injustice which befell the 
Palestinians. This shift was the result of the need to obfuscate, deny, justify 
or ignore the Holocaust, which was perceived as the major factor in the 
success of Zionism in luring the international community into accepting the 
establishment of the Jewish state.4 The official response of the Arab League 
to British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin’s announcement of 13 November 
1945, for example, was a case of official implicit or partial denial of the 
Holocaust. The League expressed Arab appreciation of the humanitarian 
desire to help the Jews of Europe and others who had been persecuted 
during the Nazi and Fascist period. Concurrently, it warned of dealing 
“with one case of oppression by perpetrating a new one,” and replacing one 
oppression by another. “Should Zionism attain its goals it would lead to the 
dispossession of the Arabs from their homeland and from their national 
rights,” which is “no less cruel than the oppression of the Jews which the 
world complains about.” Fortunately, it concluded, the victory of the 
democracies over Nazism and Fascism would enable the solution of the 
Jewish problem on a democratic basis and permit the return of the 
persecuted Jews to their homelands from which they had been expelled by 
Nazi and Fascist fanatic actions.5 Thus the fate of the Jews was reduced to 
mere expulsion from their homeland, something even less serious than the 
anticipated dispossession of the Palestinian Arabs. Moreover, the statement 
cast a certain doubt as to the scope of oppression, which the world 
“complains” about. Both arguments would become central themes in future 
Arab argumentation.6 
Since then, up until the mid-1990’s, the Holocaust was rarely raised as 
an independent subject in Palestinian as well as in general Arab public 
discourse. One possible reason for avoiding the Holocaust was its 
perceived potential to arouse sympathy worldwide, particularly in Europe, 
which had suffered from feelings of guilt since the end of the war with the 
unfolding horrors that had been perpetrated against the Jews. There was a 
genuine fear that acknowledging the Holocaust would contradict the 
recognition of the Palestinian right for self-determination and might lessen 
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the public’s sympathy for, or identification with, the Palestinian cause. 
Zionism and Israel were accused of using the Holocaust and exploiting the 
world’s sympathy to achieve their goals, which led the Arabs to ignore it, 
deny it, or instrumentalize it in their struggle against them. Even Arab 
intellectuals, who assailed Nazism, did not admit or denounce the Nazi 
genocide against the Jews, instead charging Zionism of cynically using the 
Holocaust or inventing it as a means of financial and psychological 
extortion. This process intensified as the Holocaust assumed an increasing 
central role in Israeli and Jewish identity, as well as in western culture. 
Moreover, the Jewish tragedy was conflated with the suffering of the 
Palestinians. An al-Ahram editorial, for example, wondered if anyone 
could imagine a time in which the Jews, “who had been subjected for 
generations to harshest oppressions and tyrannies”, would do the same to 
others. The Zionist efforts to dislodge people from their homes and 
disperse them “constitute the same disaster (ma’asa), which the Jews had 
experienced.” The whole world, it went on, denounced the German Aryan 
racism that had shed human blood, particularly that of the Jews. Why then 
did Zionism seek to operate as the Germans did and implement such 
methods in Palestine, which would lead to the perdition (fana’) of a people, 
its deportation and destruction?7 Palestinians, who are often represented as 
the Holocaust’s true victims, seemed to be competing with the Jews for the 
status of victimhood.8 There was no room left for accommodating the 
suffering of “the other.” Yet, there is another possible explanation for the 
avoidance of the Holocaust. Historical evidence shows that Arab 
intellectuals were aware of the extent of the horrors, but might have been 
constrained by emerging official attitudes from representing them fully. 
Politics, history, and memory were reflected in Arab literature. The subject 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict captivated Arab writers and they had no qualms 
about using antisemitic motifs in the portrayal of Jews and Zionists,9 but 
references to the Holocaust were rare. Under such conditions, the lack of 
Arab literary interest in the Holocaust seems obvious and almost inevitable. 
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This basic anti-Zionist stance determined attitudes toward the 
Holocaust, as towards antisemitism in general.10 Hence, the Palestinian/
Arab Holocaust discourse developed in the shadow of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as part and parcel of a broader anti-Zionist and antisemitic 
discourse. Discussion of the Holocaust always revolved around its political 
ramifications, and the flow of information about the Holocaust was 
deliberately limited after the establishment of the state of Israel, leading to 
a great deal of ignorance. Few Arab studies had focused on the Holocaust-
an exception was  Mahmud Abbas Abu Mazin’s notorious linking of 
Zionism to Nazism.11 Based on his 1982 doctoral dissertation, submitted to 
Moscow’s Oriental Institute, the alleged conspiracy “showed” Zionist-Nazi 
collaboration to destroy European Jewry. 
In his Introduction ‘Abbas argues that the number of Jewish victims 
was considerably lower than historians have previously reported and cites 
French Holocaust-denier Robert Faurisson as well as the Canadian denier 
Roger DeLorme, dismising the gas chambers as a “myth,” .12 The fact that 
the writer is a prominent Palestinian leader naturally attracted more 
attention to his work, and was perceived as an official Palestinian position. 
The Holocaust was frequently invoked, explicitly or implicitly, in the 
writings on and discussions of historical and political issues, such as the 
Jewish history and the Jewish problem, the Palestine problem, and the 
Zionist enterprise. There existed a correlation between the narratives, 
which evolved around those issues, and certain motifs of Holocaust 
representation. The context affected the nature of the reference to the 
Holocaust. For example, justification emerged as a major motif in the 
debate about Jewish history and Nazi atrocities,13 whereas in the discussion 
of the Palestine problem the Jewish tragedy was conflated with the 
Palestinian nakba, and the attitude of the Jews toward Palestinians was 
compared and equated to the Nazi behavior toward Jews.14 
A NEW APPROACH EMERGES 
The collapse of the Soviet Block in the early 1990s and its impact on 
world affairs, including the Middle East; the emergence of the notion of a 
new world order; the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian accords in 1993, and 
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the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement: all these provided grounds for 
a revision of the Arab traditional approach towards the Jewish Holocaust 
among liberal Arab intellectuals. Criticizing prevailing Arab perceptions of 
the Holocaust, they called for the unequivocal recognition of the suffering 
of the Jewish people, which eventually would lead to the recognition of the 
Palestinian tragedy by the Israelis and facilitate reconciliation and 
coexistence between the two peoples. This new discourse marked a 
significant turning point in the Arab discussion of the Holocaust, by 
expanding its dimensions and legitimizing diverse views. Despite its 
relative limited number of propagators, this approach brought about a 
change in the representation of the Holocaust even among its opponents. It 
diversified the mainstream discourse, while increasingly confining denial to 
Islamists, who adamantly continued to oppose any kind of reconciliation 
with the Jewish state. The starting point of the discourse is the 
acknowledgement of the Holocaust as a horrible historical fact, albeit 
without relinquishing other persistent themes, such as relativization and 
minimization of the Holocaust, equation of Zionism with Nazism, and the 
accusation of Zionist collaboration with the Nazis. 
Although there were few Arab intellectuals and activists, such as 
Israeli author and communist activist Emile Habibi and Palestinian 
Christian theologian Naim Stifan Ateek, who spoke of the Jewish tragedy 
recognizing its occurrence and its importance to the Jews before the 
1990s,15 only the debate triggered in 1997, by Arab intellectuals living in 
the West and closely familiar with its culture, aroused a wide-range 
reaction. Most prominent among them were the late Palestinian and 
Professor for Comparative English Literature, Edward Said, and liberal 
Lebanese writer and editor of al-Hayat daily, Hazim Saghiya. They both 
challenged the notion that “the Holocaust does not concern us.” Saghiya 
contended in his book Defending Peace that this notion resulted from a 
limited understanding of European history and modernity, laziness, lack of 
curiosity and a certain degree of opportunism. He accused the Palestinians 
of concentrating on the adverse political dimensions of the Jewish tragedy, 
and failing to identify with the human aspect of the Jewish tragedy or show 
any sympathy.16 The Arabs, claimed Saghiya, could surely not be blamed 
for the Holocaust but as members of the international community, they 
should not exclude themselves from responsibility for the calamity. In 
order to understand western and world sympathy toward Israel, the Arabs 
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should try to understand the Holocaust, he insisted, and should show more 
sensitivity and understanding of the Jewish tragedy in order to gain 
worldwide respect and sympathy for the Palestinian tragedy. Mutual 
sensitivity would help overcome the barriers on the road to peace.17 
Edward Said as well linked the Arab attitude toward the Holocaust to 
his general view of the Arab political and social situation. “The history of 
the modern Arab world – with all its political failures, its human rights 
abuses, its stunning military incompetence, its decreasing production, the 
fact that, alone of all modern peoples, we have receded in democratic and 
technological and scientific development – is disfigured by a whole series 
of outmoded and discredited ideas, of which the notion that the Jews never 
suffered and that the Holocaust is an obfuscatory confection created by the 
elders of Zion is one that is acquiring too much, far too much, currency,” 
he explained.18 Said called for an act of comprehension that “guarantees 
one’s humanity and resolve that such a catastrophe should never be 
forgotten and never again recur.” Seeking bases for coexistence, he claimed 
that a link exists between what happened to the Jews in World War II and 
the catastrophe of the Palestinian people, and unless this connection was 
recognized there would be no foundation for coexistence. He insisted that 
he did not attach conditions to the comprehension of and compassion for 
the Jewish tragedy; however, he believed that “such an advance in 
consciousness by Arabs ought to be met by an equal willingness for 
compassion and comprehension on the part of the Israelis and Israel’s 
supporters.”19 The recognition of the realities of the Holocaust, he added, 
does not constitute “a blank check for Israelis to abuse us, but as a sign of 
our humanity, our ability to understand history, our requirement that our 
suffering be mutually acknowledged.”20 
The motif of mutual recognition of the Jewish and the Palestinian 
tragedies as a paramount element in any reconciliation between the two 
peoples is central to this approach. It was even formally expressed in the 
official Palestinian People’s Appeal on the 50th anniversary of the nakba 
published in May 1998, which stated that “while we extend a 
compassionable recognition of the unspeakable Jewish suffering during the 
horror of the holocaust [sic], we find it unconscionable that the suffering of 
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18, 28, 1997, December 18, 1997.  
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 19. Al-Hayat, November 5, 1997; al-Ahram Weekly, November 6, 1997; Ha’aretz, 
February, 20, 1998; Le Monde Diplomatique, August-September 1998. 
 20. Al-Ahram Weekly, June 25, 1998; al-Hayat, June 30, 1998.   
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our people be denied or even rationalized.”21 A historical reconciliation 
does not only mean recognition of past suffering and its importance to the 
collective memory of each people but requires the creation of a new 
narrative which takes into account the histories of both peoples, and 
necessitates the assimilation of the history of each other and of their 
respective tragedies.22 
Another dominant theme in this approach is the universalization of the 
Holocaust. The lessons from the Holocaust, contended Saghiya and 
Tunisian writer Salih Bashir in al-Hayat, became universal moral values 
that serve as a bulwark for democracies against the threats of 
fundamentalism, extremism and racism, which target Jews and Muslims 
alike. The increasing recognition of the Holocaust’s significance, the 
expansion of sphere of memory, and the participation of other peoples in it, 
point to the expropriation of the Holocaust from its limited Jewish 
possession, and its assuming a meaning and a message for all humanity. 
Only this broader perception of the Holocaust by the Jews accompanied by 
a similar recognition the Palestinian rights “will be tantamount to an 
infringement of the sanctity of the Holocaust, which has become a 
yardstick for universalistic values.”23 
The new Arab approach gradually gained the support of additional 
Arab intellectuals and writers, and evoked intensive debates on the 
Holocaust in the Arab press. The acknowledgment of the occurrence of the 
Holocaust is gradually infiltrating into the mainstream Arab discourse, 
although this does not necessarily entail the acknowledgement of its 
dimensions, uniqueness and meaning. The controversy over the issue of the 
Holocaust as a unique Jewish experience versus its universalistic meaning 
has continued unabated. As the corollary of the process of the 
universalization of its memory by the international community such beliefs 
are simply not accepted in Muslim nations.24 
CONFLICTING TRENDS IN THE PALESTINIAN HOLOCAUST DISCOURSE 
The new approach has also ushered in a counter-reaction and a spate 
of new publications dealing with Holocaust denial. Such was the case with 
Jordanian-Palestinian Islamist Ibrahim ‘Allush’s ideological embrace of 
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Holocaust denial.25 ‘Allush, who returned to Jordan after thirteen years in 
the US, continued to claim that the acknowledgment of the Holocaust is an 
acknowledgment of its uniqueness as a Jewish tragedy that diminishes the 
Palestinian one, and that constitutes recognition of Israel’s right to exist. 
His view reflects the general Islamist approach to the Holocaust and to any 
reconciliation with the Jewish state.26 American-based Palestinian scholar, 
Joseph Massad, who does not deny the Holocaust, considered the Arab 
discourse of denial as a submission “to the Zionization of the Holocaust 
and to its appropriation by Israeli propagandists for their own purposes.”27 
In a similar vein, the new approach was criticized for failing to mention the 
Palestinian suffering and explicitly call for a mutual recognition.28 The 
centrality of Holocaust denial in the Arab discourse was manifested in two 
events in 2001 – a cancelled conference of western revisionists in Beirut, 
and an Arab forum on historical revisionism, which took place in May in 
Amman. 
A conference on “Revisionism and Zionism,” co-sponsored by the 
California-based Institute of Historical Review (IHR), the leading 
Holocaust denial organization in the world and by the Swiss-based Truth 
and Justice Association, was scheduled to be held between March 31 and 
April 3, 2001, in the Lebanese capital, Beirut. Jorgen Graf, the founder of 
Truth and Justice who fled to Iran to avoid a 15-month prison sentence, 
was a driving force in its organization. The conference was cancelled due 
to the intervention of the American State Department with the Lebanese 
government at the Beginning of March, as a result of the pressure exerted 
by Jewish organizations. If it had materialized, it would have been the first 
such conference in the Middle East.29 
The cancellation of the conference aroused a bitter controversy which 
culminated in an initiative to hold an alternative conference in Amman. A 
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group of Arab intellectuals led by Ibrahim ‘Allush, a member of the 
Jordanian Writers Association (JWA), decided to organize a special 
meeting in Amman to discuss “what happened to the Revisionist historians’ 
conference in Beirut?” The meeting, which was postponed twice due to the 
intervention of Jordanian security authorities, took place at last on 13 May 
to coincide with the commemoration of the Palestinian nakba, in 
cooperation with the Association against Zionism and Racism (AZAR). In 
contrast to the Beirut conference where all the speakers were to have been 
western Holocaust revisionists, the principal participants in the Amman 
conference were Arab journalists and members of anti-normalization 
professional associations. They sought first and foremost to demonstrate 
opposition to the intellectuals who had called for the cancellation of the 
Beirut conference. The two main speakers were Amman-based Lebanese 
journalist Hayat ‘Atiyya and Jordanian journalist ‘Arafat Hijjazi. ‘Atiyya, 
who appeared two days later in an al-Jazira talk show dealing with the 
question “Is Zionism worse than Nazism?,” emphasized in her talk the 
alleged parallels between Zionism and Nazism and argued that historical 
revisionism is not an ideology but a well-documented research project. 
Hijjazi dealt with aspects of Holocaust denial, reiterating the notion of 
Jewish exploitation of the Holocaust, the exaggeration of the number of 
Jews exterminated, and challenging the existence of gas chambers.30 
The outbreak of al-Aqsa intifada at the end of September 2000, the 
stalling peace negotiations, and the growing antagonism between Israelis 
and Palestinians curtailed the continued development of the new approach. 
Crude Holocaust denial re-emerged as a means for delegitimizing Israel 
and Zionism, along with motifs that had typified the discourse of the early 
years of the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as regret that Hitler had not finished 
the job. Jarir al-Qidwa, an education adviser to Yasir ‘Arafat, stated that 
claims that Jews were murdered in the Holocaust are “all lies and 
unfounded claims” to evoke sympathy from the world. There was “no 
Dachau, no Auschwitz. [They] were disinfecting sites,” he concluded.31 
Similarly, a history lecturer at the Islamic University in Gaza, ‘Isam 
Sisalim, considered to be an expert on Jews and Judaism, reasserted in the 
Palestinian TV program “Pages from our History,” on  November 29, 2000, 
that “No Chelmo, no Dachau, no Auschwitz! [They] were disinfecting 
sites.” He accused the Jews of inventing the lie of extermination in order to 
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justify the establishment of Israel, a “foreign entity, implanted as a cancer” 
in the Arab land. “They always portrayed themselves as victims, and they 
made a Center for Heroism and Holocaust. Whose heroism? Holocaust? 
Heroism is our nation’s, the holocaust was against our people. . .We were 
the victims, but we shall not remain victims forever.”32 PA semi-official 
paper al-Hayat al-Jadida, for example, published on 13 April 2001 an 
article by Khayri Mansur, “marketing ashes,” in which he raised several 
recurring themes of Holocaust denial: the claim of political and economic 
exploitation by Zionist propaganda, the deflated number of the 
exterminated Jews, and the lack of scientific evidence on the use of gas.33 
References to the Holocaust seem to increase, especially in times of 
crises and Israeli-Palestinian encroachments, such as operation “Cast Lead” 
in 2008-9, “Protective Edge” in 2012, and “Pillars of Defense” in 2014 in 
Gaza.34 Social networks and catchy caricatures play an important role in 
reinforcing the major themes of the traditional Arab representation of the 
Holocaust. Among these are the denial and trivialization of the Holocaust, 
the equation of the Palestinian tragedy with the Holocaust, the equation of 
Jewish/Zionist ideology and policies with Nazi racist ideology and deeds, 
and the accusation of Zionist instrumentalization of the Holocaust. 
International Holocaust Remembrance Day also serves as an occasion to 
refer to the Holocaust in the press and in the social networks, revealing a 
blend of denial and ignorance.35 
But voices propagating the new approach did not disappear, and their 
impact was reflected in statements, by Arabs visiting Auschwitz and 
Holocaust Museums, and by Arab scholars participating in conferences 
dealing with the Holocaust. Jordan’s Prince Hasan Bin Talal, brother of the 
late King Husayn, was among the special guests invited to a ceremony 
marking the rededication of the lone remaining synagogue in the Polish 
town of Oswiecem in September 2000.36 Palestinian scholar Ghasan 
‘Abdallah visited Yad Vashem twice in 1999 and 2000,37 and other 
Palestinian scholars discussed the Holocaust from a Palestinian perspective 
in different academic forums. Nadim Rouhana, an Israeli Arab scholar, 
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participated along with other Muslims in the “Third World Views of the 
Holocaust” conference which took place in Boston in April 2001; 
Palestinian activist Ata Qaymari presented a paper on in the Palestinian 
perspective at a conference held in Cyprus in 2004. The conference, co-
sponsored by the Yakar Center for Social Concern, the Palestinian Center 
for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development 
(Panorama), and the Truman Institute at the Hebrew University, brought 
together 16 Israeli and Palestinian academics and journalists to discuss 
shared histories. US-based Palestinian scholar Saliba Sarsar also wrote a 
paper on the Holocaust and the Nakba in cooperation with Dan Bar-On.38 
The event that symbolizes, more than any other, the acceptance of the 
Holocaust for what it is was the trip to the concentration camps of 
Auschwitz-Birkenau in May 26-30, 2003, by a group of 250 Israeli Arabs 
and Jews and a group of Muslims, Christians and Jews from France, in 
defiance of significant criticism, particularly by Israeli Arabs.39 The trip 
was initiated by Christian Arab educator Father Emile Shoufani, who 
launched a campaign “memory for peace” to learn “the Jewish pain” and 
“the origins of anxiety” which determined the Israelis’ attitude toward the 
‘other,’ in order to share the pain and eventually pave the way for better 
understanding and coexistence. Realizing the significance of the Holocaust 
in the Israeli psyche, he believed that “the memory of the Holocaust is the 
key for reopening the dialogue” between the Palestinians and the Israelis, 
which had been severed due to the intifada.40 
Shoufani rejected any linkage between his will to share the Jewish 
pain and the acknowledgement of the Palestinian suffering, insisting that 
the act of compassion is unilateral in order to “break the cycle of give and 
take that proved to be a vicious circle.”41 Similarly, Palestinian activist Ata 
Qaymari suggested that the Palestinians learn not to mix their anger against 
occupation with a human reaction to the suffering of the other. “Such an 
attitude will help Jews not only overcome their trauma, but also to identify 
with the three forms of the Palestinian agony, namely, racial 
discrimination, occupation and exile.”42 
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CONCLUSION 
Upon becoming the Palestinian Authority’s Prime Minister in 2003 
and in line with the new approach, Mahmud ‘Abbas, (whose Ph.D. 
dissertation accused Zionism of collaborating with Nazism and contested 
the number of Jewish victims) retracted his thesis’ assumptions, in an 
interview with Israeli daily Ha’aretz admitting that “the Holocaust was a 
terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish nation that could not be 
denied.” He reiterated this view in his concluding statement at the end of 
the Aqaba summit between him and Israeli PM Sharon on 4 June 2003,43 
but only this year did he dare to declare his view explicitly to his own 
people. 
The responses to his statement in the Arab media were diverse. There 
were those who supported his approach but most of them qualified that 
support. An editorial in a pan-Arab daily agreed with ʻAbbas, despite what 
it termed “the Holocaust industry”. Several talkbacks called to separate the 
Palestinian problem and the Holocaust, yet accused “international Zionism” 
of inflating it and turning it into a myth. Egyptian paper Al-Masry al-Youm 
chose to emphasize, in an article by Muhammad Kassab, the controversies 
in the Arab discourse on the Holocaust over the veracity of the event and 
its exploitation by Israel for plundering Germany and the western countries, 
while the oppressive acts of the ‘Chosen People’ against the Palestinians 
continued. Kassab quoted the late Egyptian intellectual ʻAbd al-Wahhab al-
Masiri, considered an expert on the Holocaust, who claimed that Israel is 
using the Holocaust and forces Europe to support her, while blackmailing it 
politically and economically. Al-Quds al-ʻArabi’s editorial on April 27, 
titled “ʻAbbas and the Holocaust industry”, approved of  ʻAbbas’ approach 
but at  the same time accused Israel of turning the Holocaust memory into 
an industry which justified the oppression of the Palestinians.44 A post in a 
Palestinian site by Jamal ʻAbd al-Nasir Muhammad Abu al-Nahl on April 
28 repeated similar allegations, adding that the Zionist enemy is the “real 
Nazi,” and the “Palestinian people is [sic] being burnt in the fire of the 
Zionist occupier.”45 A pro-Hamas site, on the other hand, criticized ʻAbbas 
on April 28, in an article by Fayiz Abu Shamala, agreeing with Netanyahu 
that he should choose between Palestinian conciliation and appeasement of 
Israel. It claimed  Holocaust denial was of little concern but that Israel was 
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“the Holocaust of the Palestinians,” as per Hamas spokesman Sami Abu 
Zahra.46 
In the second decade of the 21th century, it seems that the taboo on the 
Holocaust has been partly lifted. Calls for original Arab research and for 
spreading knowledge of the Holocaust, Arabs admitting visiting the death 
camps, Yad Vashem and the Washington Holocaust Museum (USHMM) 
are a far cry from the ban on information of the past. Mainstream 
Palestinian and Arab discourse accepts the occurrence of the Holocaust, but 
it continues to challenge its uniqueness and scope while de-legitimizing 
Israel and Zionism, and while the major themes of the traditional Arab 
representation of the Holocaust still prevail. 
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